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Theory and Empirical Analysis
Wan-Schwin Allen Cheng
Clearinghouses insure trades. Acting as a central counterparty (CCP), clearinghouses con-
solidate financial exposures across multiple institutions, aiding the efficient management of
counterparty credit risk. In this thesis, we study the decision problem faced by for-profit
clearinghouses, focusing on primary economic incentives driving their determination of lay-
ers of loss-absorbing capital. The clearinghouse’s loss-allocation mechanism, referred to as
the default waterfall, governs the allocation and management of counterparty risk. This
stock of loss-absorbing capital typically consists of initial margins, default funds, and the
clearinghouse’s contributed equity.
We separate the overall decision problem into two distinct subproblems and study them
individually. The first is the clearinghouse’s choice of initial margin and clearing fee require-
ments, and the second involves its choice of resources further down the waterfall, namely
the default funds and clearinghouse equity. We solve for the clearinghouse’s equilibrium
choices in both cases explicitly, and address the different economic roles they play in the
clearinghouse’s profit-maximization process.
The models presented in this thesis show, without exception, that clearinghouse choices
should depend not only on the riskiness of the cleared position but also on market and
participants’ characteristics such as default probabilities, fundamental value, and funding
opportunity cost.
Our results have important policy implications. For instance, we predict a counteracting
force that dampens monetary easing enacted via low interest rate policies. When funding
opportunity costs are low, our research shows that clearinghouses employ highly conserva-
tive margin and default funds, which tie up capital and credit. This is supported by the low
interest rate environment following the financial crisis of 2007–08. In addition to low produc-
tivity growth and return on capital, major banks have chosen to accumulate large cash piles
on their balance sheets rather than increase lending. In terms of systemic risk, our empirical
work, joint with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), points to the
possibility of destabilizing loss and margin spirals: in the terminology of Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009), we argue that a major clearinghouse’s behavior is consistent with that of
an uninformed financier and that common shocks to credit quality can lead to tightening
margin constraints.
Contents
List of Figures v
List of Tables vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Market Background and Current Practices 8
3 Discrete Time Margin Theory 14
3.1 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2 Model 1: the baseline version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.1 Model timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.2 Model specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.3 Profit functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3.1 Traders’ equilibrium choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3.2 Clearinghouse’s equilibrium choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3.3 Equilibrium market characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.4 Systemic risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.5 Clearing market inefficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Model 1: the extended version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4.1 The extended model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
i
3.4.2 Equilibrium strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4.3 Legacy equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4.4 New equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4 Continuous Time Margin Theory 61
4.1 Model 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1.1 Traders’ profit functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1.2 Clearinghouse’s profit function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Equilibrium trading choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3 Equilibrium clearinghouse choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3.1 Equilibrium fee choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3.2 Equilibrium margin choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5 Empirical Drivers of Margins 75
5.1 Collateral requirements in theory and in practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.1.1 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.1.2 Empirical Work on Margins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.1.3 Collateral Requirements in the Cleared CDS Market . . . . . . . . . 85
5.2 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2.1 Clearinghouse collateral data: the Part 39 data set . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2.2 CDS positions data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.3 CDS spreads and interest rates data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.4 Account data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2.5 The market during our sample period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3 Do collateral requirements follow a Value-at-Risk rule? . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.3.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
ii
5.3.2 Testing the Value-at-Risk margining rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3.3 Time-series test of the VaR hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3.4 Cross-sectional test of the VaR hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.4 The Determinants of Collateral Requirements: Portfolio Risk and Market
Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.4.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4.2 Margins and Portfolio-specific Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.4.3 Funding Cost, Collateral Rates and other Market Variables . . . . . . 127
5.5 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.5.1 Counterfactual losses and realized returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.5.2 CDS DV01 approximation duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.5.3 Varying risk measurement windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6 Default Funds and Clearinghouse Equity 141
6.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.2 Model 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.2.1 Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.2.2 Clearinghouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.3 Equilibrium solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.3.1 Equilibrium decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.3.2 Comparative statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.4 Welfare and systemic risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.4.1 Equilibrium welfare distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.4.2 Systemic risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.5 Empirical predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.6 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.6.1 Minimum equity requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
iii
6.6.2 Clearing membership policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.6.3 Hidden risks from increasing funding costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Bibliography 176
Appendix
A Proofs for Chapter 3 183
B Auxiliary lemmas and proofs for Chapter 4 223
C Proofs for Chapter 4 225
D Comparative statics computations for Chapter 6 231
E Proofs for Chapter 6 236
iv
List of Figures
1 Graphical demonstration of a default waterfall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Model 1 timeline, baseline version. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 (Normalized) equilibrium clearinghouse choices, exact v.s. approximate. . . . 30
4 Model 1 timeline, extended version. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5 Profit function illustrations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6 The impact of introducing an exchange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7 Prevailing equilibrium for varying θ and ν = λG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8 Maximum expected profit of the clearinghouse as a function of θ = γ for λ = 1. 56
9 Log-log scatter plots of gross notional v.s. the number of contracts (left) or
names traded (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
10 Histogram of margin/notional ratio observations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
11 Histogram of realized return on margins for cleared portfolios. . . . . . . . . 102
12 Histogram for historically simulated return on margins, center of histogram
(left) and zoomed in on left tail (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
13 The ratio of exceptions overtime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
14 Model 3 timeline and type † member evolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
15 Sectioning of the α− γ plane into different pooling equilibria regimes. . . . . 158
16 The exchange’s individual rationality constraint. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
v
17 Sectioning of the α− γ plane. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
vi
List of Tables
1 Descriptive statistics for different account categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2 Time series summary statistics of initial margins over time. . . . . . . . . . . 94
3 Descriptive statistics for (realized) return on margins and test results for the
5-day 99% VaR rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4 Descriptive statistics for historically simulated return on margins and test
results for the 5-day 99% VaR rule, with two-way clustered standard error . 108
5 Test results for M -day VaR rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6 Test results for M -day VaR rules, correcting for autocorrelation. . . . . . . . 113
7 Portfolio and market variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8 Initial margins and portfolio variables summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . 119
9 Initial margins and market variables summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . 120
10 Check for multicollinearity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
11 Regression results for explaining initial margins with portfolio variables . . . 124
12 Regression results for explaining initial margins with portfolio and market
variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
13 Comparing counterfactual losses to realized losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
14 Descriptive statistics for historically simulated return on margins for d = 5
with two-way clustered standard error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
15 Regression results for explaining initial margins with portfolio variables with
last 1000 days of P&L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
vii
16 Regression results for explaining initial margins with portfolio and market
variables with last 1000 days of P&L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
17 Comparative statics for the equilibrium default fund and equity rule. . . . . 162
18 Comparative statics for the equilibrium welfare distributions. . . . . . . . . . 165
19 Comparative statics for the systemic risk measure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
20 Derivatives of the exchange’s revenue function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
21 Comparative statics for the equilibrium default fund. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
22 Comparative statics for the equilibrium equity rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
23 Comparative statics for equilibrium systemic risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
viii
Acknowledgements
I consider myself very fortunate to have met many inspirational individuals who supported
me through my doctoral program(s). I would like to thank my advisor, Agostino Capponi, for
introducing me to central clearing, anchoring my ambitions towards impactful research, and
providing academic perspective. Valuable interactions with Darrell Duffie, Gregory Duffee,
Paul Glasserman, Stefano Giglio, Richard Haynes, Chin-Tsang Jiang, M. Ali Khan, Anton
Korinek, Jayachandran Sethuraman, Sayee Srinivasan, Carey Priebe, John Wierman, and
Jonathan Wright contributed greatly towards my research. The all-encompassing support
from both the Columbia IEOR and Johns Hopkins AM&S staff helped tremendously with
my academic advancements.
I am grateful to Cathy Chen, Camilo Herna´ndez, Christopher Horng, Patrick Huang,
Yueling Loh, and Carmen Ng for the great company provided; Wenbo Gao, Irene Lo, Kristen
Maynor, and Lizbeth Morales for keeping me grounded; Luigi Durand, Randy Jia, Wayne
Hung, Anjani Patel, Josephine Tong, David Wang for emotional support; Karla Herna´ndez,
Joeseph Paat, Gaoran Yu, and Yuan Zhao for physical preparedness; Sung-Ah Bahk, Ryan
McNellis, Percy Li, Runze Tang, Brian Ward, and Shangsi Wang for broadening my cultural
perspective; Theodore Drivas, Kevin Guo, Michael Hamilton, Ruby Lin, Cristina Simpetru,
Charlie Tsui, Kevin Yuan, and Jordan Yoder for the ever odd but necessary antics.
I would have nothing without my family. Assuredly insane and unapologetically hectic,
we are always there at the wrong place and time. That is right, though.
ix




Clearinghouses insure trades. Acting as a central counterparty (CCP), clearinghouses con-
solidate financial exposures across multiple institutions, aiding the efficient management
of counterparty credit risk, and simultaneously protect themselves using sophisticated loss
allocation mechanisms. In this thesis, we study the decision problem faced by for-profit clear-
inghouses, focusing on primary economic incentives driving their determination of layers of
loss-absorbing capital.
Financial institutions can mutualize counterparty risk by becoming clearing members of
a clearinghouse. In return for a fee and default resource contributions, the clearinghouse
guarantees clearing member contractual positions, subjecting itself to counterparty risk and
default losses.
Clearinghouse choices have profound systemic consequences. As the counterparty of all
trades, insufficient clearinghouse default resources can lead to price instability from fire
sales and market panic. When the clearinghouse as a going concern is questioned, there
maybe significant disruptions in clearing and settlement activities. As clearinghouses have
significant discretion over the sizing of their default resources, analyzing the incentives behind
their choices can help understanding such forms of systemic risk that can arise.
The clearinghouse’s loss-allocation mechanism, commonly referred to as the default wa-
1
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Defaulting member’s initial margins
Defaulting member’s pre-funded default fund
Clearinghouse committed equity
Surviving members’ pre-funded default funds
Surviving members’ unfunded default funds (assessments)
Variation margin gain haircutting
Figure 1: Graphical demonstration of a default waterfall.
When losses exceed the defaulting member’s margins, they are sequentially allocated to the defaulting
member’s contribution to the default fund, clearinghouse equity, and other default fund resources. When
these are all exhausted, end-of-the-waterfall procedures are enacted.
terfall, determines the allocation and management of counterparty risk. The stock of loss-
absorbing capital typically consists of initial margins, default funds, and the clearinghouse’s
contributed equity. Modern clearinghouses often have significant monopoly power, as they
unilaterally determine the level of these default resources (subject to regulatory approval).
The structure of a typical default waterfall is illustrated in Figure 1.
The profit-maximizing incentive of clearinghouses, which is a significant departure from
the literature, is the overarching theme of this thesis. Historically structured as mutually
owned organizations, clearing institutions have often been modeled as benevolent financial
utilities (Santos and Scheinkman (2001), Koeppl et al. (2012), Biais et al. (2016a)) owned
by clearing members. Modern clearinghouses, however, are structured as distinct for-profit
corporations. While realistic, there are few studies that explicitly model clearinghouses as
profit-maximizing entities (Huang (2016)).
The overall problem faced by the modern clearinghouse in practice is thus choosing the
appropriate level of clearing fee, initial margins, default funds, and clearinghouse equity that
maximize profit. Such an objective also pins down multiple decision variables simultaneously,
and provides an explicit link of the clearinghouse’s choices to economic variables. In contrast,
a benevolent financial utility or competitive market model assumes the clearinghouse makes
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zero profit, which is likely satisfied by various combinations of clearinghouse choices.
To maximize profits, the clearinghouse needs to balance revenue income and default
protection with clearing volume. A high fee, high margin, and large default fund regime in-
creases profit per cleared trade, as revenue is higher and default protection is stronger. Low
equity contributions also contribute to profit, as the clearinghouse’s losses are capped at a
lower amount. However, such choices deter members, as stringent requirements makes cleared
trades less attractive. To incorporate the clearing participants’ (members and traders) incen-
tives, our models derive trading demand from their individual rationality (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints, which dictate their actions in response to the clearinghouse’s
choices. The clearinghouse’s equilibrium choice then endogenizes participants’ clearing in-
centives.
The models presented in this thesis show, without exception, that clearinghouse choices
should depend not only on the riskiness of the cleared position but also on market and
participants’ characteristics such as default probabilities, fundamental value, and funding
opportunity cost. While economically intuitive, such results are novel in the literature. The
prevailing view is that default resources are determined solely by characteristics of the cleared
contract: Figlewski (1984) assumes margins are set so that portfolio losses are covered with
high probability, Junge and Trolle (2014) assume margins are equal to the notional of the
traded contract. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Anderson and Jo˜eveer (2014), and
Glasserman et al. (2016) all assume margins are equal to some mix of value at risk (VaR)
or expected shortfall of the collateralized positions. The rule for default funds advocated
by the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures is the “Cover 2” requirement (CPMI
and IOSCO (2012)), stating that the aggregate default fund should be sufficient to cover
the default losses of the two largest clearing members. We argue that such rules are not
incentive compatible since they do not taking into account important variables such as
funding opportunity costs. Such costs clearly affect the attractiveness of clearing trades,
especially when trading capital requirements are high.
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The topic of central clearing relates to not only current market practice but also recent
regulatory developments. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of central clearing, relevant
market practices, regulations, and historical clearinghouse failures.
Chapters 3–6 study the clearinghouse’s decision problem. We separate the overall deci-
sion problem into two distinct subproblems and study them individually. The first is the
clearinghouse’s choice of initial margin and clearing fee requirements, and the second involves
its choice of resources further down the waterfall, namely the default funds and clearinghouse
equity. The reason for this separation is that while initial margin requirements and clearing
fees apply to all clearing participants (clearing members and their clients), default fund and
equity contributions are more relevant for clearing members. This simplification allows us
to solve for the clearinghouse’s equilibrium choices in both cases explicitly, and address the
different economic roles they play in the clearinghouse’s profit-maximization process.
Chapter 3 presents Model 1, which studies the profit-maximizing fee and margin levels.
The clearinghouse faces a continuum of traders who default when they become illiquid, and
bears all default losses. There is heterogeneity in both trader preferences for the contract and
trader liquidity risk, introducing asymmetric information in the model. The fundamental
tradeoff is that while higher margin mitigates default losses and higher fee increases clear-
ing revenue, both reduce trading activity because they impose larger costs to traders. We
show that equilibrium fee and margin levels are determined not only by price volatility, but
also (crucially) by trader fundamentals and funding costs. Systemic risk arises as the clear-
inghouse’s choice of margin requirements may not fully insulate it from default losses. We
provide an equilibrium study of fee and margin, market volume, the distribution of economic
surplus, and systemic risk arising from margin shortfalls.
The main contribution of Model 1 is to explicitly relate equilibrium variables to contract
riskiness, trader fundamentals, and funding cost. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first theoretical model to micro-find margin levels for a profit-maximizing clearinghouse. Our
results capture the high level of initial margins deployed in derivatives markets, the relation
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between margins and contract riskiness, and the “term-structure” of margins: that back
month futures contracts generally have lower margin requirements. In a model extension,
we further separate matching and clearing services by introducing an exchange, and analyze
the implications of the different market structure on the resulting equilibria.
Chapter 4 presents Model 2, which serves as a continuous-time extension to the discrete-
time Model 1. The goal of this study is to show that the main conclusions of the Model 1
are robust to the various simplifying model assumptions. Indeed, we find that the results
are broadly consistent with that from Model 1, including that equilibrium fee and margin
levels are determined jointly by price volatility, trader preferences, and funding costs.
Chapter 5 provides an empirical study of clearinghouse margin levels. In collaboration
with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) we study the actual initial
margin requirements associated with centrally cleared CDS portfolios. The unique regulatory
data set is used to investigate drivers of clearinghouse margins. We document several stylized
facts, including heterogeneity of clearing member portfolios, significant time variation in
margin levels, and clustering of portfolio return on margins around the mean. Our empirical
findings are consistent with and support our theoretical predictions from Models 1 and 2.
We strongly reject the prevalent concept that margins are based on VaR, finding that (i)
margins are more conservatively set and unequally implemented across accounts, while (ii)
portfolio characteristics explain a significant portion, including market based variables such
as the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX, a gauge for market volatility ) and the Overnight Index
Swap spread (a proxy for interest paid on collateral). We further show the usefulness of
the initial margin model of Duffie et al. (2015) to capture panel variation of initial margins,
and argue that clearinghouses place large subjective weights on tail risk. As high quality
clearinghouse data is scarce and proprietary, to the best of our knowledge this study is the
first to investigate actual portfolios and the associated margining rules. The results also have
important implications with regards to systemic risk. In the terminology of Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), we argue that the clearinghouse’s behavior is consistent with that of an
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
uninformed financier and that common shocks to credit quality can lead to tightening margin
constraints, which are conditions that can lead to destabilizing loss and margin spirals.
Chapter 6 presents Model 3, which studies the profit-maximizing default fund and eq-
uity levels. In this model, two groups of members participate in the clearing process to
share default risks, guaranteed by default fund contributions and clearinghouse equity. The
tradeoff is more complicated than that in Model 1. Large default fund requirements in-
crease the funding costs borne by members and decrease the amount of (counterparty) risk
they can offload to the clearing network; on the other hand, they increase protection from
other members’ defaults and reduce the clearinghouse’s exposure to default losses. Large
equity commitments increase members’ expected profits by providing a further layer of pro-
tection, attracting more members to participate and increasing the clearinghouse’s revenue;
however, they also increase the clearinghouse’s potential for losses. We show that the equi-
librium choice of default fund and equity levels of a clearinghouse are determined by funding
cost as well as the level of risk-sharing. Systemic risk arises in equilibrium as pre-funded
default resources may be exhausted.
Our analysis of Model 3 highlights the incentives behind a clearinghouse’s choices. Over-
all, Model 3 (i) explains the empirically observed differences in capitalization and profitability
across clearinghouses, (ii) highlights associated systemic implications, and (iii) explains the
incentives behind the currently prevalent “defaulter-pays” clearing networks.’ The model
produces several policy implications, including that low funding cost environments may cre-
ate the illusion that clearinghouses would always be adequately capitalized.
Our results imply a counteracting force that dampens monetary easing enacted via low
interest rate policies. The low interest rate environment following the financial crisis of 2007–
08 has led to large cash piles on the balance sheets of major dealer banks. Combined with
low productivity growth and return on capital, funding opportunity costs have been likely
low. The research shows that this supports the highly conservative margin and default fund
levels employed by major clearinghouses, which ties up capital and credit. However, this
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may not be sustainable: if policy rates were to rise and profitable investment opportunities
appear, cleared trades may become comparatively expensive and trading activity would
diminish. If the clearinghouse responds by lowering capital requirements this could cultivate
systemic risk. Monetary policies increasing interest rates may have unintended consequences,
impacting collateralization and liquidity in the space of cleared markets.
All technical proofs are delegated to the appendices.
Chapter 2
Market Background and Current
Practices
This chapter presents an overview of the backdrop of modern clearinghouses.
The modern clearinghouse
Clearinghouses originated as subsidiaries of financial exchanges as an extension of their
clearing and settlement functions. As exchanges were historically mutually owned by their
members, their clearing subsidiaries were viewed as financial utilities, operating to increase
surplus of the members.
Modern clearinghouses are different along two important dimensions. First, many clear-
inghouses now exist independent of the trading venue. For instance, ICE Clear Credit (ICC),
a major U.S. clearinghouse clearing standardized credit default swaps, is not associated with
any specific trading venue. Trades established on several Swap Execution Facilities (e.g.
Bloomberg terminal) are novated to ICC. Second, modern clearinghouses often are publicly-
traded, for-profit entities. A prominent example is CME group, a publicly-traded company
operating a large chain of exchanges and clearinghouses. Clearing members, while heavily
involved in clearing operations, are no longer direct owners of the clearinghouse.
8
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Exchanges, on the other hand, are organized as quote-driven or order-driven markets.
A quote-driven exchange consists of broker-dealers who profit from bid-ask spreads and
brokerage fees; an order-driven exchange sets up operational facilities, such as the limit-
order book, to match buyers directly to sellers.
The landscape of centrally cleared financial markets in the U.S. is currently dominated
by several large clearing corporations, including CME Group Inc., The Depository Trust &
Clearing Corporation (DTCC), Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), LCH.Clearnet, and Op-
tions Clearing Corporation (OCC). Clearing parent companies typically own several clear-
inghouses and exchanges, each siloed in a specific asset class and individually capitalized.
Competition is limited due to the high barriers of entry: large economies of scale, regulatory
compliance, and research overhead costs all contribute to monopoly power. For example,
ICE’s capital contribution (equity) in ICE Clear Credit, a subsidiary, is limited to $50 million
USD, and handles more than 60% of the cleared CDS contracts in the U.S..
Central clearing
Financial institutions mutualize counterparty risk by becoming clearing members of a clear-
inghouse. In return for a fee and default resource capital contributions, the clearinghouse
guarantees clearing member contractual positions. The clearing service entails novation:
after a trade is established between two clearing members, the contractual obligations are
replaced by equivalent positions between the two original parties and the clearinghouse. In
the event of one party’s default, the original counterparty is insulated from losses as his con-
tractual position is now with the clearinghouse. In this respect, the clearinghouse is referred
to as a central counterparty (CCP). For a comprehensive review, see Pirrong (2011).
To limit the amount of exposure to clearing members, clearinghouses typically practice
daily variation margining. When a portfolio changes in (mark-to-market) value either be-
cause of price fluctuations or new positions added, this change is paid out to the member
in the form of variation margins, so the net obligation of the clearinghouse to the member
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(and vice versa) at day end is kept at zero.
Variation margining has important implications with regards to the member’s use of cap-
ital. In particular, capital required for trading a cleared contract consists of only the initial
margin, regardless of the contract value. We demonstrate the logic through an example.
Suppose firm B(uyer) purchases a CDS contract from firm S(eller) at the market value of
$2. This results in an upfront cash flow from B to S of $2. As a result, B’s cleared portfolio
increases in value by $2, and S’s portfolio decreases in value by $2. The end-of-day variation
margins from S to the clearinghouse, and in turn from the clearinghouse to B, are thus $2
more. In particular, the cash B used to purchase the contract is “rebated” to him through
variation margins.1 Similarly, liquidating cleared positions can only free up capital through
reducing initial margins. Furthermore, since default events lead to corresponding changes in
market value, when a default occurs, settlement is equivalent to paying variation margins.
When a clearing member defaults, the clearinghouse inherits the open positions and is
required to offload them to return to a balanced book. Usually an auction is held to allocate
the defaulting member’s positions among those who are solvent. Since the portfolio value
may deteriorate during this liquidation period, the clearinghouse may incur default losses.
These losses are allocated among the surviving members according to a default waterfall.
The typical default waterfall is illustrated in Figure 1. The first line of defense against
default losses is the defaulting member’s initial margins. When margins are insufficient,
losses accrue to the member’s contribution to the default fund. If losses exceed the defaulting
member’s contribution, they are absorbed by capital contributions (equity) committed by
the clearinghouse first, and then by default funds contributed by other clearing members.
In the event that all such pre-funded capital is exhausted, clearinghouses typically have
the right to call for additional member contributions to the default fund (referred to as
un-funded default funds or assessment rights), which are often capped at a multiple of the
original default fund contribution. “End-of-the-waterfall” procedures are implemented when
1This rebate is described in Junge and Trolle (2014).
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even this is insufficient.
Clearinghouses may impose certain variations to their default waterfalls. For instance,
LCH creates additional incentives for clearing members to participate in the auction process
by allocating losses first to default funds belonging to clearing members who did not partic-
ipate in bidding (LCH Clearnet (2014b)). Some clearinghouses create an additional equity
tranche after assessment rights are used up.
The end-of-the-waterfall procedure advocated by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association is variation margin gain haircutting (ISDA (2013a)), which subjects members
who have accrued gains over the liquidation period to receive a pro rata reduction on their
variation margin gains, allowing the clearinghouse to use the haircut to cover default losses.
ISDA (2013a) argues that this “winner-pays” procedure is robust and almost always a suffi-
cient resource. This default waterfall structure is graphically demonstrated in Figure 1. For
a more detailed review of current practices, trends, and default resources data, see Domanski
et al. (2015) and Armakola and Laurent (2015).
Contract design and collateral practices
Clearinghouses often do not design the precise terms of cleared contracts. For instance,
standardized CDS contracts in the U.S. are typically cleared by Intercontinental Exchange,
but the terms are designed by Markit, and the governing master agreements designed by
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). In practice, the clearinghouse’s
decision problem consists of setting clearing fees and the allocation of resources in the various
layers of the default waterfall. The capital tied up as margins is significant, and traders
receive interest on the posted securities, usually based on the OIS spread or LIBOR.
Clearinghouses impose uniform margin requirements for traders with different risk charac-
teristics, even for contracts that are designed by the clearinghouse (e.g. CME corn futures).
For example, some clearinghouses allow for reduced margins for hedgers, but the binary
classification of speculators and hedgers is unlikely to capture all the heterogeneity in trader
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characteristics. Within each group of traders, the margin requirements are the same. As the
classification of speculator or hedger is determined by an external regulatory body (i.e. the
CFTC).
Regulatory support and supervision of clearinghouses
The recent resurgence of academic interest in clearinghouses are in part due to regulatory
responses to the financial crisis of 2007–08. Both the European Market Infrastructure Reg-
ulation (EMIR) and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
require sufficiently standardized derivative contracts to be centrally cleared by a CCP. In
addition to mitigating counterparty risk through netting, central clearing increases trade
transparency, legal and operational efficiency, and default management.
In the U.S. CCPs are principally governed by the CFTC. The Dodd–Frank Act grants
the CFTC authority over Derivative Clearing Organizations (DCOs). As a result, major
clearinghouses recognized as DCOs are required to report confidential trade data to CFTC
on a daily basis. The relevant rules and regulations are codified in Title 17, Chapter I, Part
39 of the Code of Federal Regulations. While some securities are under the jurisdiction of
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) so that bilateral trades need not be reported to
CFTC, they are reported once cleared by a registered DCO. The law requires each DCO to
provide any information CFTC deems necessary. DCOs are also monitored and subject to
periodic stress tests from the CFTC’s Division of Clearing and Risk (CFTC (2016)).
Clearinghouse failures
The failure of systemically important clearinghouses can harm financial stability due to the
liquidation of the large exposures they manage. Possible disruptions to clearing and settle-
ment activities can further destroy value. Historical observations of clearinghouse defaults
are rare and include: the French Caisse de Liquidation (CLAM) in 1974, the Kuala Lumpur
Commodity Clearing House in 1983, and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Clearing Cor-
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poration (HKFE) in 1987, although both CME and OCC were close to failure in the 1987
stock market crash.
There have not been failures of clearinghouses who use the modern default waterfall
as illustrated in Figure 1. Both CLAM and HKFE used third-party guaranty funds and
did not have assessment rights. Since modern clearing parent companies often contribute
limited resources to clearinghouses that they operate, it is unlikely default losses would result
in the overall bankruptcy of the parent. A clearinghouse subsidiary whose equity capital is
exhausted thus can continue to operate (although members may choose to reduce exposures
with weak clearinghouses or resign). Modern clearinghouse failures thus should be thought
of when the clearinghouse fails to obtain sufficient resources to fulfill cleared obligations
and not necessarily the solvency of the clearinghouse corporate entity. In the event of such
failures, resolution procedures are implemented. We refer the interested reader to ISDA
(2013a) and Duffie (2015).
The timely resolution and recapitalization of a clearing network after the default of a
clearinghouse is an active research topic, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. While
we do not focus on the relation between central clearing, collateralization, and counterparty
risk, we remark that there is a fast-growing literature in this area. Duffie and Zhu (2011)
provide a theoretical foundation for analyzing the impact of various degrees of central clearing
on aggregate collateral demand. Mancini et al. (2016) provide an empirical analysis of
the centrally cleared Euro market and find that high quality collateral acts as a shock
absorber, stabilizing the market. Glasserman et al. (2015) analyze hidden illiquidity effects
in the presence of multiple central counterparties and identify potential “race to the bottom”
phenomena in margin requirements. Menkveld (2015a) analyzes the social cost of crowded
trades in a centralized clearing setting.
Chapter 3
Discrete Time Margin Theory
Overview
In this chapter, we study the decision problem faced by a profit-maximizing clearinghouse
when setting the fee and margin requirements for heterogeneous traders who may default.
We introduce Model 1, a model that views margins, in conjunction with the upfront clearing
fee, as imperatives in a clearinghouse’s profit-maximization process. Margins in Model 1
should be understood as the entire set of resources used by the clearinghouse to compensate
for default losses.1 The clearinghouse’s fundamental trade-off is that while high margins
mitigate the clearinghouse’s default losses and high fees increase its revenue, both reduce
trading activity because they impose larger opportunity costs to traders (Telser (1981)). Our
analysis yields equilibrium fee and margin requirements that support profit-maximization of
the clearinghouse.
While it is generally agreed upon that margins should increase with price volatility, this
is insufficient for pinning down exact margin requirements. For instance, a parametric Value
at Risk (VaR) margining rule can fit any margin requirement with a suitable distributional
assumption and confidence level. Nonetheless, that margins are determined solely by fea-
tures of the cleared contract is professed both in the academic literature and in practice.
1Default resources typically consist mostly of initial margins.
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Most academic studies assume that margins are determined by VaR with exogenously spec-
ified confidence levels (Figlewski (1984), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). In practice,
margins are based on default loss quantiles simulated over a wide range of scenarios with
additional “add-on” amounts (CME Group (2010), Pirrong (2011), Hull (2012), ICE Clear
US (2015)). The relevant simulation parameters, add-ons, and stress scenarios are chosen by
clearinghouses, which implies that margins critically depend on the incentives behind their
choices. Taking into account only contract characteristics such as price volatility potentially
neglects clearinghouses’ profit-maximizing incentives.
The model economy consists of a clearinghouse and a continuum of heterogenous traders
who trade a mandatorily cleared, standardized contract. We use the term “clearinghouse” to
denote the actual clearinghouse and the collection of all its clearing members.2 We assume
that the clearinghouse is deep pocketed and does not default. This assumption, in addition
to maintaining model simplicity, resembles the typical assumption of actual clearing service
end-users (the traders). As noted in Chapter 2, clearinghouses have complex default waterfall
structures to guarantee the service of obligations. Typical waterfalls do not require end-users
to share in default losses except in very extreme cases when trading gains receive haircuts.
Thus, from the perspective of the end-users, there is an almost certain guarantee that their
cleared contracts would be serviced.
In the baseline version of Model 1, the clearinghouse provides both matching and clearing
services to clients for clearing fees. This is the case, for instance, for the New York Stock
Exchange and ICE Swap, where the clearinghouse and trading platform work as a single for-
profit entity. Post trade, an adverse realization of the contract value results in some traders
becoming illiquid and default. Traders’ defaults create a loss to the clearinghouse as it must
honor opposing positions held by non-defaulting traders. In equilibrium, the clearinghouse’s
choice of clearing fee and margin requirements maximizes its expect profit, and each trader
2In practice, the clearing member who client-cleared a trade would bear the default losses first and
the clearinghouse would only bear losses when the clearing member defaults and his pre-funded capital is
insufficient to cover the losses.
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trades if and only if his expected profit is positive.
Asymmetric information arises in Model 1 because traders obtain heterogenous, unob-
servable, income from trade. This models, in reduced form, unobservable trader preferences
and fundamentals. Traders’ types directly impact the clearinghouse’s profit, as they de-
termine both their trading motives and probabilities of default. More specifically, traders
extract profit both from the fundamental value (income) and default protection (limited
liability); since the fee lowers traders’ overall surplus, while margins lower the usefulness
of limited liability, the fee and margin requirements affect traders’ incentives (and hence
the clearinghouse’s profit) differently. Asymmetric information creates a screening role for
margins that the clearing fee cannot replace, analogous to classical results in the credit mar-
ket literature where interest rates cannot always substitute for collateral (Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981)). The need for using such screening devices comes from the fact that the clearinghouse
either cannot or does not discriminate between traders. In practice, clearinghouses do not
have margining rules tailored specifically to each trader. Individual trader characteristics
such as credit quality and asset size often do not factor into the fee and margin calculations.3
Equilibrium margins are a function of the riskiness of the traded contract, the average
fundamental value that traders can generate from trading, and funding cost. Traders self-
select into two groups, as only those with high enough incomes will trade. Different from the
typical assumption that margins are determined only by contract risk characteristics (such as
price volatility), we show that it is market riskiness (defined as contract riskiness normalized
by average income) that determines margins. Moreover, when mapping equilibrium margins
to VaR, we find that the equilibrium confidence level depends both on market riskiness and
funding cost. This implies that even if a VaR margining rule were seemingly implemented,
the clearinghouse would choose VaR parameters incorporating market characteristics not
specific to the cleared positions.
3At ICE Clear Credit, all clearing participants pay the clearing fee of $6 per million notional cleared for
North American & Sovereign CDS index contracts. We refer the reader to the ICE Clear Credit’s schedule
of fees and online documentation of margining rules, see www.theice.com for details.
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We show that equilibrium margins increase with market riskiness. This is consistent with
empirical evidence that margins increase with volatility (Hedegaard (2014)), and additionally
explains the “term-structure” of margins. For instance, it is usually the case that back month
futures contracts have lower margin requirements. This is likely due to participating traders
being mostly hedgers, which in Model 1 correspond to traders with high incomes who trade
mostly to capture fundamental value, as opposed to speculators who trade to take advantage
of limited liability.
Our analysis focuses on the case of small funding costs. The current economic environ-
ment, in which real government bond yields are close to zero and firms carry large cash
balances on their balance sheets supports this assumption. Our small funding cost results
explain why margins are often comparatively high relative to day to day movements in posi-
tion values. For instance, Hedegaard (2014) finds that margins for futures contracts are, on
average, 2.5 times the daily standard deviation of returns. Model 1 shows that as costs for
funding margins go to zero, the equilibrium margin requirement grows unbounded. Further-
more, we show that when margin requirements are high, tiny variations in funding cost can
have significant effects on equilibrium margins as they severely impact traders’ profits. As
we show in Chapter 4, these results are robust as they arise in continuous time frameworks
as well.
When funding cost increases, the clearinghouse reduces its margin requirement to in-
centivize traders to participate. To compensate for the lost default protection, however, it
demands a higher fee. Although both fee and margins are subject to funding cost, increasing
the funding cost per unit capital impacts trader profits mainly through margin funding cost,
because in equilibrium the clearing fee is much smaller than the margin requirement. The
upfront clearing fee thus plays a crucial role in Model 1, as it incentivizes the clearinghouse
to maintain market volume when funding margins is more expensive. It is through the fee
income channel that the funding cost becomes a primary determinant of margins.
The simplicity of Model 1 allows for an analytically tractable study of the interplay of
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fees and margins with direct economic interpretations. We provide an equilibrium study of
market volume, distribution of economic surplus, and systemic risk, and find that fee and
margins often have significant, but opposing, economic roles. We find that increasing market
riskiness and funding cost reduce both market volume and social welfare. As there is less
surplus to be shared, the clearinghouse’s profit decreases. Approximately half of the surplus
in our model economy is captured by the clearinghouse, and the remaining half by traders.
Compared to a benchmark first-best economy with a welfare-maximizing social planner, we
find that there are significant inefficiencies introduced by asymmetric information and the
misalignment of interests between agents.
Systemic risk arises as the clearinghouse’s choice of margin requirements may not fully
insulate it from default losses. As clearinghouses are often systemically important, the
exhaustion of pre-funded initial margins can lead to market panic and stress. For example,
in 2013, an algorithmic trading error led to the collapse of HanMag Securities, one of the
major clearing members at KRX. The initial margins were insufficient to cover default losses
and a portion of the non-defaulters’ default funds was used up, prompting other members and
the U.S. CFTC to launch an overall review on clearinghouse default management practices.
We thus use the probability of such “margin exhaustion” events as our measure of systemic
risk. Model 1 predicts that an increase in funding cost raises the probability of margin
exhaustion, as equilibrium margins are lower. On the other hand, the effect from an increase
in market riskiness is non-trivial. Margin requirements have low sensitivity to increases in
market riskiness only for high risk environments, leading to an increase in systemic risk. We
also consider an alternative systemic risk measure, the conditional expected margin shortfall.
With this measure, we again find that margin requirements have low sensitivity to increased
riskiness, showing the robustness of our previous result for high risk environments.
In the extended version of Model 1, we consider the case where the trading facility
(an exchange) is distinct from the clearing facility (the clearinghouse). A typical example is
Bloomberg L.P., which serves as a Swaps Execution Facility and whose trades may be cleared
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by CME. We introduce an exchange who matches trade orders in return for a trading fee.4 It
incurs a fixed operational cost (e.g. server maintenance, order processing, physical location)
when listing a contract for trade (Pirrong (1999)), and chooses to not list the contract for
trade if the generated revenue cannot cover the cost. In equilibrium, the exchange chooses
the trading fee which maximizes its profit, given the clearinghouse’s optimal choice of the
fee and margin requirements.
The introduction of the exchange gives rise to results which complement that of the
baseline version along two different dimensions. First, we show that the equilibria from
the baseline version are naturally inherited. By comparing the resulting equilibrium fee and
margins to that of the baseline version, we find that the introduction of the exchange increases
the equilibrium clearing fee and reduces the equilibrium margin requirement. Clearinghouse
profit, trading volume, and social welfare all decrease. The effect of varying riskiness and
funding cost on the margin requirement, and thus the economic intuition, remains the same.
While the loss in social welfare compared to the first-best economy is far greater, welfare is
still approximately evenly distributed among the clearinghouse, the exchange, and the traders
as a whole. Second, the presence of the exchange allows for an entirely different family
of equilibria – ones where equilibrium margins are zero. When faced with the exchange
competing for fee revenue, the clearinghouse may abandon the use of margin altogether
to entice traders to participate and charge a higher fee. In this case, a positive margin
requirement would lower the clearing fee, and the exchange would extract more profits from
the traders at the expense of the clearinghouse, a phenomenon absent in the baseline version.
To demonstrate this, we provide a complete characterization of equilibria within the extended
version (Proposition 3.11) for the benchmark setting where there is no funding cost. Our
results imply that, when trading and clearing facilities are separate, even small changes in
riskiness may cause equilibrium margins to switch from very high to very low levels.
4We use the term “exchange” as a comprehensive term for financial intermediaries facilitating the matching
of buy and sell orders in a centralized fashion. Recent innovations in technology have blurred the line between
exchange-traded and over-the-counter markets. E-trading platforms such as Swaps Execution Facilities
(SEFs), for instance, are non-exchange trading venues who support centralized markets.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 discusses related academic literature.
Section 3.2 explains the set up of the baseline version of Model 1. Section 3.3 solves for
agents’ equilibrium strategies. Section 3.4 extends the baseline model with an exchange and
develops the corresponding analysis. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1 Related literature
The main result of Model 1 is to explicitly relate equilibrium fee and margin requirements
to market riskiness and funding cost. Previous works in the context of collateralized trading
often assume that either the margin requirement is exogenously specified for each contract
(Telser (1981), Garleanu and Pedersen (2011)), or that it is set at a portfolio level accord-
ing to a mixture of VaR, expected shortfall, and maximum shortfall measures (Figlewski
(1984), Anderson and Jo˜eveer (2014), Duffie et al. (2015)). Moreover, different from the
exogenously specified margining rules, the results provide a priori theoretical support for
margin requirements.
Model 1 is related to the credit market literature, which has extensively analyzed the
determination of optimal collateral requirements. In the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Besanko and Thakor (1987) both find collateral a useful
screening device of borrowers either through adverse selection or incentive effects. Similar
to our study, collateral levels arise from profit-maximizing Nash equilibria. Bester (1985)
and Bester (1987) further demonstrate the usefulness of collateral in creating a self-selection
mechanism. There are, however, several important distinctions between collateralized loans
and margined trades: first, the direction of future exposure is uncertain as every counter-
party could be out of the money. Second, (initial) margin posting is not between traders,
but is unilateral to the clearinghouse (Pirrong (2011)). Third, the usual assumption of id-
iosyncratic borrower or insuree risk (Koeppl (2013)) is challenged by the fact that publicly
traded contracts are exposed to the same market risks, and that traders may not be seeking
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insurance but rather speculating. Fourth, an optimal contracting approach with separating
equilibria is not necessarily viable as contracts traded are often not designed by a clearing-
house but by some third-party entity (e.g. a CDX contract is designed by Markit but cleared
by ICE Clear Credit). By convention, even contracts designed by clearinghouses implement
uniform margins rather than offering several different margin requirements.
The analysis also bears similarities with the market microstructure literature concerning
informationally advantaged traders, where market makers have at their disposal two screen-
ing devices: bid and ask quotes (Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985)).
However, clearinghouses face a distinctly different problem, as adverse selection arises due
to heterogeneity in trader fundamentals and default probabilities, rather than information
asymmetries with regards to the traded security.
3.2 Model 1: the baseline version
Our model economy consists of a clearinghouse (CH) and a unit mass of non-atomistic
traders (T ). All agents are expected profit-maximizers. In our baseline model, the clearing-
house provides both matching and clearing services. Traders trade a standardized contract,
and cannot meet without its intermediation. Matched trades are then novated to the clear-
inghouse and cleared. We describe the timeline of the model in Section 3.2.1, specify the
distributional assumptions in Section 3.2.2, and give the profit functions of traders and
clearinghouse in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Model timeline
There are two periods, separated by the realization of the contract value. Traders choose
whether to participate in trading ex-ante; ex-post, traders may become illiquid and default.
The clearinghouse bears the losses. An illustration of the model timeline is given in Figure
2.











Figure 2: Model 1 timeline, baseline version.
Prior to the realization of the contract value, the clearinghouse sets its margin requirement
C and fee δ per contract cleared. The standardized contract we consider is exogenously given
and not designed by the clearinghouse, thus the decision variables of the clearinghouse are
the fee and margin requirements.
Next, each trader i chooses his position pi ∈ [−1, 1] in the contract. Traders are char-
acterized by their types B, which describe income they can generate from trades. Each
trader’s type is private information and known only to the trader. The actions yield incomes
piB. Because the trader may default due to an adverse realization of the contract value, this
income is only received if the trader remains liquid. Types are described by the distribution
F (i.e. F (t) is the fraction of traders whose incomes do not exceed t). Participating traders
pay the fee δ and post margin C to the clearinghouse. Throughout the chapter we use the
terms “mass of participating traders” and “market volume” interchangeably.
The contract value ε ∼ H is then realized. The clearinghouse collects payments from
traders who are out of the money and is obligated to pay the traders who are in the money.
When a trader becomes illiquid, he is forced to default on his obligations and the clearing-
house closes out the position. The trader receives bankruptcy protection; he does not lose
more than his posted margin. When out of the money traders default, the clearinghouse
experiences a shortfall in payments and must make up for the difference thereby incurring
a loss. Thus, a default leads to losses for the clearinghouse and deprives the trader of his
income.
We assume that future income received by traders is fully pledgeable (in the sense of
Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997)) and that margin requirements are met with liquid assets, so
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that the total amount of liquid assets a participating trader can utilize after the realization
of the contract value is piB + C. The payment due to him from the clearinghouse is piε.
Hence a participating trader becomes illiquid when
piε+ piB + C < 0.
3.2.2 Model specification
The distributions F and H are assumed to be Laplace with parameters (0, λ) and (0, γ),
respectively. That is, the cumulative distribution functions are
F (t) =

1− 12e−λt , t ≥ 0
1
2e
λt , t < 0
, H(t) =

1− 12e−γt , t ≥ 0
1
2e
γt , t < 0
. (3.1)
While H is a probability distribution describing the realization of a random variable ε, F
is not; it is used to describe the distribution of deterministic types among a unit mass of
traders.
The trader’s type encodes fundamental value that he can capture from trade. It can be
thought of as either the utility of the trader for engaging and staying in the trading business,
or as a hedging benefit that he obtains from holding the contract. As our focus is not the
determinants of fundamental value, we view B directly as income for holding a position in
the contract. Traders with positive B’s are natural buyers of the contract, whereas those
with negative B’s are natural sellers.
The parameters γ and λ carry straightforward economic interpretations. The mean




thus serves as a measure of the
volatility of the random contract value, with the contract being more volatile when γ is small.
It represents the extent to which traders capture surplus from bankruptcy protection, which
we view as a form of speculation. 1
λ
, on the other hand, is the average potential income of
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each side of the market. When λ is small, there are many traders with large incomes. It
represents the extent to which traders trade due to fundamental value, generating surplus
from incomes. Throughout the chapter we normalize various quantities by using 1
λ
as the
denominator, so to maintain comparability between model economies with different average
incomes. For example, we define a measure of market riskiness 1
θ
:= 1/γ1/λ . A high value of θ
means that many traders have large incomes (λ is small) and the contract is not volatile (γ is
large), both of which contribute to a lower default rate. We remark that market riskiness 1
θ
,
which takes into account traders’ fundamental values (incomes) from trading the contract, is
distinct from contract riskiness 1
γ
, which only considers the riskiness of the cleared contract.
3.2.3 Profit functions
Because a trader (of type B) receives bankruptcy protection, his profit for choosing the
trading strategy pi is:
max(piB + piε,−C)− |pi|δ − |pi|α(δ + C), (3.2)
The first argument in the max function corresponds to the case where the trader remains
liquid, and the second corresponds to when he defaults. Notice that, differently from the
clearing fee which is paid upfront by traders, the margin C is returned to the trader if he
does not default. The parameter α is the per unit funding cost of committed trading capital,
which we assume to be small and nonnegative. The funding cost should be interpreted as the
opportunity cost of lost investment returns because of having capital tied up for the trade.
Recall from Chapter 2, traders receive interest on the liquid securities posted as margin.
Since α is an opportunity cost, however, it is the cost net of any such benefits.
The clearinghouse’s total profit consists of its total received fee revenue less losses due to
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trader defaults:
Clearinghouse’s Payoff = δ × participating traders
− loss per contract× participating traders who default. (3.3)
3.3 Equilibrium
This section solves for equilibrium strategies using backward induction. Our definition of
equilibrium is standard: traders choose long/short positions to maximize their ex-ante ex-
pected profits given the clearinghouse’s choice of actions; in view of this, the clearinghouse
chooses fee and margin requirements that maximize its expected profit.
Section 3.3.1 solves for the traders’ decisions. Section 3.3.2 investigates equilibrium fee
and margins, and relates them to varying funding cost and market riskiness. Section 3.3.3
studies the market characteristics stemming from agents’ equilibrium decisions. Section 3.3.4
studies the systemic risk arising from margin shortfalls. Section 3.3.5 studies the inefficiencies
in the cleared market due to asymmetric information and misaligned incentives between the
clearinghouse and traders.
3.3.1 Traders’ equilibrium choices
Traders take bankruptcy protection into consideration when choosing their trade positions.
Our first proposition shows that there is a unique income threshold governing the trading
decisions.
Proposition 3.1 Fix δ, C, α ≥ 0. Then there exists a unique trading threshold B˜ = B˜(δ, C;α)
such that for a trader with income B, his expected profit is positive when choosing pi > 0 if
and only if B > B˜, and when choosing pi < 0 if and only if B < −B˜.
Our result agrees with economic intuition; the expected profit of a long (short) trader
is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in his type B. The marginal long traders are those
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whose expected profits are exactly zero; that is, those whose types B˜ satisfy
E[max(B˜ + ε,−C)]− δ − α(δ + C) = 0.
We remark that because of the symmetry of F , the number of long and short positions are
the same, i.e. it is always possible to match traders and clear the market.
A straightforward calculation (Lemma A.1 in the appendix) shows that B˜ is the solution
to




The above expression indicates that this “trading threshold” does not depend on the dis-
tribution of types F . Indeed, after δ and C are declared, each trader only evaluates the
profitability of his own potential trade, disregarding the trading actions of other traders.
From Proposition 3.1, we see immediately that there is a “no-trade” region. In addition,





+ 1 = 1 + α
H(B˜ + C)
≥ 1. (3.5)
That is, a one unit increase in fee decreases market volume by more than a one unit increase
in the margin requirement.
Notice that a trader of type B ∈ (B˜,−B˜) would want to be both long and short (this
case exists if and only if B˜ ≤ 0), because if he can default on the two positions separately
his expected profit would be
E[max(B˜ + ε,−C)] + E[max(−B˜ − ε,−C)]− 2((1 + α)δ + αC)
> max(E[max(B˜ + ε,−C)], E[max(−B˜ − ε,−C)])− (1 + α)δ − αC > 0.
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However, multiple positions are usually governed by master agreements which dictate that
when a trader defaults on one position, he has to default on all positions governed by the
agreement (Hull (2012)). Thus, a trader’s payoff from being both long and short a contract
is, in fact,
max(B + ε−B − ε,−2C)− 2((1 + α)δ + αC) ≤ 0.
Hence, he never has the incentive to choose both positions. In this case, the trader chooses
the action that gives him the highest expected profit: long (pi = 1) if B > 0 and short
(pi = −1) if B < 0. Hence, the level of incomes beyond which traders will choose to go long
is bounded below by zero. We can then define the effective trading threshold
B¯(δ, C;α) := max(B˜(δ, C;α), 0), (3.6)
where B˜ solves Eq. (3.4). We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2 A trader chooses pi = 1 if B ≥ B¯, pi = −1 if B ≤ −B¯, and pi = 0
otherwise. The symmetry of the distribution F implies that the mass of participating traders
is 2(1− F (B¯)).
We remark that the clearinghouse may want the traders of type B ∈ (−B˜, B˜) to trade.
However, the fee and margin requirements are such that this would not be profitable for
these traders. In this model, the clearinghouse only has information about the distribution
of traders’ types and cannot distinguish between them. It cannot incentivize separate groups
of traders by offering them lower fees or reduced margin requirements.
As those who default ex-post must have chosen to trade ex-ante, traders’ choices directly
affect the default losses of the clearinghouse. From Eq. (3.2) we see that if ε < 0, all long
buyers with insufficient income B + ε ≤ −C will become illiquid and default; if ε > 0, all
short sellers with insufficient (negative) income −B − ε ≤ −C will default. We formalize
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this statement in the following
Proposition 3.3 Ex-post, the mass of traders who chose pi = ±1 and default is (F (−C ∓
ε)− F (B¯(δ, C;α)))+.
The results presented so far do not require the Laplace distribution assumption. It is
enough to require H to be continuous, symmetric, and supported on the entire real line to
prove propositions 3.1–3.3. We only need F to be symmetric to guarantee that it is always
possible to clear the market. Finally, notice that default risk in our model is a wrong way risk.
That is, defaults are positively correlated with losses on the cleared position, as speculative
traders are more default prone.
3.3.2 Clearinghouse’s equilibrium choices
This section studies the fee and margin requirements chosen by the clearinghouse. The main
trade-off in the clearinghouse’s problem is that a high fee increases its revenue but diminishes
market volume; a high margin requirement has a smaller impact on market volume and is
more effective in protecting it against default losses, but does not contribute to its revenue.
Using Eq. (3.3) and propositions 3.1–3.3, we can write the clearinghouse’s payoff function
as
X(δ, C) :=2δ(1− F (B¯)) (3.7)
+ (ε+ C)(F (−C − ε)− F (B¯))+ + (−ε+ C)(F (−C + ε)− F (B¯))+.
The first term corresponds to the total revenue from clearing fees. The second term is the
margin shortfall from long positions, which is the amount of losses due to defaults of long
traders not absorbed by initial margins and borne by the clearinghouse. This is equal to
the shortfall per default, −ε−C, multiplied by the mass of traders who traded long ex-ante
and defaulted ex-post. The last term is the margin shortfall from short positions. A direct
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computation shows that the clearinghouse’s expected profit is given by:






λ+ γ + B¯
)
. (3.8)




Observe that the clearinghouse can always “kill the market” by choosing δ = ∞, driving
out all traders. For this choice it receives no fee revenue, but also does not bear any losses.
Thus, its maximized expected profit is always nonnegative: it is always rational for the
clearinghouse to clear the contract.
Notice that the clearinghouse’s choices are restricted to uniform fee and margin require-
ments in Eq. (3.9), and cannot implement alternative contract structures that may further
alleviate asymmetric information. In other words, we do not implement an optimal con-
tracting approach, nor do we allow for separating equilibria where traders self-select into
different groups and trade. We model the clearinghouse’s decision process as such to reflect
reality: recall, from Chapter 2, clearinghouses often do not have the power to design the
precise terms of cleared contracts; even those designed by the clearinghouse, uniform margin
requirements are still followed by convention. We thus expect Eq. (3.9) to capture the main
decision process faced by a clearinghouse.
Next, we solve the clearinghouse’s problem. Proposition A.1 in the appendix provides the
first order conditions governing the critical points of E[X(δ, C)] and solves for them. The
following theorem gives the first order dependence of equilibrium fee and margin requirements
on market riskiness and funding cost. Henceforth, we adopt the notation o(ψ(α))
ψ(α) → 0 as α→ 0
for a given function ψ.
Theorem 3.1 The equilibrium fee and margin requirements, respectively denoted by δ˜(θ, α)
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3  = 1, actual
3  = 1, approx.
3  = 0.5, actual
3  = 0.5, approx.












3  = 1, actual
3  = 1, approx.
3  = 0.5, actual
3  = 0.5, approx.
Figure 3: (Normalized) equilibrium clearinghouse choices, exact v.s. approximate.
Both fee and margin requirements increase with market riskiness. Equilibrium margin decreases with
funding cost while the fee increases with it.
and C˜(θ, α), are given by
λδ˜(θ, α) = 1− α + (1 + θ)
2
θ2
α + o(α), (3.10)







− 1 + o(1). (3.11)
Furthermore, λδ˜(θ, α)→ 1 and λC˜(θ, α)→∞ as α→ 0.
Observe that the approximation error for the equilibrium margin requirement is of order
o(1), whereas it is of order o(α) for the clearing fee. The larger approximation error for the
margin requirement is due to the fact that it grows unbounded as α approaches zero, in which
case the o(1) error is small compared to the actual margin requirement. Figure 3 compares
the approximate and exact equilibrium fee and margin requirements. The approximations
(dashed lines) are obtained from Eqs. (3.10) and (3.11), while the exact values are recovered
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by numerically solving the first order conditions governing the equilibrium (Eqs. (A.8), and
(A.9)). The approximation is increasingly better as α approaches zero. When θ = 1 the
approximation error is close to negligible. Notice that the approximation error increases as
θ becomes small relative to α. This is because when funding cost is very high, increasing
the fee raises the effective trading threshold B¯ at a faster rate (Eq. (3.5)); whereas when
market riskiness is high, the default protection provided by margins is increasingly important.
Altogether, this means that the actual equilibrium fee (margin) is lower (higher) than that
given by the first order approximation when θ is small relative to α.
Theorem 3.1 shows that when there is no funding cost, the benefit of demanding high
levels of margin far outweighs the loss in market volume. Because margin comes at no
cost, high margin requirements only deter traders indirectly because of lower bankruptcy
protection value, but directly lowers the expected losses of the clearinghouse. In equilibrium,
the margins demanded by the clearinghouse are so high that traders are always liquid, no
matter the realization of the contract value. The trading decisions are then purely governed
by whether the income is sufficient to cover the fee.
In practice, margin requirements are clearly not infinite. The economic force that reins
in margin requirements is the positive funding cost – traders cannot afford to post infinite
margin upfront. Knowing this, the clearinghouse chooses a margin requirement that balances
both the objectives of protection against default losses and maintaining market volume. The
zero cost scenario presented in Theorem 3.1 should thus be viewed as a characterization of
which equilibria are reasonable for positive funding costs: as the funding cost per unit capital
goes to zero, margin requirements should go to infinity. This scenario mirrors the results
in Geanakoplos (1997) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015), who analyze general collateral
equilibria for the case when assets are used to collateralize security trades. In their studies,
the equilibrium collateral level coincides with the lowest endowment level. Similarly, when
margin is freely available Theorem 3.1 also prescribes the margin requirement to match the
“worst case scenario” by setting it to infinity. We find similar results under a distinctly
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different continuously time model in Chapter 4.
The formulas presented in Theorem 3.1 allow us to straightforwardly perform comparative
statics, keeping in mind that − logα is a large positive number when the funding cost α is
small. We can directly see from Eq. (3.11) that margin requirements decrease with funding
cost. We can further rewrite Eq. (3.11) as









− 1 + o(1),
so that the primary effect of a decrease in θ is to increase margins through the − logα
θ
term.
In other words, margins increase with market riskiness. Similarly, we can see from Eq. (3.10)
that the fee increases both with funding cost and market riskiness. This shows that the first
order approximations presented in Theorem 3.1 capture the dependence of margin and fee
requirements on funding cost and market riskiness, as demonstrated in Figure 3.
Model 1 hence shows that, contrary to professed beliefs, equilibrium margin requirements
are not determined only by price volatility but depend further on trader fundamentals and
funding cost (this is also observed in the equilibrium “VaR confidence level” addressed in
Section 3.3.4). That margin increases with riskiness is seemingly intuitive, as the probability
of traders defaulting and the size of default losses are both higher when the contract is
riskier. The clearinghouse thus protects itself against potential default losses by increasing
the margin requirement, which directly decreases the probability of traders defaulting and





, that determines margins. In practice, this means that contracts with
conventionally riskier characteristics (such as larger price variation) need not have higher
margins, especially if investors who trade that contract are driven by strong fundamentals
rather than speculation. For instance, for the month of March, 2017, the initial margins
of CBOT corn futures starting May, 2017 and ending in December, 2017 were $990 per
contract. They were $715 per contract for corn futures starting March, 2018 and ending
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in September, 2018, even though the underlying commodities are similar. As participants
in back month contracts tend to be those who can capture large hedging benefits, this can
explain why the margins for the latter contract is lower: even though the riskiness of the
contracts may be similar, the market riskiness is lower for markets with traders that capture
large incomes. This “term-structure” of margins points to the dependence of margins on
trader fundamentals. On the other hand, the fee also increases with riskiness. When the
average trader is more default prone, the clearinghouse uses the higher upfront payment as
a cushion against potential default losses, and also to screen out default prone traders (a
higher fee raises the effective trading threshold B¯).
Because margins tend to be large compared to fees, as demonstrated in Theorem 3.1,
when funding cost per unit capital increases, most of the increased cost to traders come
from posting margin rather than the clearing fee. Thus to preserve market volume, the
clearinghouse lowers the margin requirement to incentivize trading, while making up for the
loss in default protection with a higher fee. Notice that this effect would be absent in a model
without clearing fees, since the for-profit clearinghouse then has no incentive to maintain
market volume. It is thus through the clearing fee income channel that funding cost becomes
a primary determinant of margins.
3.3.3 Equilibrium market characteristics
In this section we analyze market characteristics stemming from agents’ equilibrium deci-
sions. In particular, we analyze the equilibrium market volume along with the size and
distribution of economic surpluses.
Proposition 3.4 The equilibrium trading threshold, B˜(θ, α), is given by
λB˜(θ, α) = 1− α− α
θ
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and the equilibrium market volume is
2(1− F (B˜(θ, α)) = e−λB˜(θ,α) = e−1ααθ
(
1 + α + α
θ





Since for small α, − logα is a large positive number, Proposition 3.4 shows that increasing α
raises the trading threshold. In other words, the effect of increased fee outweighs the effect of
reduced margin requirements, resulting in decreased market volume. In contrast, the trading
threshold is lower in a less risky market (high θ) because of both reduced fee and reduced
margins. Hence, increased market riskiness reduces market volume.
Next, we analyze the economic surplus captured by the clearinghouse. Recall, the clear-
inghouse’s expected profit consists of two components: total clearing income and margin
shortfall. The expected margin shortfall M(γ, λ, α) can be written as




+ 11 + θ + λB¯
)
.
Proposition 3.5 In equilibrium, total clearing revenue δ˜(θ, α)e−λB˜(θ,α) and expected margin
shortfall M˜(θ, α), are given by
λδ˜(θ, α)e−λB˜(θ,α) = e−1ααθ
(














The economic surplus (profit) captured by the clearinghouse is











To make the results of Proposition 3.5 more transparent, we consider the Taylor expansion
α
α
θ = 1 + α
θ
logα + o(α logα). (3.13)
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This allows us to write






+ o(α logα), (3.14)




Eq. (3.14) indicates that, in equilibrium, expected margin shortfall is a logarithmic order of
magnitude smaller than total clearing revenue (notice that for small α > 0, −α logα α).
Thus varying market riskiness and funding cost affect clearing profit primarily through the
fee income channel: increased funding cost and market riskiness both reduce clearing profit.
In other words, a profit-maximizing clearinghouse would set the margin requirement so high
that default losses are much less of concern for them compared to their fee incomes in
equilibrium. We return to the systemic implications of this result in Section 3.3.4.
We now study the distribution of economic surplus. We denote total welfare (economic
surplus) by W , and measure it by the expected income less losses due to funding cost,
aggregated over all participating traders. Given pre-specified fee and margin requirements
(δ, C), the aggregate welfare is given by
W (γ, λ, α) = E
[∫
|pi(B)|=1
(|B|1piε+piB+C≥0 − α(δ + C)) dF (B)
]
. (3.15)
In the above expression, 1piε+piB+C≥0 is the indicator function that the trader remains liquid
at the end of the timeline. Notice that the clearinghouse’s profit comes from the traders, thus
aggregate production in the model economy comes solely from realized income. Moreover,
when a trader is illiquid and defaults, he does not receive income, creating a default loss to
the clearinghouse and reducing welfare.
A direct computation shows that the realized welfare at equilibrium (δ, C) = (δ˜(θ, α), C˜(θ, α))














− α(δ˜ + C˜)
)
. (3.16)
We can then obtain the following approximation formula for small funding cost α:
Proposition 3.6 The equilibrium welfare in our model economy, W˜ (θ, α), is given by











Comparing the expression of total welfare with the clearinghouse’s expected profit given
in Proposition 3.4, we see that approximately half of the economic surplus is captured by
the clearinghouse as profits and the remaining half is captured by traders. While the clear-
inghouse can extract rents because of its unique position, the fact that it does not know
traders’ types protects traders from it extracting all their surplus. In addition, using the
Taylor Expansion in Eq. (3.13), we see that increases in funding cost and market riskiness
destroy economic surplus, both through reduced trading activity and more costly trades.
3.3.4 Systemic risk
This section analyzes the systemic risk inherent in the model economy. Systemic risk arises
because the clearinghouse’s choice of margin requirements does not fully insulate it from
default losses. As in the case of KRX in 2013, even with sufficient clearinghouse capital and
a smooth default resolution process, the exhaustion of pre-funded initial margins can lead
to market panic and stress.
Recall from Eq. (3.7), the margin shortfall is given by
MS(γ, λ, α) := (ε+ C)(F (−C − ε)− F (B¯))+ + (−ε+ C)(F (−C + ε)− F (B¯))+.
We define a systemic event as {MS > 0}; that is, the event that initial margins at the
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clearinghouse are insufficient to cover default losses.
For comprehensiveness, we analyze systemic risk using two different measures. The first
measure is the probability of a systemic event (margin exhaustion), P (MS > 0), which is
analogous to Value at Risk. The second measure is the expected margin shortfall conditioned
on a systemic event, E[MS|MS > 0], analogous to Expected Shortfall. The latter measure
bears similarities with the SRISK measure proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2016), who
define systemic risk as the expected capital shortfall conditioned on a systemic event. In
our case, the systemic event is that initial margins are exhausted, and the capital shortfall
is margin shortfall. The two risk measures provide complementary views on systemic risk,
and allow us to assess the robustness of our results.
Proposition 3.7 In equilibrium, the systemic risk measures in our model economy are given
by












Proposition 3.7 maps our results to the professed Value at Risk (VaR) margining rule,
a reduced-form model commonly used in the literature (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
Glasserman et al. (2015)). Most studies treat clearinghouses as non-profit financial utilities,
and directly assume that margins are set to limit default losses to a certain extent. However,
this is of little use in explaining actual margin requirements: one could essentially argue
that any margin requirement is captured by such “VaR margining rules” by fitting a suitable
distribution of losses and choosing a specific confidence level. Proposition 3.7 pins down an
equilibrium VaR by solving for the associated confidence level P (MS > 0) that arises in
equilibrium. The equilibrium VaR rule which emerges is that with approximate confidence
level 1− P (MS > 0) ≈ 1− 2(1+θ)2
θ
α.
Proposition 3.7 produces two important predictions with regards to the probability of
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a systemic event. First, the primary effect of an increase in funding cost is to increase
P (MS > 0). This is because an increase in α induces the clearinghouse to lower its margin
requirement, putting itself more at risk. Second, an increase in market riskiness has a non-









Hence, for low levels of θ (θ < 1), the primary effect of a decrease in θ is an increase in
P (MS > 0). That is, if market riskiness is high, margin requirements have low sensitivity
to riskiness. This results in a higher probability of margin exhaustion. On the other hand,
the opposite effect emerges when market riskiness is low (θ > 1). Margin requirements then
have high sensitivity to riskiness, leading to a decreased P (MS > 0) in equilibrium.
Proposition 3.7 provides a coarser approximation to the conditional expected margin
shortfall. The reason is that the probability of a systemic event is low, and first order ap-
proximations become less accurate for events in the tail of the loss distribution. Nonetheless,
we find that in terms of conditional expected margin shortfall, margin requirements mar-
gin requirements have low sensitivity to riskiness, and a decrease in θ increases conditional
expected margin shortfall. This shows that our previous result in high risk environment is
robust: in terms of both of our proposed measures, increasing market riskiness when it is
high increases systemic risk.
Another dimension of systemic risk can be captured by the probability of the clearing-
house taking a loss
P (X < 0) = P (MS > δe−λB¯). (3.17)
The argument for this more aggressive measure of risk is that the clearinghouse can use its
fee income as a capital buffer for absorbing default losses, so that markets need not panic if
margin shortfalls do not exceed fee income. As the distribution of MS does not fall within
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the class of standard probability distributions, evaluating Eq. (3.17) in equilibrium becomes
intractable. Nevertheless, using the result in Proposition 3.5 and Markov’s inequality, we
can bound the measure in equilibrium by:
P (X < 0) ≤ M˜
δ˜e−λB˜
= θ
2 + 3θ + 1
θ2
α + o(α). (3.18)
Recall from Section 3.3.3, the total fee income is a logarithmic order of magnitude larger than
margin shortfall. Thus, Eq. (3.18) shows that the probability of the clearinghouse suffering
a loss is quite small when funding costs are low, as a very extreme price movement would
be required for equilibrium fee income to be insufficient to pay for default losses. Eq. (3.18)
also highlights the usefulness of endogenizing the clearing fee for analyzing systemic risk, as
modeling margins in isolation does not allow for such a comparison between default losses
and clearing revenue.
3.3.5 Clearing market inefficiencies
This section analyzes market inefficiencies in the model economy. We consider a first-best
situation where a benevolent social planner, who knows the type of each trader, replaces the
clearinghouse as the clearing facility. She solves for the first-best fee and margin requirements
by setting a different fee and margin requirement for each trader depending on his type, and
maximizes aggregate welfare. In addition, she chooses each trader’s position.5 In other
words, she solves the following optimization problem:
max
pi,δ,C
W (γ, λ, α)
pi(·) : R→ [−1, 1]
δ(·) : R→ R+,
C(·) : R→ R+.
5As the social planner would make a trader participate if and only if his net contribution to welfare is
nonnegative, there is no conflict with traders’ interests.
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The next proposition gives the first-best solution:
Proposition 3.8 Let α < 12e and let xh(α)(xl(α)) denote the unique solution to xe−x = 2α










γ|B| , xl(α) ≤ γ|B| ≤ xh(α),
0, xh(α) ≤ γ|B|.
Different from our previous results, the margin requirement is zero for a large proportion
of traders, and the fee is always zero. The social planner does not impose any margin
requirement on traders who have sufficiently high income and are unlikely to default. In
addition, she “subsidizes” those who are extremely default prone by setting their margins to
zero so that their trades are profitable. She only specifies positive margin requirements for
those who are default prone but not extremely so. Interestingly, this means that for these
“intermediate” trades, the beneficial liquidity support provided by margins (which lower
their default probabilities) outweigh margin funding costs and lead to increased welfare.
As there is always a choice of fee and margin that allows for a trader to contribute
positively to aggregate welfare, the social planner makes every trader participate, and thus
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Similar to Proposition 3.6, we can approximate social welfare up to o(α) accuracy:
Proposition 3.9 The aggregate welfare under the first-best solution is





(θ − 1 + log 2 + c0 − log θ) + o(α).
Here, c0 ≈ 0.5572 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
Again, for small α, varying market riskiness and funding cost impact first-best welfare pri-
marily though the α logα
θ
term. As such, increases in funding cost or market riskiness both
reduce welfare.
We can also compare first-best welfare with that of the laissez-faire result given by Propo-
sition 3.6. Using the Taylor expansion given in Eq. (3.13), we can quantify the lost welfare














Thus, the misalignment of interests and asymmetric information between the clearinghouse
and the trader can create significant welfare costs to the model economy.
3.4 Model 1: the extended version
In this section we consider a model extension where the trade matching service is provided by
an exchange (Q) rather than the clearinghouse. This extended version, in comparison to the
baseline version, highlights the effects of separating matching (searching for counterparties)
and clearing (guaranteeing delivery) services.













Figure 4: Model 1 timeline, extended version.
3.4.1 The extended model
The exchanges provides, at a cost, trade matching services for traders. Matched trades are
then cleared by the clearinghouse. A timeline illustration is given in Figure 4.
The introduction of the exchange creates a stage between the clearinghouse and the
traders’ decisions. After the clearinghouse’s declaration of clearing fee (δc) and margin (C)
requirements, the exchange chooses to list the contract for trade or not. If it lists the contract,
it demands a trading fee δb per contract, while incurring an operational cost G for providing
the matching service. In other words,
Exchange’s profit = δb × participating traders−G. (3.20)
Participating traders (i) pay the total fee δ := δb + δc, where δc goes to the clearing-
house and δb to the exchange, and (ii) post margin C to the clearinghouse. As before, the
clearinghouse bears illiquid traders’ default losses.
We remark that in the extended version the clearinghouse moves first and has more
bargaining power. The reason for this assumption is that when exchanges and clearinghouses
are separate entities (as in the case of Bloomberg Swaps Execution Facility and ICE Clear
Credit), the clearinghouse tends to have more bargaining power as it is more involved with
the eventual settlement of the contract and management of daily cash flows stemming from
the position.
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3.4.2 Equilibrium strategies
This section solves for the equilibrium strategies in the extended model. We assume γ, λ, α
and G to be exogenously specified positive parameters. The traders’ equilibrium decisions
are the same as those given in the baseline model.
3.4.2.1 Exchange’s equilibrium choice
This section studies the equilibrium fee chosen by the exchange. Using Proposition 3.2 we
may rewrite the exchange’s profit, given by Eq. (3.20), as
R(δb; δc, C,G, α) := 2δb(1− F (B¯(δc + δb, C;α))−G,
which depends on the clearinghouse’s choice of (δc, C), the exchange’s choice of δb, and its
operational cost G. The exchange has neither revenue nor costs if it chooses to not list the




R(δb; δc, C,G, α)
In addition, it chooses to list the contract if the maximized profit is greater than 0, and
chooses to not otherwise. The next proposition solves for the exchange’s profit maximizing
fee δ˜b(δc, C;α).
Proposition 3.10 Define







γα := (1 + α)γ,
λα := (1 + α)λ.
Then the following statements hold:
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1. (Strategic Complement.) If ξα ≥ 0, then δ˜b is the unique solution to
γα(δc + C) + log 2− 1 = −(λα + γα)δb − log(1− λαδb),








≥ 0, and B˜ ≥ 0.




e−γC − δc − α1 + αC.




< 0, and B˜ = 0.
Because of the lower bound on the trading threshold (Proposition 3.2), R may exhibit
non-differentiable “kinks” (see Figure 5 for an illustration). However, Proposition 3.10 guar-
antees that the profit-maximizing fee is unique, and owing to the salient features of the
Laplace distribution, can be characterized in an analytically tractable manner. As we note
in the appendix, uniqueness of the profit-maximizing exchange fee follows directly from log-
concavity of the income distribution, and does not require the Laplace assumption.
Proposition 3.10 shows that the exchange’s equilibrium response to increases in (δc, C)
may be to increase or decrease its fee. Which “regime” prevails depends on the value of ξα,
which can be thought of as a risk-adjusted measure of aggressiveness of the clearinghouse’s
strategy. Indeed, ξα is clearly monotonically increasing in both δc and C, and decreasing in
γ. If the clearinghouse is sufficiently aggressive (δc and C are high, ξα ≥ 0), the exchange’s
fee choice behaves like a strategic complement, increasing when the clearinghouse becomes
more aggressive. In this case, if the clearinghouse increases δc or C, market volume decreases,
and is then further decreased as the exchange increases its fee. However, the gain from
increased fee per trader outweighs the loss in market volume. When the clearinghouse is not
aggressive (ξα < 0), the exchange’s fee choice becomes a strategic substitute, decreasing when
the clearinghouse becomes more aggressive. In this case, all traders participate; when the
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(a) Continuously differentiable profit function
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(b) Profit function with a “kink”
Figure 5: Profit function illustrations.
The exchange’s choice of fee is always unique.
clearinghouse increases δc or C, market volume again decreases. In response, the exchange
decreases its fee so that again all traders participate. In this case, decreased fee is outweighed
by increased market volume.
We graphically demonstrate the economic implications of Proposition 3.10 on the δc−C
plane, for the case α = 0. Figure 6a shows that the clearinghouse’s strategy space can be
separated into two distinct regions by the level curve ξ0(δc, C) = 0. When the strategic
substitute regime prevails all traders participate. This can only happen when the contract is
sufficiently risky so that the trading threshold approaches zero. Indeed, from Figure 6a, we
see that this regime is only feasible if the volatility of the contract is greater than the average
income, i.e. γ
λ
< 1, in which case ξ0(δc, C) = 0 meets both axes in the positive region.


































(b) Range of equilibria
Figure 6: The impact of introducing an exchange.
The figure on the left shows that the clearinghouse’s strategy space is separated into two regimes.
Depending on its choice of δc and C, the exchange reacts differently. The strategic substitute regime is
feasible only when γλ < 1. The right figure shows the impact on the effective feasible region. It is bounded
below by the curve ξ0 = 0, and above by the curve R = 0. The clearinghouse profit-maximizing strategy
may occur in the interior or on the boundary.
3.4.2.2 Clearinghouse’s equilibrium choices
In the extended model, the clearinghouse’s expected profit is given by:






λ+ γ + B¯
)
, (3.22)
where we recall that B¯ is the effective trading threshold defined in Eq. (3.6). When the
clearinghouse sets δc and C, it takes into account the exchange’s equilibrium response, in
addition to the traders’ choices. It takes into consideration that the exchange’s equilibrium
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s.t. R(δ˜b(δc, C); δc, C,G) ≥ 0.
Proposition A.3 in the appendix provides analytical expressions of the critical points. We
consider the setting without funding cost (α = 0) and use it as a benchmark for our analysis.
Interestingly, the introduction of the exchange and its individual rationality constraint (R ≥
0) results in distinctly new families of possible equilibria. We fully characterize the possible
equilibria in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.11 Let α = 0, then the equilibria in the extended model must be one of the
following five types.
(i) (Unconstrained infinite margin equilibrium)
(λδ˜c, λC˜, λδ˜b) = (1,∞, 1) .
This can occur only when λG ≤ e−2.
(ii) (Constrained infinite margin equilibrium)
(λδ˜c, λC˜, λδ˜b) = (−1 + log(λG),∞, u0) ,
where u0 is the unique solution to the equation u0(2 − 2u0) 1θ = λG that is larger than
θ
1+θ . This can occur only when e
−2 ≤ λG ≤ e−1.
(iii) (Unconstrained zero margin equilibrium)
(λδ˜c, λC˜, λδ˜b) =
(
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where u is the unique solution to the equation 1− log(2− 2u) + θ2
u
− (1 + θ)2 = 0 that




(iv) (Constrained zero margin equilibrium)
(λδ˜c, λC˜, λδ˜b) =
(







where u0 has been defined in case (ii).
(v) (No trading) λδ˜c = ∞. The exchange chooses to not list the contract and its profit is
0. The clearinghouse’s expected profit is 0. This can occur only when λG ≥ e−1.
In equilibria (i)-(iv), the exchange’s fee acts as a strategic complement to δc and C. Which
equilibrium prevails depends only on the value of θ and λG.
In Proposition 3.11, the names of the presented equilibria indicate whether the equilib-
rium margin requirements are infinite or zero, and whether the exchange’s IR constraint is
binding or not. When the exchange’s IR constraint is binding, the clearinghouse is “con-
strained” from making a more aggressive choice of (δc, C), as it would result in the exchange
choosing to not list the contract, voiding its profitable clearing business.
Proposition 3.11 shows that equilibria analogous to that of Theorem 3.1 in the absence
of funding cost are directly inherited in the extended model. Indeed, for the unconstrained
infinite margin equilibrium, the fee is set to the average potential income and the margin to
infinity. We will refer to this family of equilibria as legacy equilibria. Moreover, Proposition
3.11 shows that the presence of the exchange introduces new families of equilibria distinctly
different from that of the baseline model (equilibria (ii)-(v)). The reason is that the ex-
change’s presence modifies the domain of the clearinghouse’s choices (the “effective feasible
region”) in two ways. First, the exchange’s IR constraint ensures that the clearinghouse’s
choices of δc and C are not too high, so as to guarantee that the exchange achieves a non-
negative profit. Second, the fact that the exchange may use its fee as a strategic substitute
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(Proposition 3.10) means that the clearinghouse will exploit this by setting δc and C suf-
ficiently high. Precisely, when ξα < 0, the clearinghouse can always increase its expected
profit by increasing δc and C without lowering market volume, as the exchange’s equilibrium
response is to lower the trading fee to incentivize all traders to participate. We thus must
have ξα ≥ 0 when the clearinghouse chooses the optimal δc and C. The effective feasible
region is thus Kα := {δc ≥ 0, C ≥ 0|R(δ˜b(δc, C;α); δc, C,G, α) ≥ 0, ξα(δc, C) ≥ 0}, and
its geometry is what underpins the new types of equilibria. The geometry of the effective
feasible region is illustrated in Figure 15 for the case α = 0.
In the following sections, we analyze the impact of introducing the exchange along two
different dimensions. First, we focus on legacy equilibria (C˜ →∞ as α→ 0 and G = 0), so
as to maintain comparability with our baseline results. This highlights how the dependence
of equilibrium fee and margin requirements on market riskiness and funding cost changes.
Second, we consider how market riskiness and operational costs affect which of the possible
equilibria prevail. This highlights the new characteristics of the extended model.
3.4.3 Legacy equilibria
In this section we compare the baseline model equilibrium with the legacy equilibrium in the
extended model. To maintain comparability we make the assumption that G = 0. (Should
a positive operational cost be introduced in the baseline model, the clearinghouse would
choose to clear the contract if and only if its expected profits exceed G.)
3.4.3.1 Equilibrium solutions
We start with the following theorem showing that the equilibrium fee and margins in the
extended model parallel those given by Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2 Assume G = 0 and θ2 + θ < 1. The equilibrium fee and margin requirements
corresponding to C˜ → ∞ as α → 0, respectively denoted by δ˜b(θ, α), δ˜c(θ, α), and C˜(θ, α),
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are given by
λδ˜b(θ, α) = 1− α− (1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)α + o(α) (3.23)
λδ˜c(θ, α) = 1− α + (1 + θ)
2
θ2
α + 2(1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)α + o(α), (3.24)











We remark that the approximation errors are of the same order as that given in Theorem
3.1. We also point out that there is the additional assumption of θ2 + θ < 1, which means
that the market is sufficiently risky. This arises because, as we will see in the next section,
zero margin equilibria take over when the market is not risky.
The introduction of the exchange directly affects the resulting equilibrium fee and margin
requirements. By comparing Eq. (3.10) and Eq. (3.24), we see that the difference in clearing
fees is 2(1+θ)2
θ(1−θ−θ2)α, i.e. the introduction of the exchange increases the equilibrium clearing
fee. This is because if the clearinghouse imposes too low a fee, the exchange would impose
a high fee to take advantage of the high market volume, decreasing the clearinghouse’s
profit (Proposition 3.10). The clearinghouse thus uses a high fee to ensure that this does
not happen. The fee imposed is so much higher that the clearinghouse reduces the margin
requirement so the deterring effect to traders is smaller. Indeed, by comparing Eq. (3.11)
and Eq. (3.25), we see that the difference in margin requirement is log(1−θ−θ2)−θ
θ
, i.e. the
introduction of the exchange decreases the equilibrium margin requirement. The total fee
paid by a trader increases by θ3+2θ2+θ+1
θ(1−θ−θ2) α.
We observe from Theorem 3.2 that the first order effects of varying riskiness and costs on
the margin requirement remain the same as in the baseline model. Increased funding cost
reduce margins. By rewriting Eq. (3.25) as







θ(1− θ − θ2)
)
− 2 + o(1),
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we see that the primary effect of a decrease in θ (increase in riskiness) is to increase margins
through the − logα
θ
term. The intuition behind equilibrium margins thus remain the same as
in the baseline model. Similarly, we observe that an increase in funding cost increases the
clearing fee and reduces the exchange’s fee. When funds are costly, the clearinghouse can
reduce margin requirements to incentivize trading, whereas the exchange’s only choice is to
reduce its fee to mitigate the negative impact of higher funding cost on trades.
Different from the baseline model, varying market riskiness has an indeterminate effect
on clearing and exchange fees. To see this, we can differentiate equations (3.23) and (3.24)
with respect to θ, disregarding the o(α) terms, and obtain:
∂λδ˜b
∂θ
≈ (θ + 1) (1− θ
3 − 3θ2 − 3θ)
θ2 (θ2 + θ − 1)2 ,
∂λδ˜c
∂θ
≈ 2(θ + 1) (θ
3 + 4θ2 + θ − 1)
θ3 (θ2 + θ − 1)2 .
Thus, when the market is risky, i.e. θ is low, the clearing (exchange’s) fee increases (decreases)
with riskiness; however, when the market is not risky (θ2 + θ approaches 1), the relations
are reversed. In the former case, the clearinghouse increases its fee and reduces the margin
requirement in response to increased riskiness and the intuition remains the same as in the
baseline model. The exchange responds by reducing its fee and preserves market volume. In
the latter case, the market is relatively stable, and an increase in riskiness presents a case
for the clearinghouse to incentivize more traders to participate by decreasing its fee. While
the marginal traders added are more risky, the overall risk is still low. The exchange takes
advantage of the increased market volume and increases its fee. Interestingly, in either case
the exchange partially offsets the clearinghouse’s changes in clearing fee by adjusting the
trading fee, effectively stabilizing changes in total fee δ.
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3.4.3.2 Market characteristics
This section studies the impact of the exchange on the market characteristics introduced in
Section 3.3.3.
Proposition 3.12 In the extended model (with G = 0 and θ2 + θ < 1):
λB˜(θ, α) = 2− 2α− (1 + θ)
2
1− θ − θ2α−
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2








1− α + (1 + θ)
3
θ2(1− θ − θ2)α +
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)
)
+ o(α)
λM˜(θ, α) = e−2ααθ +1 θ
2 + 3θ + 1
θ2(1− θ − θ2) + o(α)
λE[X˜] = e−2ααθ
(
1 + (1 + θ)
2
1− θ − θ2α +
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2





1 + α− (1 + θ)
2(1− θ)
θ(1− θ − θ2) α +
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2






3 − 4θ + 3
3θ(1− θ − θ2)α +
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)
)
+ o(α).
A direct comparison of propositions 3.4 and 3.12 shows that the effect of varying market
riskiness and funding cost on market characteristics remain the same as in the baseline model.
However, there is a big impact on the levels of the equilibrium variables. This can be seen
from Proposition 3.12, which indicates that the trading threshold increases by approximately
1
λ
(the average potential income), decreasing market volume. By Taylor expanding the ααθ
term using Eq. (3.13), we see that clearing fee income and clearing profit both decrease by
approximately 1− e−1 = 63.2%. The impact on margin shortfall is, however, indeterminate:
it changes by a factor of e−11−θ−θ2 , i.e. it increases for stable markets (high θ) and decreases
for risky markets.
Total welfare is lowered by 1− 3e−22e−1 = 44.8%, and is distributed evenly across the clear-
inghouse, the exchange, and the traders in aggregate. Comparing to the first-best case
analyzed in Section 3.3.5, we see the loss in efficiency is more pronounced: approximately
1 − 3e−2 ≈ 59.4% of first-best welfare is lost due to misaligned interests and asymmetric
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information.
3.4.3.3 Systemic risk
This section studies the impact of the exchange on the systemic risk measures introduced in
Section 3.3.4.
Proposition 3.13 In the extended model (with G = 0 and θ2 + θ < 1):
P (MS > 0) = 2(1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)α + o(α)








A direct comparison of propositions 3.7 and 3.13 indicates the introduction of the exchange
impacts both systemic risk measures. Because the equilibrium margin requirement decreases,
the probability of a systemic event increases: the “equilibrium VaR confidence level” increases
by a factor of 11−θ−θ2 . On the other hand, conditional expected margin shortfall decreases by a
factor of e−1. This is because the increased total fee screens out many default-prone traders.
Thus from a systemic risk perspective, there may be benefits from separating clearing and
trading facilities depending on the measure of interest. Similar to our results for the baseline
model, a decrease in θ increases (decreases) P (MS > 0) for low (high) levels of θ, and a
decrease in θ increases conditional expected margin shortfall.
As in Section 3.3.4, we can bound the probability that the clearinghouse incurs a loss,
P (X < 0). This is given by
P (X < 0) ≤ M˜
δ˜e−λB˜
= θ
2 + 3θ + 1
θ2(1− θ − θ2)α + o(α).
While the bound is looser by a factor of 11−θ−θ2 due to lower equilibrium margins in the
presence of the exchange, the main insights remain the same: as expected margin shortfall
is much smaller than total clearing fee income, the probability of the clearinghouse suffering
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a loss is very small.
3.4.4 New equilibria
In this section we consider the dependence of the various potential equilibria presented in
Proposition 3.11 on market riskiness and the exchange’s operational cost. While the previous
section focuses on the legacy equilibrium and analyzes how it depends on model parameters,
this section focuses on when the prevailing equilibrium switches from one family to another.
To convey the main intuitions and highlight the main economic forces in play, we consider
the case α = 0 throughout this section. It should be noted, however, that our analysis and
results still hold for small, positive funding cost, as all involved functions are continuously
differentiable.
We recall from Proposition 3.11 that the type of prevailing equilibrium depends solely
on market riskiness θ−1 and the exchange’s operational cost ν := λG. In addition, we can
identify the regions that give rise to each of the five equilibria. We report the results in Figure
7. For each choice of θ and ν, we compute the fee and margin requirements in each of the five
cases using the expressions provided in Proposition 3.11. We then evaluate the corresponding
expected profits and recover the prevailing equilibrium as the choice yielding the maximum
expected profit. We remark that the thresholds separating the regions associated with the
different types of equilibria depend only on the Laplace distribution assumption, and are
robust to the defining parameters of the distribution.
3.4.4.1 Market riskiness
We first study the dependence of the prevailing equilibrium type on the market riskiness
parameter θ. Figure 7 indicates that the clearinghouse chooses to eliminate defaults by
setting high margin requirements when the market is risky (θ is low) and to incentivize more
trades by abandoning the use of margin when it is not (θ is high).
We now demonstrate the transition of margin requirements from infinite to zero by look-
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Figure 7: Prevailing equilibrium for varying θ and ν = λG.
High market riskiness and high operational costs push the clearinghouse to demand infinite margin
(C =∞). There are no equilibria in which trading occurs if ν is too high.
ing at the dependence of the expected profit of the clearinghouse on θ in Figure 8. Fixing
ν = 0, λ = 1 and θ = γ, we consider both the case of zero and infinite margin requirements.
Because ν = 0, the exchange’s IR constraint is non-binding. We find that the profit made by
the clearinghouse when it sets a zero margin requirement is a non-monotone function of mar-
ket riskiness θ−1. As θ increases, the expected profit first increases due to the reduced default
rate; it then decreases when θ becomes sufficiently high as it diminishes the bankruptcy pro-
tection value, which in turn reduces trading activity. As θ approaches infinity, the contract
value converges to zero. In this case traders’ decisions become independent of the margin
requirement (when the contract value is deterministic, all traders trade and none default),
so that the zero margin equilibrium and the infinite margin equilibrium coincide and result
in the same level of clearinghouse profit.
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Figure 8: Maximum expected profit of the clearinghouse as a function of θ = γ for λ = 1.
The clearinghouse’s expected profit when it chooses zero margin is non-monotonic in θ: it rises initially due
to lower default rates and then declines due to lower participation.
Figure 8 indicates that there is a critical value θ∗ above which the clearinghouse chooses
a zero margin requirement, and below which it chooses infinite margin (we have numerically
computed the threshold θ∗ = γ∗/1 ≈ 0.58). Thus, margin requirements may be subject to
large swings even if the contract volatility 1/γ or average potential income 1/λ only changes
by a moderate amount.
From Figure 7, we note that there exist values of ν for which the exchange switches from
being profitable to neutral and then profitable again, as riskiness decreases. That is, the
exchange’s profit is also a non-monotonic function of market riskiness. In particular, consider
the case ν = 0.13 (the borderline between constrained and unconstrained infinite margin
equilibria is e−2 = 0.1353 by Theorem 1) and θ = 0.5. In this case, an unconstrained infinite
margin equilibrium prevails, and the exchange makes positive profit. As θ increases, the
expected default losses decrease, reducing the need for margin. As θ reaches approximately
0.58, there is a shift to a constrained zero margin equilibrium, in which the exchange is
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making zero profit. This happens when the exchange’s IR constraint becomes binding:
without the constraint the clearinghouse would choose δc and C so that the exchange would
be making negative profit. δ˜c hence is chosen low enough so that the exchange exactly breaks
even, but high enough to guarantee that the clearinghouse’s expected profit is higher than
that of the infinite margin equilibrium. If market riskiness decreases further, there is a shift
to an unconstrained zero margin equilibrium, where the exchange again makes a positive
profit. In this case enough traders trade due to relatively high potential incomes and the
exchange’s IR constraint becomes non-binding.
3.4.4.2 Operational costs
In this section, we study the dependence of the prevailing equilibrium type on the normalized
operational cost ν, which affects prevailing equilibria through the exchange’s IR constraint.
When ν is low, the exchange makes a positive profit and the constraint has no effect on pre-
vailing equilibria (cases (i) and (iii) in Proposition 3.11). When ν is high, the clearinghouse
must take into account that, at worst, the exchange needs to break even (cases (ii) and (iv)
in Proposition 3.11). When ν is too high, however, the break even condition results in a
negative expected profit for the clearinghouse. The clearinghouse would then choose to “kill
the market” (case (v) in Proposition 3.11) and the contract is not traded.
The described pattern is visible in Figure 7, as we move from the left to the right along the
ν axis. For high levels of riskiness, e.g. θ = 0.2, the prevailing equilibrium is unconstrained
and involves infinite margin, if the operational cost is low. As ν increases, the exchange’s IR
constraint becomes binding and the clearinghouse must reduce δc or C. This is achieved by
lowering its fee but keeping margin requirements high. For low levels of riskiness, e.g. θ = 1,
the prevailing equilibrium involves zero margin and is unconstrained when the operational
cost is low. As ν increases, making the exchange’s IR constraint binding, two situations can
occur. For moderate operational costs, the prevailing equilibrium is that with zero margin
but with reduced clearing fee. As the operational cost further increases, constrained infinite
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margin equilibria take over. As the expected profit function is continuous with respect to δc
and C, this suggests that a downward jump in the clearing fee occurs to compensate for the
upward jump in margin requirements. No trading happens if ν is too high, regardless of the
level of market riskiness.
We conclude the section by pointing out additional inefficiencies that can arise when the
clearinghouse is constrained by the exchange’s IR constraint. In general, the equilibrium
response of the clearinghouse to an increase in operational costs is to lower its fee and
incentivize the exchange to list the contract. In this case, the additional surplus generated
in the economy may more than compensate for the clearinghouse’s decreased fee revenue.
Consider, for instance, the setting θ = 1, ν = 0.3, under which a constrained infinite margin
equilibrium prevails. If the exchange’s operational cost were to increase by a small amount
dG, say due to a regulatory tax, the prevailing equilibrium remains constrained with infinite
margin, but the clearinghouse lowers its fee.
From Proposition 3.11, the clearinghouse now has expected profit:
E[X;G+ dG] := −(G+ dG)(log λ(G+ dG) + 1).
As the prevailing equilibrium is an infinite margin equilibrium, we must have λG < e−1 (see
cases (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3.11). Thus
dE[X;G]
dG
= − log λG− 2 > −1, for λG < e−1.
Hence, the expected clearinghouse profit decreases by less than dG. The tax revenue is more
than enough to compensate the clearinghouse for decreased revenue. The excess can then be
distributed to the clearinghouse, the exchange, or the traders. Any such allocation results
in a Pareto improvement, as even without the distribution: (i) the clearinghouse has the
same expected profit, (ii) the exchange still breaks even, and (iii) more traders trade, which
implies that (iv) traders who would have traded anyway pay a lower aggregate fee and are
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thus better off.
3.5 Concluding remarks
We have studied the decision problem faced by a profit-maximizing clearinghouse. Model 1
endogenizes not only the margin but also the fee requirement, and captures the main tradeoffs
underpinning the clearinghouse’s choices: both high fee revenue and better default protection
come at the cost of decreased market volume. Model equilibria explain the usefulness of fee
and margin requirements in screening traders, and pins down their dependence on contract
riskiness, trader fundamentals, and capital funding costs. The simplicity of the model allows
for an analytical, yet intuitive, study of the interplay of fees and margin requirements. We
investigate market characteristics such as market volume and the distribution of economic
surplus, as well as the resulting inefficiencies due to conflicting interests and asymmetric
information. We also quantify several measures of systemic risk that arise in equilibrium, in
particular reconciling the margins with an “equilibrium VaR”. We find that the separation
of clearing and trading facilities can significantly impact fee and margin requirements, in
addition to introducing distinctly different families of equilibria.
An important prediction of Model 1 is that margins are dependent not only on the
riskiness of the contract being traded, but also on trader fundamentals and funding costs.
The dependence of trader fundamentals on margin requirements is partially supported by
current market practice: hedger margins are often less than that of speculators, and there
is a term-structure of margin requirements that tends to be lower when market participants
are deemed to be less speculative. The relation between margins and funding costs can be
empirically tested. In particular, since increases in interest paid on collateralizing securities
(measured by OIS spreads or LIBOR) directly lower traders’ funding cost, we expect a
positive relation between margins and the interest paid, after controlling for contract riskiness
and trader fundamentals.
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The non-concavity of the clearinghouse’s expected profit function implies that fee and
margin constraints can affect prevailing equilibria without being binding. For instance, in
our extended model with α = 0, when a zero margin equilibrium is the true global maximum,
a minimum margin requirement {C > c} may result in the clearinghouse choosing infinite
margin, a local maximum. If the requirement were to be removed, however, there can be a
sudden drop in margin requirements as the global maximum would occur at C = 0. This aids
analyzing the impact of regulations on the determination of fee and margin requirements.
Randomness in Model 1 comes from the realization of the contract value, ε, which triggers
default among losing traders. Our model thus implicitly focuses on “wrong way risk”: the
risk that the trader is out of the money at default. We choose this specification because when
the trader is in the money, the clearinghouse bears no losses. An avenue for future research
is to introduce idiosyncratic liquidity risk among the traders so that they can also default
exogenously with some probability, similar to Koeppl (2013). The “law of large numbers”
(Judd (1985)) would allow the clearinghouse to have perfect foresight on the fraction of
traders who default due to the exogenous, idiosyncratic, shocks. If the clearinghouse does
not pay defaulting traders who are in the money, its expected profit increases because winning
traders also default, and a fraction of losing traders who default are also those who would
already be defaulting in the baseline model. Hence, introducing idiosyncratic risk would
likely disincentivize the clearinghouse from using margin to mitigate default losses, but not
qualitatively change our results. Indeed, we consider an alternative setting in Chapter 4
where defaults are completely exogenous, and find qualitatively similar results.
Another extension of Model 1 is to analyze the equilibrium haircuts, the percentage dis-
count applied when financial assets are pledged to meet margin requirements. This can be
done by treating pledged margin as an financial asset with positive price volatility. The dif-
ference between the equilibrium margin requirements in the benchmark model (no volatility),
and in the case where the asset’s value is volatile can be used to quantify the equilibrium
haircut.
Chapter 4
Continuous Time Margin Theory
Overview
In this chapter, we introduce an alternative margin model, Model 2. The main goal is to
assess the robustness of the main conclusions derived from Model 1 in Chapter 3 to deviations
from the model assumptions.
Similar to Model 1, the continuous time model economy consists of a clearinghouse and
a continuum of heterogenous traders. Traders trade a mandatorily cleared, standardized
contract and obtain heterogenous, unobservable, income from trade. The clearinghouse
provides both matching and clearing services, does not default, and declares continuously
uniform per contract fee and margin requirements. Agents are expected profit maximizing
and do not discount the future.
Market stress times arrive at random. When the market is stressed, traders default
independently with fixed probability. At the same time, the price of the cleared contract
jumps. This create a loss to the clearinghouse as it does not receive the change in contract
value from defaulting traders, but still must honor payouts to them.
Model 2 deviates from Model 1 along three important dimensions. First, in the continuous
time model economy default times are not known in advance. Second, we consider exogenous
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defaults. This is different from Model 1 where traders’ defaults are driven by an adverse
realization of the contract value and lower realizable income. Third, we consider more
relaxed distributional assumptions on the underlying contract price distribution and trader
preferences.
Recall, an important prediction of Model 1 is that margins are dependent not only on the
riskiness of the contract being traded, but also on trader fundamentals and funding costs.
Moreover, when mapping the results to an “equilibrium VaR”, Model 1 shows that the con-
fidence level depends on characteristics not specific to the traded contract. We find that
both our main conclusions hold true in Model 2. In addition, we show that while contract
characteristics such as volatility and the distribution of price jumps remain important de-
terminants of margins, so do capital funding costs and trader fundamentals such as default
probabilities. We further find that equilibrium VaR confidence levels depend exclusively on
default probabilities and capital funding costs. This shows robustness of our main results in
Chapter 3.
Default risk in Model 2 is not a wrong way risk because incomes do not correlate with
defaults. This changes the nature of the relation between margins and funding costs. Specif-
ically, in Model 2 it is the ratio between margin funding cost and fee funding cost that
determines margins. Thus, the wrong way risk assumption is essential for relating mar-
gins to the level of funding costs. We also note that in the absence of the wrong way risk
assumption, the income distribution no longer has an impact on margins.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 presents Model 2. Section 4.2 solves for
traders’ equilibrium choices. Section 4.3 solves for the clearinghouse’ equilibrium strategies.
Section 4.4 concludes.
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4.1 Model 2
In Model 2, we consider a continuous time model economy populated with a unit mass of
heterogenous traders i ∈ [0, 1] and a clearinghouse at inception. Information is modeled
with a filtered probability space (Ω, (G(t), t ≥ 0),P). Traders trade a mandatorily cleared,
infinitely-lived security whose price process is denoted by P . We assume there is no arbitrage
in the economy and P is a risk-neutral measure associated with an interest rate normalized
to zero. P is thus a P−martingale.
Market stress events arrive according to a Poisson process N whose stress arrival intensity
is described by the nonnegative process λ. We use the stopping time Tn to denote the time
of the n-th arrival. Market stress induces traders’ defaults and causes a jump in the price of
the security. Under market stress, each surviving trader defaults with probability D ∈ (0, 1)
independently and exogenously.
Furthermore, there are two exogenous, mutually independent processes ν, ε, which are
also independent of the filtration generated by P and λ. ν(t) ≥ 0 describes the fundamental
volatility of the price jump under market stress at time t, and ε(t) the unit variance random
variable capturing the shape of the jump distribution. In particular, the price process of the
security jumps according to:
P (Tn)− P (T−n ) = ν(T−n )ε(Tn).
We assume ε(Tn) i.i.d.∼ H, where H is continuously differentiable with density h. Notice that
since H is symmetric, the fact that the price process jumps does not contradict the assump-
tion that P is a martingale. We leave the dynamics of λ and ν intentionally unspecified.
To model traders’ preferences, we assume, as in Model 1, trader i receives income for
trading the contracts at a rate of pii(t)Bi, where pii(t) ∈ [−1, 1] is his position in the contract
at time t. B is private information encoding the trader’s type, which is distributed initially
(at time 0) according to a symmetric distribution B ∼ F. We assume F is continuously
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differentiable with a finite first moment, and denote its density by f . By the law of large
numbers, the surviving members at time t are distributed according to Ft = (1 − D)N(t)F.
The mass of surviving traders is denoted S(t) = (1−D)N(t).
At each instant in time, the clearinghouse declares the initial margin rule C(t), and the
clearing fee δ(t). These are the units of capital that needs to be posted to the clearinghouse,
and paid to the clearinghouse per contract traded, respectively. In view of the clearinghouse’s
choice of C(t) and δ(t), trader i responds by choosing his position pii(t) ∈ [−1, 1] in the
contract.
When trader defaults, they are protected by limited liability. Thus, if the price jumps
against them under market stress, they are only liable for the amount up to the collateral
posted. However, they receive the entire amount owed to them when the price jumps in their
favor.
Comparing models 1 and 2, we see that they share several common features: (i) trader
preferences are modeled with income proportional to the size of the position, (ii) the clear-
inghouse unilaterally declares a uniform fee and margin level, and (iii) traders are protected
by limited liability. Different from Model 1, however, in Model 2 we assume (i) default times
are not known in advance as the market stress arrives at random, (ii) defaults are exogenous
and not correlated with income levels, and (iii) aside from being symmetric there are no
restrictions on the income distribution F and the distribution of contract price changes H.
4.1.1 Traders’ profit functions
The expected profit of a trader consists of three components: (i) trading gains due to prices
moving in his favor, (ii) income received from staying in the market, net of any applicable
funding costs and fees, and (iii) default protection granted by the clearing system. Denoting
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Eq. (4.1) also implies that the clearinghouse practices variation margining, so that positions
are marked-to-market and payouts occur continuously over the life time of the position,




Bipii(t)− (βC(t) + (1 + α)δ(t))|pii(t)|dt.
Here, β represents the per unit funding opportunity cost of collateralizing assets, and α the
per unit opportunity cost of paying the clearing fee. Limited liability protection creates a
wealth transfer from the clearinghouse to the trader, and can be quantified as:
wD(τi) := (pii(τi)ν(τ−i )ε(τi) + |pii(τi)|C(τi))+ − |pii(τi)|C(τi). (4.2)
Eq. (4.2) shows that defaulting traders can lose at most the margins they post.




E[wP (τi) + wB(τi) + wD(τi)] (4.3)
subject to trading limit constraints pii(t) ∈ [−1, 1].
4.1.2 Clearinghouse’s profit function
We now analyze the clearinghouse’s optimization problem. The surplus that it captures
consists of two components: (i) fee income from participating traders and (iii) default losses
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Here p˜iB(t) denotes the optimal trading strategy chosen by a trader with income parameter
B at time t. Eq. (4.4) reflects that the clearinghouse’s instantaneous fee income is the size of
each trader’s |p˜iB(t)| portfolio times its per contract fee δ(t), aggregated over the distribution
of traders. Recall that surviving members’ income parameters are distributed according to
Ft = (1−D)N(t).






Here X− := −min(X, 0) reflects that the clearinghouse bears only the losses, but not the
gains, that defaulting traders generate. We also assume that the clearinghouse is risk-neutral





E[vf (n)− vd(n)], (4.5)
subject to nonnegativity constraints δ ≥ 0, C ≥ 0.
4.2 Equilibrium trading choices
In this section we solve for traders’ equilibrium trading choices p˜ii(t).
Proposition 4.1 Define Λ(t) := ∫ t0 λ(s)ds and WH(ν, C) := E[(C+ νε)+−C]. The trader’s




e−DΛ(t)|pii(t)| {|Bi|+ λ(t)DWH(ν(t), C(t))− (1 + α)δ(t)− βC(t)} dt
]
(4.6)
Notice that WH(ν, C) =
∫
C+νx≥0C + νxdH(x)− C is the expected wealth transfer from
the clearinghouse to a trader due to default protection. The value of default protection is
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where we used that H is symmetric in the second equation. As in Model 1, quite intuitively,
increased margins directly lowers the value of default protection, since the trader is liable
for a larger amount of default losses. Increased price volatility increases the value of default
protection, since the trader has a higher chance of making large gains from the price jump
and is protected from downside risk. In view of Proposition 4.1, we see that the surplus that
the trader captures at each instant in time is
e−DΛ(t)|pii(t)| {|Bi|+ λ(t)DWH(ν(t), C(t))− βC(t)− (1 + α)δ(t)} (4.7)
Eq. (4.7) shows that the instantaneous surplus consists of clearing income |Bi|, the default
protection WH(ν(t), C(t)) less funding cost βC(t)+αδ(t) and clearing fee δ(t). Since default
protection only benefits the trader if he actually defaults, it is weighted by the intensity at
which the trader defaults in the next infinitesimal time period, λ(t)D. Moreover, because
of his potential future defaults, the trader effectively discounts the future at the rate λ(t)D.
Eq. (4.7) also shows that the trader’s optimal strategy is given by:
p˜ii(t) =

sgn(Bi), |Bi|+ λ(t)DWH(ν(t), C(t)) ≥ (1 + α)δ(t) + βC(t),
0, otherwise.
(4.8)
Analogous to Proposition 3.1 in Chapter 3, our analysis shows that given the clear-
inghouse’s choices (δ(t), C(t)) and stressed price volatility ν(t), there is a natural trading
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threshold B¯(t) := B¯(δ(t), C(t), ν(t)) defined as
B¯(δ(t), C(t), ν(t)) := ((1 + α)δ(t) + βC(t)− λ(t)DWH(ν(t), C(t))+,
and trader i trades one unit of the contract if and only if |Bi| ≥ B¯(t). A closer look at
the trading threshold reveals that he trades when the income plus default protection benefit
|Bi| + λ(t)DWH(ν(t), C(t)) exceeds the cost of fee and funding costs (1 + α)δ(t) + βC(t).
When Bi > 0(< 0), he is a natural buyer (seller), and chooses to buy (sell) one unit of the
security when he trades.
The trading threshold increases when either the fee or margin does. Indeed, assuming
B¯ > 0, we can compute
∂B¯(t)
∂δ
= 1 + α,
∂B¯(t)
∂C
= β − λ(t)D∂WH
∂C
.
A unit increase in fee and margin impacts the trading threshold differently. While the effect
of increasing the fee is entirely determined by the fee funding cost, the effect of increasing
the margin is determined by both the funding cost and the impact on default protection
value.
4.3 Equilibrium clearinghouse choices
In this section we analyze the clearinghouse’s equilibrium choices. We will denote the
equilibrium fee and margin requirements at time t as δ˜(t) and C˜(t), the survival function
F¯ (x) = 1−F (x), and use φF (x) := f(x)F¯ (x) to denote the hazard rate function of the distribution
function F .
We first rewrite the clearinghouse’s problem Eq. (4.5) in an economically intuitive for-
mulation.
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e−DΛ(t) (δ(t)− λ(t)DWH(ν(t), C(t))) F¯ (B¯(t))dt
]
(4.9)
From Eq. (4.9) we see that the clearinghouse wants to maximize the instantaneous reward
function:
K(δ(t), C(t), ν(t)) := (δ(t)− λ(t)DWH(ν(t), C(t))) F¯ (B¯(t)).
The marginal surplus of the clearinghouse per trader is her fee rate δ less the instantaneous
wealth transfer due to default protection λDWH and the cost due to margin adjustments.
Her aggregate instantaneous rewards is the marginal surplus times the mass of participating
traders F¯ (B¯).1
4.3.1 Equilibrium fee choice
As there are no inter-temporal constraints or costs associated with δ, the fee choice is gov-
erned purely by the static maximization of K(δ(t), C(t), ν(t)). We denote
δ∗(t) := δ∗(ν(t), C(t)) := argmax
δ
K(δ(t), C(t), ν(t))
K(t)∗ = K(δ∗(t), C(t), ν(t))
B∗(t) = B¯(δ∗(t), C(t), ν(t)).
We refer to δ∗(t) as the profit-maximizing fee level. Notice that this is different from the
equilibrium level δ˜(t) as it is a function of C(t) and ν(t). Proposition 4.2 implies the following:
1For ease of exposition we disregard the constant factor of two.
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Corollary 4.1 δ∗(t) satisfies
δ∗(t) > λ(t)DWH(C(t), ν(t)),
and solves the following first order condition:
F¯ (B∗(t)) + (1 + α) (δ(t)− λ(t)DWH(C(t), ν(t))) F¯ ′(B∗(t)) = 0. (4.10)
Moreover, B∗ ≥ 0 and satisfies
B∗(t) > βC(t) + αλDWH(C(t), ν(t)).
Notice that B¯(δ, C, ν) is non-differentiable in both δ and C when B¯(δ, C, ν) = 0. However,
Corollary 4.1 shows that B¯(δ∗, C, ν) > 0 and thus has the useful implication that when
looking for interior maximizers, we can solve for them via differentiating K(δ, C, ν).
The uniqueness of the fee level is governed by our notion of regularity. We start with a
definition.
Definition 4.1 A continuously differentiable distribution function F is regular if there
exists M,a > 0 such that all for x > M ,
xφF (x) > 1 + a. (I)
It is strongly regular if
xφF (x) is non-decreasing in x for x ≥ 0. (II)
Condition (II) is stronger than (I) in the sense that the former implies the latter.2 Our
notion of (strong) regularity allows us to establish the existence and uniqueness of interior
2We include a proof of this fact in Appendix B.
CHAPTER 4. CONTINUOUS TIME MARGIN THEORY 71
optima, and is satisfied by all non-decreasing hazard rate distributions, and is closely related
to that proposed by Myerson (1981).
We now characterize the profit-maximizing fee level. By Corollary A.2, this is governed
by the first order condition Eq. (4.10). Under suitable regularity conditions, the clearing
business is profitable (so that the clearinghouse chooses a finite fee level) and the equilibrium
fee level is uniquely determined by Eq. (4.10).
Proposition 4.3 Suppose F is regular, then δ∗(t) <∞ for all C(t) and ν(t). If we assume
further that F is strongly regular, then δ∗(t) is unique.
We note that the Laplace distribution employed in Chapter 3 is strongly regular, and thus
guarantees the existence of a unique profit-maximizing fee by Proposition 4.3.
4.3.2 Equilibrium margin choice
In this section we solve for the profit-maximizing margin levels C˜(t) given the profit-maximizing
fee δ∗. It is then clear that the equilibrium fee is given by δ˜(t) = δ∗(C˜(t), ν(t)).
Recall from Proposition 4.2 that the clearinghouse’s optimal strategy is to maximize her
instantaneous reward K(δ(t), C(t), ν(t)) for each t ≥ 0.
When C˜(t) ∈ (0,∞), this is governed by the first order condition ∂K
∂C




F¯ (B¯(t)) + (δ(t)− λ(t)DWH)F¯ ′(B¯)∂B¯
∂C
= 0. (4.11)
We know that the profit-maximizing fee satisfies Eq. (4.10) from Corollary 4.1. Eqs. (4.10)







Eq. (4.12) shows that, at optimum, the marginal benefit for increasing margin by one unit,
CHAPTER 4. CONTINUOUS TIME MARGIN THEORY 72
−λ(t)D ∂WH
∂C
, normalized by the collateral funding cost β, is equal to the marginal benefit for
increasing the fee rate, 1, normalized by fee opportunity cost α. Moreover, it implies that
















In fact, under our regularity assumption F , this is both necessary and sufficient for an interior
optimum.












The expression given in Eq. (4.14) contains important facts about margins. First,
the equilibrium margin scales with the volatility ν(t), increases with the default intensity
λ(t)D(t), and decreases with the margin funding cost β. Second, we observe that an increase
in the fee funding cost α increases equilibrium margin. This is because such an increase re-
duces the clearinghouse’s inclination to charge fees and thus it increases margin to protect
its profit.
Eq. (4.14) can also be interpreted as a micro-foundation for Value-at-Risk (VaR) margin-
ing rules. Given the distribution of “stressed” price jumps, H, the confidence level used for
calculating margins is given by β
λ(t)Dα .When β = α, the confidence level is purely determined
by traders’ default intensities λ(t)D. The quantile is then scaled by fundamental volatility,
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similar to the delta-normal method typically used for calculating VaR.
The results from Model 2 echo those of Model 1. While contract characteristics, i.e. the
shape of the distribution H and the fundamental volatility ν, are both important determi-
nants of margins, capital funding costs α, β and market variables (stress arrival intensities λ
and default probabilities D) can also profoundly influence equilibrium margins. Similar to
results in Model 1, when margin funding costs β go to zero, margin requirements go to infin-
ity. This shows that our conclusions in Model 1 are robust to (i) continuous time extensions
and (ii) the Laplace distribution assumption.
We notice that exogenous defaults, the fact that default risk is not a wrong way risk as in
Model 1 because incomes do not correlate with defaults, changes the nature of our funding
cost results. Specifically, it is now the ratio of funding opportunity costs β
α
that determine
margins. If we were to assume β = α as in Chapter 3, then equilibrium margins become
independent of the level of funding costs. Thus, the wrong way risk assumption is essential
for relating margins to the level of funding costs. We also note that in the absence of the
wrong way risk assumption, the income distribution no longer has an impact on margins
(aside from regularity assumptions).
4.4 Concluding remarks
In this section we have provided an alternative margin model, Model 2, to that presented in
Chapter 3, Model 1. Differently from Model 1, Model 2 assumes unpredictable, exogenous
defaults, and a more general class of trader income and loss distributions, characterized by
our notion of regularity.
Our analysis shows that the results from Model 1 are robust to continuous time extensions
and more general distributional assumptions. We find that when defaults are uncorrelated
with trader preferences (incomes), and when margin funding costs are constant and given by
the ratio of clearing fees to funding costs, the equilibrium margins become independent of
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funding costs. Of course, if certain collateralizing securities provide additional benefits (say,
using treasury securities that also satisfy regulatory needs) so that margin funding costs are
an order of magnitude smaller than fee funding costs, previous funding cost results hold: as
margin funding costs go to zero, margins go to infinity. We also show that our results serve
as a micro-foundation to VaR margining rules, and discuss the implication for the mapped
confidence level.
The benefit of using a continuous time framework is that Model 2 has the potential
to incorporate constraints on collateral velocity (Duffie et al. (2015)) or to allow for the
possibility that adjusting margin levels is costly. A future research direction is to incorporate
these features into Model 2 and assess the impact on margin levels.
Chapter 5
Empirical Drivers of Margins
Financial markets put into motion the Great Recession. The interaction between volatility,
leverage, and collateralization served to amplify fundamental shocks, and contributed to the
creation of self-reinforcing death spirals experienced by major financial institutions. The real
economy suffered.
Largely in response to the crisis, a vast literature analyzed the collateral channel in
amplifying financial shocks. Following a fundamental shock, losing market participants post
additional collateral, which may force liquidation and generate downward price pressure.
This can increase estimates of fundamental volatility which further increases the margin
requirements. Many theoretical models have uncovered the workings of such margin spirals.
Many models assume an exogenous value-at-risk (VaR) collateralization rule (Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009)), where margin requirements are set to cover some quantile of the return
distribution (e.g. 99% of losses). Other models assume exogenously that collateral must cover
the worst possible outcome, reducing the probability of default to zero. Still some models
derive collateralization rules endogenously. These endogenous rules, while mostly stylized,
typically do not resemble VaR and can be very complex.
Despite its importance, existing work exploring the collateral channel have been mostly
theoretical, with little to no empirical work exploring how collateral is set in practice, what
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its main determinants are, and what the implications are to available theories. As we discuss
in detail in this chapter, actual collateral requirements are time-varying functions depending
not only on multiple characteristics of the collateralized portfolio but also on the aggregate
state of the economy. Prices and quantities of collateral are determined endogenously in
equilibrium, and reflect optimal choices from the market participants, as pointed out by
Geanakoplos (1997).
This chapter presents new empirical evidence related to collateral requirements in the
OTC market for credit default swaps (CDS), the market at the very center of the financial
crisis. Over the past decade, the CDS market has moved towards mandatory clearing:
after two parties (referred to as clearing members) enter a CDS contract, all counterparty
obligations are transferred to a clearinghouse. Operating as a central counterparty (CCP),
the clearinghouse insulates members from default risk, but requires them to post daily-settled
collateral (margin).
We use a novel data set collected and maintained by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC). The database captures the entire universe of CDS positions cleared
by the four major CDS clearinghouses, officially known as Derivative Clearing Organizations
(DCOs), for the two years between May 2014 and April 2016. Our focus is on the dominant
DCO, ICE Clear Credit (ICC), who managed 60% of the U.S. cleared CDS market in 2015.1
The data – covering more than 18,000 contracts and all major dealers operating in the
CDS market – reports not only the CDS positions but also individual margin requirements
the DCOs demand to collateralize CDS portfolios. Observing both the time and cross-
sectional variation in collateral requirements, we study empirically the determinants of the
requirements in the cleared CDS market, test the predictions and assumptions of theoretical
models, and draw implications for financial stability.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that directly studies the collateral
requirements associated with entire derivatives portfolios, and particularly so for a large
1This is measured with gross notional cleared at each of the four DCOs. Combined with ICE Clear
Europe (ICEU), ICE cleared more than 90% of the U.S. cleared CDS market in 2015.
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market in which default risk plays a central role. While prior studies have looked at headline
margin requirements for individual securities (Figlewski (1984), Gay et al. (1986), Hedegaard
(2014)), their approaches are less applicable in the modern setting of portfolio margining:
i.e. where margins are set at the portfolio level rather than for individual contracts, as in
the case of CDS clearinghouses. Our disaggregated, granular CDS data provides a valuable
source for analyzing portfolio-level collateral requirements and the associated systemic risk
implications (Huang and Menkveld (2016)).
Using this data set, we first document several new stylized facts of centrally cleared CDS
markets. We show that collateralization, defined as the posted collateral over aggregate
net notional, can vary drastically across clearing member accounts, indicating that (large)
clearing members trade portfolios with very different characteristics. Returns on margins,
defined as the profit and loss (P&L) over posted initial margins, cluster tightly around their
mean and exhibit fat tails.
Next, we dig deeper into the empirical determinants of collateral. In view of the prominent
influence VaR has on modern perceptions of margin setting (Figlewski (1984), Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), Hull (2012), Glasserman et al. (2016)), we start with exploring the
ability of standard VaR margining rules to explain observed margins. The benchmark VaR
discussed in the literature is 5-day 99% VaR, according to which collateral should be sufficient
to cover 99% of the 5-day loss distribution. Testing a particular VaR rule is straightforward: a
99% VaR collateral rule should exhibit losses exceeding the required collateral level, referred
to as an exception, 1% of the time. This simple empirical test is valid even when the
information set behind the conditional quantile is not observed by the econometrician.
Collateral levels far exceed that implied by the benchmark VaR. In fact, for our entire
sample period, the largest realized drawdowns are only around 30% of initial margins: ex-
ceptions did not occur, despite significant market events such as the Chinese stock market
panic of early 2015. Strikingly, this conservativeness in collateral holds true even when we
incorporate CDS price movements since 2004, which includes the financial crisis. We collect
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historical CDS prices to simulate returns for each actual CDS portfolio. Even when including
large shocks that mimic those during the crisis, the implied VaR confidence level is between
99.98% and 100%. This is a first indication that collateral levels focus on more extreme loss
realizations than typically assumed, consistent with theoretical models such as Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2015) and with much of the subsequent empirical evidence.
Since standard value-at-risk does not explain observed collateral, we turn to assessing a
wider class of portfolio-specific variables. Specifically, we estimate a panel model relating
margins to VaR as well as other risk variables such as expected shortfall, maximum shortfall,
aggregate short notional, and aggregate net notional. We perform the estimation with and
without time and clearing members account fixed effects, controlling for aggregate variation
in market conditions as well as dealer-specific portfolio characteristics not well captured by
standard risk measures (e.g. idiosyncratic risks). We show that such portfolio variables
explain a significant portion of the panel variation with an R2 of 52% without fixed effects,
and 82% with fixed effects. Compared to just using VaR as the explanatory variable, there is a
non-negligible increase in explanatory power when other portfolio variables are incorporated:
not only does the benchmark VaR rule not adequately explain collateral levels, but also
significant panel variation is missed. This shows that clearinghouse collateral rules capture
dimensions of risk not limited to standard loss quantiles.
Duffie et al. (2015) proposed an alternative model for collateral requirements, where
initial margins is an exogenous mix of maximum shortfall and short notional (i.e. the short
charge). This model puts greater emphasis than VaR on the actual maximum loss that the
counterparty could incur; it adds a short charge because CDS short positions have large
downside risks, and this “jump-to-default risk” is specifically margined for large net short
positions. Their model parameters were calibrated to anecdotal evidence. As it turns out,
this model is only slightly less conservative than the collateral rule in practice. However, it
outperforms VaR in explaining collateral panel variation, and captures well its dependence on
short charges. Remarkably, the loading Duffie et al. (2015) propose for the short charge are
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL DRIVERS OF MARGINS 79
basically identical to that we estimate from the data. Using our margins data, we estimate
a modified version of their model, where the loadings best explain collateral panel variation.
This extended model achieves an R2 of 67% without fixed effects, and 86% with time and
account fixed effects, which is particularly notable for a model with just one variable.
Next, we incorporate market variables into our panel: since collateral rules adapt to mar-
ket conditions and reflect the clearinghouse’s discretion, we should expect collateral levels
respond to variables that capture the state of the economy and market conditions. In par-
ticular, following the recent theoretical model of Capponi and Cheng (2016), we incorporate
measures of aggregate risk, such VIX and the average CDS spread, and measures of funding
opportunity costs, including the CDS spread deviation from the average and the Overnight
Index Swap (OIS) spread.
We show that, following intuition, increases in aggregate risk increase the equilibrium
collateral level. High interest paid on collateral (the OIS spread) also induce an increase,
since, everything else equal, they lower the opportunity cost of immobilizing margin capital.
Interestingly, high funding costs for the counterparties, captured by high LIBOR-OIS spread
and the idiosyncratic component of CDS spreads, are associated with lower margin levels
in equilibrium (though with weak statistical significance). This result is again consistent
with the model of Capponi and Cheng (2016), which predicts that as funding costs increase,
demand for positions that require high collateralization will decrease, which reduces the
equilibrium collateral level. Together, these market variables help explain as much of the
total variation in margins as the time fixed effects. These results provide evidence that
margining rules indeed capture dimensions of risk not specific to the cleared portfolio.
To summarize, we show that using VaR as a benchmark, the actual level of collateral
employed in the cleared CDS market is extremely conservative, even after accounting for
crisis level losses. Moreover, loss quantiles and portfolio volatility do not adequately capture
collateral neither in the level nor the panel variation. Instead, short charge and maximum
shortfall – measures focusing on extreme risks, to which a short CDS contract is particularly
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL DRIVERS OF MARGINS 80
exposed – describe much better actual margin setting. Our results confirm the heuristic rule
of Duffie et al. (2015).
Our results are consistent with the equilibrium theories of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015),
who predict that all market collateral equilibria are equivalent to one where there are no
defaults in binomial economies. Our result is particularly interesting in light of the debate
concerning to what extent do these results extend to more general economies (Fostel and
Geanakoplos (2015)). Empirically, we find that clearinghouses behave very similarly to what
is predicted by Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015), placing a large weight on the most extreme
events, and requiring enough collateral to be almost completely covered against clearing
member default.2
Finally, our results relating margins to market variables have important implications for
funding liquidity and systemic risk: they show that clearinghouse margining rules do indeed
depend strongly on market conditions, and they may be dampen or reinforce margin spirals
depending on the nature of market shocks, as predicted for example by Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009). When a common market shock increases aggregate default risk in the
market or aggregate volatility, this significantly increases the required margins for members,
which can lead to a margin spiral.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1 we briefly review existing
theoretical and empirical work on collateral requirements and their interaction with the
macroeconomy. We then describe our data in Section 5.2 and reports a few stylized facts.
Our formal model testing methodology for the VaR margining rule is presented in Section
5.3, whereas the full analysis of the determinants of collateral rules is presented in Section
5.4. existing theories. Section 5.5 assess robustness of our results. Section 6.7 discusses the
2There are several differences between the purely theoretical model of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015)
and our empirical setting. For example, we consider a clearinghouse that determines collateral rules in
a monopolistic or oligopolistic setting (given that ICC is the largest clearinghouse with dominant market
power), whereas the theoretical model of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015) assumes a competitive market.
Most real life situations of margin setting involve some degree of market power, so our analysis of the cleared
CDS market should be informative about other environments and markets in which collateral is required for
trading.
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interpretation of our results and concludes.
5.1 Collateral requirements in theory and in practice
In this section we briefly review the existing theoretical and empirical literature on collateral
requirements. We then describe the specific setting we study in this chapter: margin setting
in the cleared CDS market.
5.1.1 Theory
A large theoretical literature has studied various mechanisms through which collateral (mar-
gin) constraints may affect markets and the aggregate economy. Models in this literature
typically assume exogenously specified margin requirements, and focus on the general equilib-
rium effects of those assumed collateral rules. Typical assumptions include fixed loan-to-value
ratios (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Mendoza (2010), Garleanu and Pedersen (2011)), VaR
and expected shortfall with exogenous confidence levels (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
Heller and Vause (2012), Sidanius and Zikes (2012), Anderson and Jo˜eveer (2014), Glasser-
man et al. (2016)), maximum shortfall measures (Gromb and Vayanos (2010), Vayanos and
Wang (2012)), collateral set at contract notionals (Junge and Trolle (2014)), and a mixed
extension of the above (Duffie et al. (2015)).3
Of course, margin constraints do not arise exogenously: they are chosen endogenously by
the parties together with the price and size of the positions. Several studies have explored the
theory of endogenous collateral requirements in different contexts and their general equilib-
rium implications, such as Telser (1981), Baer et al. (1994), Geanakoplos (1997), Holmstro¨m
and Tirole (1997), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015), and
3A related literature has explored how financially constrained intermediaries can impact the macroecon-
omy and asset prices, see Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), and Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2014). A stream of work (Booth et al. (1997), Longin et al. (1999), Broussard (2001)) uti-
lizes the techniques of extreme value theory to account for leptokurtic returns in financial markets, since
empirically observed returns often deviate significantly from normality, which give rise to higher “adequate”
margins (assuming adequate margins are those given by VaR).
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Capponi and Cheng (2016).4
Theoretical models that endogenize margin requirements typically show that they are
determined not only by features of the financial contract, but also by market conditions
and specific characteristics of market participants (see, in particular, Holmstro¨m and Tirole
(1997), Geanakoplos and Zame (2014), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015), and Capponi and
Cheng (2016)). Theoretical factors that influence margins can hence be broadly categorized
into portfolio variables, which are characteristics specific to the collateralized portfolio it-
self; and market variables, which are economic variables that depend on the state of the
macroeconomy or the market participant holding the portfolio. Examples of portfolio vari-
ables include portfolio size measures (e.g. gross notional) and portfolio risk variables (e.g.
standard deviation and VaR). Examples of market variables include aggregate default risk
and counterparty fundamentals, as well as funding opportunity costs. Following the lines
suggested by aforementioned theory, in this chapter we relate observed portfolio margins to
both portfolio and market variables.
Finally, a related theoretical research has explored the determinants of collateral require-
ments specifically in the context of cleared derivatives markets, where a central clearinghouse
becomes a counterparty to every trade that occurs in that market. Existing studies have dis-
cussed how a better understanding of margining rules can inform the organization of central
clearing (Koeppl et al. (2012), Biais et al. (2016a)), which can in turn have significant impact
on margining rules and hence collateral demand (Heller and Vause (2012), Sidanius and Zikes
(2012), Duffie et al. (2015)). Also studied are tradeoffs faced by counterparties in determin-
ing collateral levels (for example, Telser (1981), Kahl et al. (1985), Craine (1992), Cruz Lopez
et al. (2015), Menkveld (2015b)). Margin requirements can also significantly impact asset
prices (Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992), Cuoco (1997), , Coen-Pirani (2005),Chabakauri
(2013), Rytchkov (2014).) More recent theories like Capponi and Cheng (2016) have ex-
plicitly incorporated in the determination of endogenous margining both portfolio-level and
4See also Geanakoplos (2003), Geanakoplos (2010), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Geanakoplos and
Zame (2014), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014).
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market-level variables, noting that general equilibrium effects predict they jointly determine
observed collateral levels.
5.1.2 Empirical Work on Margins
Empirical work on collateral requirements and their determinants is scarce, both for non-
cleared and cleared markets. Clearinghouse data, in particular, contain proprietary informa-
tion of large market participants and are often disclosed only under strict confidentiality and
anonymity arrangements. Due to such data limitations, there is even less empirical work fo-
cusing on portfolio-level margins (as opposed to individual-security collateral requirements),
and how well conventional risk measures relate to the required collateral levels. To the best
of our knowledge, our study is the first to empirically investigate the relation between actual
margins, derivative portfolio exposures, and market variables.
A small literature has studied margining in the futures market. Figlewski (1984) and Gay
et al. (1986) test the extent to which margins in these markets protect against counterparty
losses of certain quantiles, but do not explore the determinants of the margining rule. Fenn
and Kupiec (1993) investigate empirically whether futures clearinghouses set margins in an
efficient (cost-minimizing) way using two simple models of optimal margin setting, finding
that neither model captures margins well. More recently, Hedegaard (2014) documents the
relation between average margins and price volatility in the cross-section of futures contracts.
He finds contract-specific volatility to be the main determinant of the average margin levels
by contract, with a non-negligible role played by tail risks; he also shows that clearinghouses
do not treat contracts uniformly when varying margin requirements. His results echo those
of Fishe and Goldberg (1986) and Goldberg and Hachey (1992) who also document price
volatility being a primary concern for margins.
Our study of collateral in the cleared CDS space builds upon and improves over these
studies in several dimensions. First, we consider margins that depend on the entire portfolio
of the counterparty (not just contract by contract); this is especially important as today
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most of the collateral requirements in OTC markets are set at the portfolio level. Second,
we consider a market where payoffs are highly skewed (since default probabilities can jump
upward suddenly, and sudden defaults can occur) – so that collateral plays a crucial role in al-
lowing this market to function properly. Third, whereas existing studies focus mostly on the
cross-section of futures contracts, we focus on both the cross-sectional and time-series varia-
tion of margins; in fact, we show that all of our results are robust to including counterparty
fixed effects that entirely absorb the cross-sectional average differences across counterpar-
ties. Fourth, we consider not only portfolio-specific risk measures, but also aggregate risk
and funding measures as potential determinants of collateral – all factors that can potentially
play an important role in the amplification of aggregate shocks via the collateral-feedback
channel. Fifth, we document that margins are best captured by using not only a tail risk
measure (maximum shortfall), but also a short charge (a fixed percentage of aggregate short
notional). As the short charge does not depend on historical probabilities nor the state of
the market, this shows that clearinghouses conservatively place large subjective probability
on tail events. It is not necessary for a default to be probable for the a short position to
impact margins. Sixth, importantly, we show that after controlling for maximum shortfall
and aggregate short notional, Value-at-Risk contributes very little to explaining margins.
This positive result informs theoretical literature in the modeling of margin constraints and
its impact: increases in fundamental volatility may not dictate the movement of margins if
it does not increase tail risk or short positions.
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5.1.3 Collateral Requirements in the Cleared CDS Market
The focus of this chapter is on collateral requirements in the cleared CDS space.5 As we
describe more in detail in the next section, we obtain data on margins and portfolios for all
dealers participating in the CDS markets through the largest CDS clearinghouse, ICE Clear
Credit (ICC), the dominant clearinghouse in the cleared U.S. CDS market. Therefore, we
will be able to study at the daily frequency how the margins requirements of each participant
depend on the characteristics of the portfolio they hold and on market conditions.
Clearinghouses have significant discretion over modeling assumptions and parameters
used to generate and justify margin requirements. They set them taking into account market
conditions, the demand for trading, and collateral quality. In practice, margining rules
involve a wide range of scenarios and simulations to arrive at a portfolio loss distribution,
requiring the clearinghouses to make various modeling and statistical assumptions.
Most clearinghouses, including ICC, suggest that their margins are broadly “set to cover
five days of adverse price/credit spread movements for the portfolio positions with a con-
fidence level of 99%” (Ivanov and Underwood (2011)), which we refer to as a 5-day 99%
Value-at-Risk (VaR) margining rule. However, this is only a simplified description of their
actual margining rules, for two main reasons.
First, scenario-specific add-ons are often applied to produce the final margin requirement
(CME Group (2010), ICE Clear US (2015)).6 In particular, the initial margin requirement
5Credit default swaps (CDS) are credit derivatives used trade credit quality of a reference entity. With a
fixed reference obligation, the protection buyer (the long position) is obligated to pay a quarterly premium
(the coupon payment) to the protection seller (the short position) up until contract maturity or the arrival of
a credit event, whichever is earlier. Upon arrival of the credit event, the seller pays the buyer the difference
between the face value and the market value of the reference obligation. When the reference entity is a
sovereign or corporate entity, the CDS is referred to as a single name CDS, and is distinguished by its
coupon rate, maturity, reference bond seniority, and doc clause (what constitutes a credit event), typically
rolled out quarterly. When the reference entity is a weighted basket of bonds from various sovereign or
corporate entities, it is referred to as an index CDS, typically rolled out semiannually. When components
of the reference basket defaults, the index contract protection seller pays a pro rata cash flow depending
on the weights on the components. The index contract is reversioned (the basket is updated), and coupon
payments and the contract notional are reduced accordingly. A CDS index contract is distinguished by its
notional, coupon rate, maturity, reference basket, version, and doc clause.
6As the primary regulatory authority of U.S. Derivative Clearing Organizations, the CFTC has access not
only to portfolio level margins data, but also collects documentation of the margin framework for oversight
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is the sum of seven components. In addition to considering (i) losses due to credit quality
(changing credit spreads), the methodology considers also losses due to (ii) changing recovery
rates and (iii) interest rates. There are additional charges capturing (iv) bid-offer spreads,
(v) large, concentrated positions, (vi) basis risk arising from different trading behavior of
indices and their constituents. Finally, there is (vii) an additional jump-to-default require-
ment due to the potential large payouts associated with selling credit protection on single
name contracts. Similar to the Basel capital requirements, the ICC margin framework is
a bucket approach, where there is an individual methodology for calculating each of the
seven components (“buckets”), and the final collateral requirement is the simple sum of the
components.
Second, even if clearinghouses were restricted to using VaR based margining rules, the
confidence level and margin period risk and the distributional assumption of losses are inputs
that give the clearinghouse significant freedom in setting the actual margin levels.
ICC’s margin framework shows several interesting features that are in contrast with
typical assumptions employed by the literature on the collateral channel. First, losses in
portfolio value are only one of the many components of margins. The presence of jump-to-
default requirements suggests that CDS clearinghouses are much more averse towards large
losses, something we confirm in this chapter. Second, market variables not specific to the
portfolio (such as interest rates) are also taken into account, and they affect the margin
requirement directly through the seven components of margins, and indirectly as ICC can
adjust the parameters of the margining rule in response to aggregate events. Third, the
framework prescribes that the actual collateral requirements are a complex function of many
different variables, and are not simply based on a simple risk measure such as Value-at-Risk.
In this chapter, we explore quantitatively the main determinants of collateral requirements
purposes. This framework contains a detailed break down of margin components, model assumptions, and
formulas used in ICE Clear Credit’s margin methodology, though not the calibrated parameters and the
calibration process. This document is proprietary and only accessible by CFTC officials. However, ICE
Clear Credit discloses publicly a high level break down of margin components, for which we provide a review
in this section. For ICC’s public disclosure, see https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/
ICE_CDS_Margin_Calculator_Presentation.pdf.
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in the CDS market, i.e. those observable variables that best capture the margining rules em-
ployed by ICC and that matter the most for understanding the collateral-feedback channel,
which plays a fundamental role in theoretical models of liquidity and funding constraints.
5.2 Data Description
In this section we provide an overview of our data and present descriptive statistics of the
key variables.
5.2.1 Clearinghouse collateral data: the Part 39 data set
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act grants the U.S. Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) authority over Derivative Clearing Organiza-
tions (DCOs). As a result, major clearinghouses recognized as DCOs are required to report
confidential swap trade data to CFTC on a daily basis. The data are collectively referred to
as “Part 39 data,” as the relevant rules and regulations are codified in Title 17, Chapter I,
Part 39 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Part 39 data provides a complete overview of
the centrally cleared swaps in the U.S..7
We obtain our clearing member data from the CFTC Part 39 database.8 Our data set
consists of both positions data and account summary data for CDS trades cleared by four
major CDS clearinghouses, forming a record of the U.S. cleared CDS market overtime. Our
sample period covers two years, from 2014/05/01 to 2016/05/01, for a total of 517 business
days. In this chapter we focus on the largest clearinghouse, ICE Clear Credit (ICC), which
is the main clearinghouse for the CDS market (combined with ICEU, the European arm of
ICE’s CDS clearing, they account for more than 90% of the cleared CDS market registered
in the database).
7While some swaps are under the jurisdiction of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) so that
bilateral trades need not be reported to CFTC, they are captured by Part 39 once cleared.
8Because the data set contains proprietary and confidential trade positions and margins, they can only
be accessed by CFTC officials and are not distributed for legal reasons.
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL DRIVERS OF MARGINS 88
5.2.2 CDS positions data
The CDS position component of the Part 39 data set contains daily reports of each account’s
end-of-day (EOD) position in each cleared CDS contract. For each day/account/contract
combination, we observe long/short gross notional, EOD prices for the contract,9 the cur-
rency denomination and exchange rates, and the mark-to-market (MtM) value of the posi-
tion.
Our data set includes both single name and index contracts. In the sample period we
consider (2014–2016), only the most liquid CDS index contracts (and not all single name
CDSs) were required by law to be cleared through a clearinghouse. As a result, while our
data set captures 100% of the mandatorily cleared indices, it presents only a partial view
of the entire CDS market. Our data set includes 465 distinct contract names, 455 of which
reference single name CDS contracts and 10 of which correspond to indices. We have a total
of 18,179 distinct contracts referencing these names that were cleared in our sample period.
A single name CDS contract is identified by its reference entity, maturity, bond seniority, and
doc clause. For CDS indices, a contract is identified by the index name, series, tenor, and
version. We adjust for changes in reference names due to spin-offs, split-offs, or combined
firms from mergers and acquisitions. After accounting for this, we are left with a total of
443 distinct names.
5.2.3 CDS spreads and interest rates data
We complement our Part 39 data with several additional data sets. First, we collect 5-year
on-the run CDS spreads from Markit and Bloomberg, going back before the beginning of
our sample period.10 Second, we obtain from Bloomberg the time series of the Overnight
Index Swap (OIS), the overnight rate for unsecured lending between banks, and the London
9See Section 5.3.1 for a brief overview of standardized CDS price quote conventions.
10Markit had complete data for all of our 443 names except for the 10 credit indices and 3 single name
series, STCENT, ATSL and COMMSAL; for these 13 names, data was unavailable or incomplete, so we
instead obtained the CDS spreads data from Bloomberg.
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Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), both of which we use to measure funding costs. As interest
paid on collateralizing assets are typically based on the overnight rate, large OIS spreads
increase the interest paid to clearing members and at the same time directly lower their
funding opportunity costs. The LIBOR-OIS spread, on the other hand, is typically viewed
as a measure of financial sector stress. Third, we obtain from Bloomberg the time series of
the CBOE’s Volatility Index (VIX). For all three data sets, we obtain time series ranging
between 2004/01/01 and 2016/09/13.
5.2.4 Account data
The account summary portion of the Part 39 data set contains daily reports of EOD account-
level information for each clearing member account. For each day/account combination, we
observe an initial margin requirement, actual amount of collateral posted, the currency
denomination and exchange rates, and MtM value of the portfolio. Initial margins are the
level of collateral the clearinghouse demands from the account holders, whereas collateral
posted is the actual level that account holders supply (after haircuts).11
It is useful to remember that the initial margin (on which we focus in this chapter) is
the collateral kept by the clearinghouse with the purpose of buffering against future changes
in values of the position when clearing members default on their obligations. We thus
will use the terms margin requirements and collateral requirements interchangeably. All
cleared contracts are marked to market daily, so that the change in current value of the
portfolio is transferred to the clearinghouse by the next day. This transfer is referred to as
variation margin, which is distinct from the initial margin as it does not represent a stock of
collateral but rather a cash flow reflecting the mark-to-market process. For example, if after
a price movement the value of A’s cleared portfolio decreased by $1, A has to transfer $1
to the clearinghouse, which is then passed through to a counterparty holding the offsetting
11Margin requirements are reported separately in USD and Euro; we combine them using the appropriate
exchange rate to arrive at the total initial margin requirement for the entire portfolio in USD. The actual
collateral posted is often reported entirely in USDs and covers both the USD and Euro requirements, so the
distinction between currencies is immaterial.
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position; in addition, he has to maintain sufficient assets in his initial margin account with
the clearinghouse as a buffer, the level of which is determined by the clearinghouse based
on his portfolio and market conditions. To reiterate, the posting of initial margins is to to
cover for future potential price changes, whereas the payment of variation margins is to settle
current price changes. In this chapter we focus on the collateral posted to the clearinghouse,
i.e. the initial margin.
The cleared CDS market is dominated by a handful of clearing members who act as
dealers to the outside market. Smaller clearing participants access the cleared market by be-
coming customers to clearing members.12 A clearing member thus can hold both proprietary
positions and customer positions.
Each clearing member may have several accounts with ICC. The account is designated
as a “customer account” if the account positions are taken on behalf of a customer, and des-
ignated as a “house” account if the positions are proprietary. Customer accounts are com-
mingled; that is, they consist of multiple sub-accounts for many customers, and segregated
customer specific data are not reported. We observe 44 accounts in total, each identified
by a distinct clearing firm identification number. Of these accounts, 13 are designated as
customer accounts and 31 are house accounts.
Many house accounts are set up to help with the processing of client trades, but have
little open interest, as clearing members usually use one house account to hold the majority
of their proprietary positions. We thus define a house account to be “auxiliary” if there are
little to no positions associated with them. To be precise, a house account is auxiliary if (i)
the average gross notional is less than $20 billion USD, (ii) the average number of distinct
CDS contracts traded is less than 200, and (iii) the number of distinct CDS reference entities
traded is less than 40. The remaining house accounts we refer to as “active” house accounts,
of which there are 13.
We provide descriptive statistics for each of the three account categories (active house,
12Through client clearing, customers can have their positions centrally cleared by posting margin and
paying a fee to a clearing member, essentially having the clearing member trade on their behalf.
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customer, and auxiliary house) in Table 1. Table 1 reports, for each account, the pooled
averages of the key variables over our sample period. Pooled averages are computed by
averaging point observations within the account categories and across the sample time period.
Active House Customer Auxiliary House
Number of accounts 13 13 12(18)†
Number of contracts 4,042.2 73.4 99.1
Number of names 239.3 32.6 23.8
Gross notional (billions $) 168.6 45.5 8.3
Initial margins (millions $) 657.9 614.1 57.5
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for different account categories.
This table reports the pooled averages of key variables within our data set depending on account
type over our sample period.
†Six auxiliary house had zero margins throughout, indicating no trading activity at all. We excluded these
accounts when calculating auxiliary house account descriptive statistics.
Active house accounts trade on average 4,042 different contracts, measured by the number
of distinct contracts in which the account has an open interest, distributed over 240 names,
measured by the number of distinct reference entities in which the account has an open
interest. In contrast, the customer accounts trade around 73 contracts distributed over 33
names. Customer positions tend to concentrate in the most liquid index contracts, whereas
house positions contain many more single name trades, a fact we manually confirm within
the data set. Auxiliary house accounts, with trading in about 99 contracts over 24 names
on average, resemble characteristics of customer accounts as they are set up primarily to
facilitate client needs.
The larger number of names traded by house accounts contribute to a higher gross no-
tional compared to customer accounts, $169 billion versus $ 46 billion. The initial margins,
however, are similar in magnitude for both, at $658 million versus $614 million. Measured
by margins to gross notional, the clearinghouse requires a lower collateralization rate for
active house accounts compared to customer accounts. This is because dealers usually have
well-hedged portfolios in their active house accounts, which results in a lower margin per
unit gross notional, compared to customers who often have large directional exposures. The
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gross notional and initial margins of auxiliary house accounts, at $8.3 billion and $58 million,
respectively, indicate little trading activity. In fact, six auxiliary house accounts had zero
margins throughout, indicating no trading activity at all. We excluded these accounts when
calculating descriptive statistics of auxiliary house accounts.
To further demonstrate the distinct characteristics of the different account categories,
we provide scatter plots of account specific characteristics in Figure 9. For each of the
38 accounts having non-zero margin observations within our sample, we compute the time
averaged gross notional, number of contracts traded, and traded reference names. Figure 9
reports the results in log-log scatter plots.











































Figure 9: Log-log scatter plots of gross notional v.s. the number of contracts (left) or names
traded (right).
Active house accounts cluster in the upper quadrant, indicating high gross notional and large number of
contracts or names traded. On average, customer accounts have higher gross notionals than auxiliary house
accounts.
The left panel in Figure 9 plots time averaged gross notional against the average number
of traded contracts, whereas the right subfigure plots time averaged gross notional against
the average number of traded names. Compared to the other two account types, we see that
active house accounts cluster in the upper-right quadrant, indicating high gross notional and
large number of contracts or names traded. The number of contracts or names traded by
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customer accounts and auxiliary house accounts are orders of magnitudes smaller than that
of active house accounts, as customer trades tend to be concentrated in the more liquid index
contracts. On average, customer accounts have higher gross notionals than auxiliary house
accounts. As previously discussed, since auxiliary house accounts are set up primarily to
aid customer trades, auxiliary house accounts have approximately the same level of traded
contracts/names but lower gross notional.
We next analyze the time variation and average level of aggregate posted collateral and
aggregate margin requirements. We report the initial margin requirement and actual posted
collateral in USD for each time point in our sample, aggregated over all accounts, over
all customer accounts, and over all active house accounts respectively. We note that the
summary statistics of both initial margin requirements and posted collateral trace each other
closely, and support our approach of focusing only on the initial margin requirement.13
On average about 17 billion USD worth of assets are immobilized as margins. There is
significant variation over time, ranging from 15 to 22 billion USD. Customer margins are on
the same order as that of active house margins, consistent with numbers reported in Table 1.
The time variations in margins for active house accounts and customer accounts are highly
correlated, as evidenced by the sum of their standard deviations (0.6+1.2 billion USD) being
close to the standard deviation of the aggregate (1.7 billion USD).14
Our analysis of portfolio specific margins focuses only on active house accounts. This is
because customer accounts are commingled and margins information aggregated. This means
that the observed margins are not associated with a specific institution’s portfolio, so that
we cannot study the relationship between collateral posted and portfolio characteristics. We
note, however, that our empirical analysis does not require observing the collateral posted
13The initial margin requirement is arguably economically more important, as it represents the level of
collateral that has to be immobilized, whereas posted collateral levels may fluctuate due to clearing member
operational reasons.
14We note that there are few instances where posted collateral is actually lower than the margin require-
ment, representing under-collateralization. We attribute this to member operational issues that are permitted
by the clearinghouse. As no member was declared to be in default during this period, the clearinghouse may
have considered such deficits a minor issue.
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Initial margins (billions $) Aggregate Active House Customer
Time average 17.1 8.6 7.9
Median 16.4 8.7 7.6
Range [14.8, 22.4] [7.1, 10.4] [6.2, 11.1]
Standard deviation 1.7 0.6 1.2
Collateral (billions $)
Time average 17.6 8.7 8.1
Median 17.1 8.9 7.7
Range [9.4, 23.0] [4.8, 10.4] [4.0, 11.5]
Standard deviation 1.7 0.7 1.3
Table 2: Time series summary statistics of initial margins over time.
Posted collateral tracks margin requirements closely, and on average about 17 billion USD worth of assets
are immobilized as margins. There is significant time variation in margins, ranging from 15 to 22 billion
USD.
by all clearing participants, at least to the extent that enough information can be extracted
from the clearing members whose portfolios we fully observe. We also exclude auxiliary
house accounts because there are little to no positions associated with them.
To gain further insight into active house account margins, we compute the level of col-
lateralization for cleared portfolios. We measure this with the margin to net notional ratio,
which accounts for varying sizes of cleared portfolios. We compute a portfolio’s net notional
by computing the net notional amount for each reference name, and then summing the
absolute net notionals across all names.
The results are reported as a histogram in Figure 10. For each active house account/day
combination we compute a margin to notional ratio by taking the ratio of the initial margins
requirement and aggregate net notional. We arrive at the aggregate net notional by sum-
ming the absolute net notionals across names. The resulting 6,721 observations cluster into
two distinct sub-populations. 92.3% of the observations cluster around a sub-population
mean margin to notional ratio of 2.4%. The remaining 7.7% of the observations cluster
around a sub-population mean margin to notional ratio of 14.3%. All observations of the
latter sub-population are associated with one single clearing member account. This analy-
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sis demonstrates that house account portfolios can have very different risk characteristics,














Figure 10: Histogram of margin/notional ratio observations.
The 6,721 observations cluster into two distinct sub-populations. All observations of the latter
sub-population are associated with one single clearing member account. This demonstrates that house
account portfolios can have very different risk characteristics.
5.2.5 The market during our sample period
Mandatory clearing of standardized CDS contracts was imposed only after the financial crisis.
Thus, our data set does not include the years of the crisis in which the financial system (and
the CDS market) underwent significant stress, which are particularly interesting times for
understanding collateral requirements and their interaction with the broader economy.
There are, however, two mitigating elements that allow us to understand the behavior of
collateral even in the limited span of time covered. First, even within our two-year sample,
many significant events occurred and resulted in volatility spikes, shocking the global econ-
omy and, in particular, the CDS market. Example of these events include (i) the plummet in
oil prices in November 2014, when Saudi Arabia blocked OPEC from cutting oil production;
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(ii) the plunge in the Euro when the ECB chief Mario Draghi expressed unexpectedly dovish
outlooks on monetary policy in January 2015, (iii) the 2015–2016 stock market sell-off, start-
ing with the Chinese stock market burst (“Black Monday”), and followed by an unexpected
devaluation in the Renminbi, which was further fueled by Greek Debt default; (iv) the unex-
pected negative interest rate policy announced by the Bank of Japan in January 2016, and
(v) the volatility spike when the Brexit referendum was announced in February 2016. Our
sample period also covers the (widely expected) interest rate hike by the Federal Reserve in
December 2015, the first increase in nearly a decade.
Second, while we do not have positions data going back to the financial crisis, we do
observe CDS spreads going back to 2004. This means that we are able to do counterfactual
simulations of portfolio returns, including market movements observed during the crisis.
This will provide additional information about how well collateral buffers can absorb shocks
of magnitudes as large as those observed in 2008–2009.
5.3 Do collateral requirements follow a Value-at-Risk
rule?
Most of the theoretical literature studying the importance of the collateral channel (e.g.,
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)) makes the simplifying assumption that collateral con-
straints follow an exogenously specified VaR rule. Interestingly, there is no sound economic
justification behind why such a rule should be deployed. A more recent literature (Geanako-
plos (1997), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014)) has explored the endogenous determination of
collateral requirements, and has highlighted that in general a VaR rule should not be ex-
pected to arise in equilibrium. As reviewed in Section 5.1, margin rules in practice also do
not follow VaR.
In this section, we provide a direct test of whether a VaR margining rule (or a close
approximation of it) is applied in the CDS market. In later sections, we extend our analysis
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to other potential determinants of collateral requirements. Note that we only use data
associated with active house accounts in this section. This is because, as mentioned above,
ICC practices portfolio margining, i.e., margins are set at a portfolio level and based on
portfolio rather than individual position characteristics, and customer accounts’ portfolio
margins are commingled (aggregated). As VaR is not summable, using customer account
data would distort our analysis.
5.3.1 Preliminaries
Consider a set of dates T := {1, . . . , T}, a set of contracts I := {1, . . . , I}, and a set of
market participants (clearing members) N := {1, . . . , N}. The portfolio held by participant
n at the end of date t is a vector Xnt ∈ RI . The i-th component of Xnt , Xni,t, is the portfolio’s
notional position in contract i. Xni,t can be positive or negative, depending on whether n has
a long or a short position in the contract i.
End-of-day (EOD) prices within the Part 39 data set are provided by ICC in terms of
points upfront. CDS prices historically have been quoted in terms of conventional or “break-
even” spreads, defined as the annualized quarterly spread payment per unit of purchased
protection that makes the market value of the position zero at initiation. Contracts thus
were negotiated bilaterally over the counter and, depending on when they were traded,
carried different spreads. The push for standardized CDS contracts, however, has drastically
changed the landscape of CDS price quotes and traded contracts. In particular, the 2011
“CDS Big Bang” resulted in standardized CDS having fixed coupons (usually 100 or 500
basis points). Thus, contract market values are often non-zero at outset. When trading
standardized CDS, the protection buyer makes an upfront payment to the protection seller
at initiation (or vice versa). Price quotes are then in “points upfront” instead of break-even
spreads. For instance, if a CDS contract were quoted at 0.97, the protection buyer would
pay 1 − 0.97 = 3% of the notional to the seller at contract initiation. Notice that this
quote convention is analogous to bond quotes, where a higher price quote represents a lower
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payment for the buyer. Some data providers, such as Bloomberg, convert the quoted prices
using a standardized model provided by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA) and, by convention, record break-even spreads.
We note that quoted prices are model prices. Since CDSs trade relatively thinly, EOD
transaction prices are not always available. ICC and Markit have a specific price discovery
process tailored to the CDS market. Participants submit price quotes at the end of every
business day and the clearinghouse creates periodic trade executions among participants via
an auction process. The resulting prices are used for daily mark to market purposes.
We denote the EOD prices of cleared contracts at time t as Pt, whose i-th component, Pi,t,
is the EOD price of contract i. From our previous discussion, we see that the mark-to-market
value of the portfolio X at time s can be computed as15




Position net notional× (1− price)
= X · (1−Ps)
The profit and loss (P&L) between day t and day t+M is computed as
ΨM,t(X) := MtMt+M(X)−MtMt(X) (5.1)
= X · (Pt −Pt+M) .
We use V aRM,αt (·) to denote the α−th quantile of the P&L distribution over an M−day
period starting at t. Namely, Value-at-Risk (V aR) is a quantity that satisfies:
P(ΨM,t(X) < −V aRM,αt (X)|Ft) = α,
15There is an additional adjustment factor for CDS indices that have been reversioned after the default
of a component, which we omit here for ease of exposition but account for in our empirical analysis. The
adjustment factor is less than one to account for a proportional decrease in effective notional because of
contract payout.
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where Ft represents the information available at time t. M is commonly referred to as the
margin period of risk (or liquidation period), and 1− α is the confidence level.
5.3.2 Testing the Value-at-Risk margining rule
The standard VaR collateral rule assumed in the literature stipulates that collateral require-
ments (initial margins) at time t are set equal to V aRM,αt (·), for a certain confidence level α
and margin period of risk M . That is, under the VaR rule, initial margins are set as:
H0 : IMt(Xnt ) = V aR
M,α
t (Xnt ),
where IMt(X) is the actual margins required by the clearinghouse at time t for holding the
portfolio X. This hypothesis can be directly tested using our data by comparing the actual
clearinghouse collateral requirements with the empirical quantiles of the loss distribution.
In particular, we can test H0 using two different approaches. The first approach is
applicable in the circumstances where α and M are known. For instance, a typical claim
in the CDS market is that initial margins are set to cover 5-day losses with 99% confidence
(Ivanov and Underwood (2011)). Under this assumption, H0 should hold with α = 1% and
M = 5.







I{ΨM,t(Xnt ) < −IMt(Xnt )}, (5.2)
where I{·} is the indicator function. The indicator takes value 1 when realized M−day
losses exceed the initial margin requirement; this is typically referred to as an exception (or
exceedance). Eq. (5.2) defines the statistic Z as the empirical frequency at which excep-
tions occur, averaged over time and across market participants. We have, for quite general




by the law of large numbers. For M and α specified in the null hypothesis, we can test H0
using Z as the test statistic. We refer to this “backtesting” of the VaR rule as a time-series
test of the VaR hypothesis. This is equivalent to the backtesting procedure advocated by
the Basel Accords (Hull (2012)).
A second approach can be considered in the cases that α and M are unknown. Rather
than testing the rule jointly across all counterparties, the test looks at whether the same
VaR rule is applied to all counterparties, similar to the approach implemented by Gay et al.
(1986). That is, no matter what α and M are, under VaR margining we would expect the
same margining rule to be applied to all counterparties. Formally, the margining rule H0
implies P(ΨM,t(Xnt ) < −IMt(Xnt )) = α for all n, which further implies
H ′0 : P(ΨM,t(Xnt ) < −IMt(Xnt )) = P(ΨM,t(Xn
′
t ) < −IMt(Xn
′
t )),






I{ΨM,t(Xnt ) + IMt(Xnt ) < 0},
and a test for equality is implemented for H ′0. We refer to this as the cross-sectional test of
the VaR hypothesis. In the following sections we implement both tests of the VaR hypothesis.
5.3.3 Time-series test of the VaR hypothesis
In this section we perform the time-series test outlined in Section 5.3.2, under the standard
assumption of M = 5 and α = 1%. Since IMt(Xnt ) is readily available in our data set, the
crux of our analysis lies in estimating the quantity P&L (ΨM,t).
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We consider two different approaches for estimating P&L. First, we perform a factual
analysis and compute realized 5-day ahead P&L for each actual portfolio held by active
house accounts, during our sample period. That is, we ask the following question: have
actual exceptions of the posted collateral been as frequent as the margining rule would
predict (i.e. 1% of the time)?
Second, we perform a counterfactual analysis and estimate what the 5-day ahead P&L
would have been for each portfolio, using historical 5-year CDS spreads. This counterfactual
analysis therefore compares the collateral requirement with the distribution of losses on the
portfolios held at each point in time, but using the distribution of returns for a much longer
time period, and including the financial crisis. Such a counterfactual analysis remedies to
the lack of crisis-level downturns data in our sample.
5.3.3.1 Realized returns
This section performs the factual analysis with realized 5-day ahead P&L data. Recall, Part
39 data contains not only positions data, but also EOD price data in points upfront for each
cleared contract. We can then easily compute the 5-day ahead P&L using Eq. (5.1). In
particular, for each account/business day pair (n, t), we compute
Ψ5,t(Xnt ) = Xnt · (Pt −Pt+5).
We define the ratio of P&L to initial margins as the return on margins for cleared portfo-
lios. Since both the size of losses and margins are expected to increase with portfolio volatil-
ity, this normalized measure that controls for size is better suited for comparison across
portfolios. Notice that a margin exception corresponds to a negative return on margin that
drops below -100%.
Figure 11 reports the realized 5-day ahead returns on margins. We compute returns
on margins for each account/day and obtain (517 − 5) × 13 = 6, 656 observations. A few
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interesting patterns emerge from the figure. First, the dispersion of returns in our sample
period is small relative to the amount of collateral posted. Moreover, the distribution of
returns on margins does not exhibit distinct heavy (fat) tails, despite that several important
events occurred during our sample period as highlighted in Section 5.2.5. Second, and most
relevant for the analysis of margining and losses, the most negative return observed during
our sample period is only 30% of the collateral requirement. That is, while under a 5-day 99%
VaR rule we would expect to see exceptions in 1% of our sample (or about 66 account/days),
no exceptions were actually observed. This serves as a preliminary indication that the VaR
rule with 99% confidence does not describe well the actual collateral requirements in the
CDS market.





















Figure 11: Histogram of realized return on margins for cleared portfolios.
Returns tightly cluster around the mean. In addition, the most negative returns amount to only 30% of the
posted initial margins.
Table 3 reports both the descriptive statistics for the returns and the results of our
time-series test. We observe that the mean return on margin is close to zero, and much
smaller than the standard deviation of 5.22%. The distribution tightly clusters around the
mean: about half of the mass of the empirical distribution of returns lies between ±2%.
Aggregating over account/time observations, we find that the empirical 99% Value-at-Risk
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Interquartile Range (Q3-Q1)(%) [-2.06, 2.08]
Empirical V aR5,0.05(%) -8.86
Empirical V aR5,0.01(%) -16.06
Empirical V aR5,0.001(%) -24.37
|rm| ≤ 0.15 (%) 97.99
Test results for H0 : P(rm < −100%) = 1%
Initial Margin Exceptions 0
Ratio (Z ′) 0
S.E.† 3.7× 10−3
t-stat -2.73
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for (realized) return on margins and test results for the 5-day
99% VaR rule.
We compare realized losses to initial margins for each observation. We observe no exceptions within our
sample period. The t-test shows there being strong evidence against the 5-day 99% VaR rule.
is approximately 14% of posted margins; that is, around 7 times lower than the one implied
by the VaR rule. Approximately 98% of the observations lie within 3 standard deviations
from the mean.
Next, we formally test the hypothesis of the VaR margining rule. We consider the Z





I{Ψ5,t(Xnt ) < −IMt(Xnt )}.
Note that since we have computed returns for all dates and portfolios where data is available,
the underlying dates for the returns overlap. For this reason, we will compute autocorrelation
robust standard errors.
We observe no exceptions within our sample period. To assess the statistical significance
of this observation, we compute standard errors using binomial probabilities. While we would
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ideally compute cluster-robust standard errors for our test, having observed no exceptions
means there are no residuals, and that residual-based computations would always return
null standard errors. To proceed further, we thus assume that exceptions are perfectly
correlated when underlying losses overlap for robustness against autocorrelation, and also







In the above equation, the term ζM := 2M − 1 adjusts for our assumption that exceptions
are perfectly correlated when underlying losses overlap. For α = 1%, NT = 6, 556 and
M = 5, we obtain a standard error of 0.37%. The t-test shows strong evidence against the
5-day 99% VaR rule because the frequencies of exceptions are statistically smaller than 1%.
Overall, the analysis of exceptions during our sample period indicates that the amount of
collateral posted was far larger than what would be expected by a 99% confidence rule.
We remark that our standard errors are mostly likely to be overly conservative. As a
robustness check, we also compute one-day returns and autocorrelation estimates. For each
account, we find autocorrelation estimates on the orders of 10−4 for the first five lags. Thus,
autocorrelation would likely have a smaller impact on actual standard errors compared to
our assumption of perfect correlation.
5.3.3.2 Counterfactual return estimates (historical simulation)
In this section, we use historical simulation methods to estimate P&Ls over a longer time
period than that considered in the previous section. Such a time period covers the financial
crisis, the most significant market stress in modern history. By doing so, we remedy to the
lack of power of the hypothesis test conducted in the previous section caused by the limited
16We also compute the 78 cross-section pairwise correlations of returns on margins to validate our assump-
tion that exceptions are uncorrelated across accounts. We find that the average pairwise correlation is -5%
with 36 positive and 42 negative observations.
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sample size. Moreover, the sample period (2014–2016) considered in the previous section
was relatively tranquil except for a few notable events (like those described in Section 5.2.5).
It is commonly agreed upon that high initial margin levels may be justified when stressed
periods are taken into consideration.
More specifically, the idea of our counterfactual simulation is as follows. For each pe-
riod, we observe the portfolio held by each counterparty, Xnt . By looking at the historical
distribution of price movements for all the constituents of those portfolios, we can ask what
would have been the historical distribution of returns of that portfolio since 2004 (the first
time for which CDS data are available in our data set). The resulting distribution of P&L
therefore includes the large price changes that occurred during the financial crisis.
Since there are new contracts issued and old contracts expiring every quarter, historical
prices for a currently traded contract are not always available. To deal with this practical
obstacle, we consider a historical simulation approach that closely follows that proposed in
Duffie et al. (2015). We first aggregate net exposures by name (reference entity), and then
use the historical 5-year CDS spread on those names (for which we have accurate spreads
data) to compute counterfactual returns for all days for which CDS spread are available.17 As
discussed in Section 5.2, the time series of credit spreads data span dates between 2004/01/01
and 2016/09/13; this gives us a total of 3,303 days with 5 day ahead observations. We will
17More specifically, following Duffie et al. (2015) we group together all I contracts written on the K
underlying reference entities, and denote the net position in that reference entity by Yk. Precisely, let Ωk





For each reference entity, therefore, Yk indicates the net exposure to reference entity k, aggregating together
the CDS contracts on that reference entity across maturities, seniority level, and doc clause. We then collect
historical on-the-run 5-year credit spread series for each reference entity, St ∈ RK , and estimate historical
losses via the DV01 formula:
Ψ5,u(Xnt ) ≈ d×Ynt · (Su − Su+5),
where d is the effective duration of the positions. We use d = 3 as in Duffie et al. (2015), meaning that the
average duration of CDS positions is 3 years (corresponding to the median maturity of the CDS market).
Section 5.5 performs a robustness check with respect to the choice of d.
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL DRIVERS OF MARGINS 106
refer to these days as evaluation days.18
Using this approach, for each account n and each day t, we compute all possible returns on
margin that could have occurred if the spread movements in the following 5 days mimicked
the realized spread movements that occurred on each of the 5-day windows since 2004.
We compute this by evaluating the P&L for each account/day/evaluation day combination,
using a DV01 approximation. We therefore have a large number of counterfactual return
observations: 517× 13× 3, 303 = 22, 199, 463. As a robustness check, we report how closely
the counterfactual losses mimic the actual losses in Section 5.5, and find that the two loss
series are positively (though less than perfectly) correlated. As expected, the magnitude of
the counterfactual returns is higher because it includes the financial crisis.
We report the distribution of counterfactual returns on margins in Figure 9. Due to the
large number of observations clustering around zero, we only display observations between
±50% in Figure 12a, and report the left tail of the histogram in Figure 12b. We see that the
distribution is sharply peaked, and that most returns lie between ±20%. The frequency of
returns decrease rapidly as we move away from the mean.
When we consider counterfactual returns, we observe many margin exceptions. To focus
on exception observations, we display the left tail of the distribution of counterfactual returns
in Figure 12b (i.e. we only report returns on margins observations smaller than −50%.)
There are 3,456 observations of returns on margins which are smaller than -100%, amount-
ing to 0.02% of our sample. The most negative return amounts to 268% of the posted initial
margins. Compared to the mode of the distribution, the observations out in the left tail
(≈ 100 observations) are several orders of magnitude smaller than the mode (≈ 2,000,000
observations).
Table 4 reports both descriptive statistics for the counterfactual returns and results of
the associated time-series test. Compared to the realized returns, the counterfactual returns
18A day is included in our data analysis only if prices are observed for at least 250 out of the 443 reference
entities; this filter excludes few days in the early part of the sample for which price information was not
uniformly available across contracts.
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Figure 12: Histogram for historically simulated return on margins, center of histogram (left)
and zoomed in on left tail (right).
We use the DV01 formula to approximate the 5-day ahead P&L. We display observations between ±50%
in the left panel (Figure 12a), and report the left tail of the histogram in right panel (Figure 12b). The
most negative returns amount to 268% of the posted initial margins. There are 3,456 observations of
returns on margins being less than -100%, amounting to 0.02% of our sample.
have a mean closer to zero, a higher standard deviation equal to 8.22%, and fatter tails
(the excess kurtosis is 31.26). It should not be surprising that counterfactual returns exhibit
higher standard deviation and kurtosis than those in the period 2014–2016, because they
reflect the large spread movements experienced during the financial crisis. The distribution
tightly clusters around the mean: about half of the empirical distribution of returns lies
between ±2%. Aggregating over all counterfactual returns, we conclude that the empirical
99% Value-at-Risk is approximately 27% of posted margins. Approximately 98% of the
observations lie within 3 standard deviations from the mean.
To test the VaR margining rule, we compare realized losses to initial margins for each
observation. More formally, we compute our test statistic using an extended version of
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Interquartile Range (Q3-Q1)(%) [-1.88, 1.90]
Empirical V aR5,0.05(%) -11.08
Empirical V aR5,0.01(%) -26.96
Empirical V aR5,0.001(%) -60.89
|rm| ≤ 0.26 (%) 97.80
Test results for H0 : P(rm < −100%) = 1%
Initial Margin Exceptions 3,456
Ratio (Z ′) 1.56× 10−4
S.E.† 8.90× 10−5
t-stat -110.63
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for historically simulated return on margins and test results
for the 5-day 99% VaR rule, with two-way clustered standard error
We compare counterfactual returns to initial margins for each observation and compute two-way
clustered standard errors, clustering both at the account and time level. The t-test shows there
being strong evidence against the 5-day 99% VaR rule.
Eq. (5.2):








I{Ψ5,uMtM(Xnt ) < −IMt(Xnt )},
where Ψ5,uMtM(Xnt ) is constructed as in Duffie et al. (2015) (see footnote 17 for additional
details), and U is the number of evaluation dates. As in the previous section, for each
portfolio Xnt , we estimate the frequency at which losses exceed portfolio margins. Under the
null hypothesis of a 5-day 99% VaR margining rule, Z ′ should converge to 1% in probability.
Strikingly, these exceptions are in fact extremely rare, as shown in Table 4: even including
losses as large as those observed during the financial crisis, exceptions of the initial margins
only occur about 0.016% of the time, that is, they are about one hundred times less frequent
than a 99% VaR rule would imply. The results are reported in Table 4, which shows that
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the hypothesis of a 1% VaR rule is strongly rejected.19
As a robustness check, in Section 5.5 we vary the duration assumption from d = 3 (as
suggested by Duffie et al. (2015)) to d = 5. This is an overly conservative assumption because
the most actively traded instruments are five year CDSs, which have duration slightly less
than 5 (Duffie et al. (2015)). The hypothesis of a 1% VaR rule is still rejected.
Finally, we also compute the ratio of exceptions for each day t ∈ T . In particular, for each
day t we compute the probability of an exception during the next days using the historical
distribution of price changes observed since 2004, given the portfolios held by the accounts
at that point in time. For a fixed day in our sample period, we count for each of the 13
active house accounts the number of counterfactual returns that exceed the amount of initial
margins required for their portfolio. The number of exceptions are then averaged over the








I{Ψ5,uMtM(Xnt ) < −IMt(Xnt )}.
We provide a plot of Z ′t over our sample period in Figure 13. The ratio is much lower
than 1% even at its maximum (around 0.6%). Interestingly, there is significant time vari-
ation in the ratio: there are periods in which the effective exception confidence levels
are high (05/2014–01/2015 and 06/2015–09/2015) and periods when they are much lower
(02/2015–05/2015 and 10/2015–05/2016). This indicates the existence of additional factors
affecting the fitted VaR confidence level, which in turn suggests that there are other elements
affecting the collateral requirements beyond simple a VaR rule.
5.3.4 Cross-sectional test of the VaR hypothesis
In this section we perform the cross-sectional test of the VaR hypothesis outlined in Section
5.3.2, that requires no assumption about the confidence level (α).
19We compute two-way clustered standard errors (clustering both by account and time) for our time-series
tests.


























Figure 13: The ratio of exceptions overtime.
We report the average ratio of exceptions actual portfolios held. There are periods in which the ratio of
exceptions are high (05/2014–01/2015, and 06/2015–09/2015) and periods where they are much lower
(02/2015–05/2015, and 10/2015–05/2016), indicating that there are additional factors that affect the fitted
VaR confidence level.
The most straightforward test for equality of the frequencies of exceptions across accounts
is the G−test (i.e. the two-way likelihood ratio test). Because the confidence level is expected
to be large (the expected frequency of exceptions is low), the typical χ2−test for homogeneity
is not appropriate (Hoey (2012)). Since exceptions are expected to occur with low probability,








where On is the observed number of exceptions for clearing member n, and En is the expected
number of exceptions for account n. The probability of an exception needed for calculating
En is estimated by pooling observations across accounts. In particular,








I{Ψ5,uMtM(Xn′t ) < −IMt(Xn
′
t )},







I{Ψ5,uMtM(Xnt ) < −IMt(Xnt )}.
Under the null that frequencies are the same for each account, G d→ χ2N−1.
We test whether a VaR margining rule of any confidence level can explain observed margin
levels for various combinations of CDS duration (d ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 10} years) and margin periods
of risk (M ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 10}). The null hypothesis is that if a VaR rule is implemented,
it is fairly implemented so that the frequencies of exceptions are independent of clearing
member identities. We report the p-values for various cases in Table 5. In all cases the p-
values are essentially zero. There is extremely strong evidence against equality of exception
probabilities and thus against the null hypothesis that some VaR rule can explain observed
initial margins.
p-values d: effective duration in years
M : MPoR in days 1 3 5 7 10
1 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4
3 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4
5 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4
7 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4
10 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4
df = 12
Table 5: Test results for M -day VaR rules.
We test whether a VaR margining rule of any confidence level can explain observed margin levels for
various combinations of CDS duration (d) and margin period of risk (M) assumptions. There is extremely
strong evidence against equality of exception probabilities and thus the null hypothesis that some VaR rule
can explain observed initial margins.
We remark that since we pool exception observations across evaluation dates (and the
respective portfolios) for each account, there is a possibility that strong autocorrelation of
exceptions can reduce the power of our test. To adjust for possible autocorrelation, we now
describe a conservative yet more robust approach. For a fixed portfolio, we first count the
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number of exceptions, and then divide it by the number of evaluation dates. This gives an
estimate for the probability of an exception for that portfolio. We then sum the exception
probabilities for portfolios associated with that account and use the rounded up integer
as the estimate for observed exceptions for that account. We enter this estimate into the
contingency table used for the G− test. Formally, we estimate the probability of an exception






I{Ψ5,uMtM(Xnt ) < −IMt(Xnt )}.








The estimate Oˆn replaces On in our computation of the G statistic (Eq. (5.3)). 20 The
estimated observations are thus more robust to autocorrelation compared to treating each
observation as an individual count, which may inflate the sample size.
Again, we test whether a VaR margining rule of any confidence level can explain observed
margin levels for various combinations of CDS duration (d) and margin period of risk (M)
assumptions. We report the p-values for the various cases in Table 6. In all but one case
the p-values are essentially zero. We see that, even after taking into consideration potential
correlation issues, there is still extremely strong evidence against H ′0. Except for the case
of (d,M) = (1, 1), the null hypothesis is rejected again at 100% confidence. The evidence
against equality of exception probabilities is still very strong and thus the null hypothesis
that some VaR rule can explain observed initial margins is strongly rejected.
The results in this section show that collateral requirements in the CDS market are not
determined by a simple VaR constraint. Their levels appear to be orders of magnitude higher
20The ceiling operation is performed to ensure that the contingency table only contains integer entries.
We also performed the test with unrounded data, yielding the same, if not stronger, results.
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p-values Effective Duration (Years):
MPoR(days) 1 3 5 7 10
1 0.55 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4
3 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4
5 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4
7 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4
10 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4 < 10−4
df = 12
Table 6: Test results for M -day VaR rules, correcting for autocorrelation.
We test whether a VaR margining rule of any confidence level can explain observed margin levels for
various combinations of CDS duration (d) and margin period of risk (M) assumptions. The probability of
exception for calculating En is obtained from pooling observations across accounts. This corrects for
potential autocorrelation issues where, for a portfolio, an exception event for the portfolio on one day is
correlated with an exception event on the next. In all but one case the p-values are essentially zero. There
is extremely strong evidence against equality of exception probabilities and thus the null hypothesis that
some VaR rule can explain observed initial margins.
than what is required to sustain 1% losses, even if we include in our sample losses of the
magnitude observed during the financial crisis. In addition, the collateral requirements seem
to differ across accounts in a way that cannot be explained by a simple VaR rule, no matter
what the confidence level and margin period of risk horizon for the returns is.
It is important to put our findings in perspective with existing theories of collateral: it
suggests that the observed collateral requirements significantly differ from those that are
typically assumed in theoretical models, and that additional factors should be taken into
account to explain the collateral requirements in the CDS market.
5.4 The Determinants of Collateral Requirements: Port-
folio Risk and Market Characteristics
In this section we investigate the empirical determinants of initial margins. We consider
two groups of potential explanatory variables. Portfolio variables are those that are specific
to the portfolio that an account holds with the clearinghouse, and are conventionally used
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to measure the risk of positions. These include the Value-at-Risk of the portfolio (studied
above), expected shortfall, maximum shortfall, aggregate net notional, aggregate short no-
tional, and the volatility of the portfolio.21 Market variables are those that are determined
by market forces, including the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) spread, the LIBOR-OIS spread,
clearing member CDS spreads, the average clearing member CDS spread, the deviation of
clearing member CDS spread from the average, and aggregate volatility as measured by VIX.
This section proceeds as follows. We fix notation and describe the computations of various
portfolio and market variables in Section 5.4.1. In Section 5.4.2, we perform a panel analysis
and relate the observed margin requirements for each account n and each day t to portfolio-
specific measures (portfolio variables). We also use our results to evaluate the initial margins
model proposed by Duffie et al. (2015) (henceforth, DSV). The DSV model is a simple model
of collateral rules based on maximum shortfall and size of the short positions, instead of a
VaR rule. Therefore, Section 5.4.1 considers panel regressions with portfolio variables only.
Our results show that a modified DSV model represents a good approximation of the actual
collateral rules followed in the CDS market, and has better explanatory power than VaR.
Section 5.4.3 incorporates market variables into the panel analysis. The collateral re-
quirements imposed by the clearinghouse are not fixed in time but respond to aggregate
events. Those events include changes in the aggregate conditions of the economy, and more
specifically changes in the demand for intermediation and clearing. It is thus plausible to ex-
pect that market conditions such as market volatility or members’ funding costs would affect
the equilibrium collateral levels. This analysis plays an especially important role because it
highlights and quantifies potential channels for general equilibrium effects of margining.
5.4.1 Preliminaries
For each cleared portfolio of account n at the end of day t, we compute the net notionals
Y nk,t. Precisely, let Ωk denote the collection of contracts with reference name k. Net notionals
21See definitions in Table 7.
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which is the absolute sum of net notionals across reference names. The aggregate short







The aggregate short notional plays an important role because of the highly asymmetric
nature of CDS payoffs. While the premium leg makes fixed payments, the protection leg
is exposed to jump-to-default risk. Such an asymmetry induces strong left skewness in the
payoff function of a short position, which may prompt larger collateral requirements.
Duffie et al. (2015) propose an initial margin model that follows the rule:
DSV nt = MS5(Xnt ) + 0.02× AS(Xnt ), (5.4)
where MST (·) represents the maximum shortfall of the cleared portfolio for a T−day margin
period of risk, and AS(·) is the aggregate net notional.22 The margin model incorporates
both the maximum historical loss, and a 2% “short charge”. It is noteworthy that the model
is not estimated from data or theoretically grounded, but is calibrated to anecdotal evidence
(with makes its empirical success even more remarkable, as we discuss later). For later
22While Duffie et al. (2015) compute maximum shortfall for a fixed look-back period of 1000 days, we use
a longer price series starting from the year 2004. As both ours and their time series data cover the years of
the crisis, when the largest losses occurred, the difference between the initial margins computed by the two
approaches is negligible.
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purposes, we also consider a modified version of the DSV model:
MDSV nt = 0.5×MS5(Xnt ) + 0.02× AS(Xnt ), (5.5)
which places a lower weight on maximum shortfall.







via the historical simulation approach discussed in Section 5.3.3.2. Using the empirical
distribution we form estimates of volatility (standard deviation), Value-at-Risk, expected
shortfall, and maximum shortfall of the portfolio. All portfolio variables are in millions of
USD to conform with the level of initial margins.
We collect from Bloomberg time series data of the 3-month Overnight Index Swap (OIS)
spread, the 3-month USD LIBOR rates, clearing member 5-year CDS spreads, and aggregate
volatility as measured by VIX. We perform two transformations of the data. First, we
compute the LIBOR-OIS spreads (LOIS) via
LOISt := LIBORt −OISt.
The LIBOR-OIS spreads are typically viewed as a measure of financial sector stress, capturing
mainly the interest rate differential between uncollateralized and collateralized loans. We
include this measure in our regression as it is a conceivable indicator of dealer funding
opportunity costs. OIS spreads are correlated with margin funding costs, since interest paid
on collateralizing assets are typically based on overnight rates. The higher the OIS spread,
the cheaper it is for a clearing member to fund margins. A theoretical study by Capponi and
Cheng (2016) predicts that, all else equal, the clearinghouse will ask clearing members to
post higher margins if funding costs decrease. On the basis of these predictions, we expect
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that an increase in margins is associated with an increase in OIS spreads.
Second, we transform CDS spreads, another suitable measure for funding costs. However,
the relation between CDS spreads and margins is not straightforward. On the one hand,
CDS spreads are positively correlated with funding costs, because higher spreads make it
more costly for a member to borrow funds and thus disincentive the member from executing
collateralized trades. On the other hand, large CDS spreads also imply high default risk,
which may contribute to higher margins. To disentangle the two effects, we propose the
decomposition
CDSnt = ACDSt +DCDSnt .
Here ACDS, the average clearing member CDS spread, is meant to capture average default
risk in the market, which is expected to play an important role from the point of view of the
clearinghouse. DCDS, the deviation from the average, is meant to capture the differences in
funding costs among members. We choose this measure as it is plausible for clearinghouse
margin rules to explicitly account for market stress, which correlates with a general increase in
CDS spreads. However, clearinghouses often claim margining rules are not member specific.
That is, they do not explicitly take into account characteristics of the member except for
his cleared portfolio. Thus, if variations in default risk truly influence margins, this effect
should be captured by the average default risk of dealers.
All market variables are recorded in basis points (bps) to conform with market convention.
23 The full list of variables and the notation used in this section are summarized in Table 7.
23The only exception is VIX, which is typically reported in percentage points.
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL DRIVERS OF MARGINS 118
Notation Units Definition
ψ millions $ Empirical 5-day distribution of profit and losses for a portfolio
IM millions $ Observed initial margins posted for a portfolio
Y millions $ Net notional aggregated over reference names for a portfolio
Portfolio Variables
SD millions $ Sample standard deviation of ψ
V aR millions $ 1 percent quantile of ψ
ES millions $ Average of profit and losses less than equal to V aR
MS millions $ Minimum of ψ
AN millions $ Aggregate net notional (by reference entity) of portfolio
AS millions $ Aggregate short notional (by reference entity) of portfolio
DSV millions $ Initial margin estimate used by Duffie et al. (2015),
equal to MS + 0.02×AS
MDSV millions $ Adjusted initial margin from DSV , equal to 0.5×MS + 0.02×AS
Market Variables
OIS bps End of day 3-month Overnight Index Swap spreads
LOIS bps End of day 3 month USD LIBOR-OIS spreads
CDS bps End of day market quote for clearing member specific 5-year CDS spread
ACDS bps Average end of day clearing member 5-year CDS spread
DCDS bps Deviation of end of day 5-year CDS spreads from the average,
equal to CDS −ACDS
V IX bps End of day CBOE Volatility Index
Table 7: Portfolio and market variables.
This table displays the key variables and notation we use in our regression analyses.
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Table 8 displays summary statistics of our key portfolio variables and initial margins, in
millions of USD. In addition to the overall mean and standard deviations (which we also refer
to as dispersions), we report summary statistics that describe properties of panel variables,
both across accounts and time. In particular, we compute the dispersions in time averages,
mean time dispersions, dispersions in account averages, and mean account dispersions.
We observe that averages monotonically increase in the order of standard deviation (SD),
Value-at-Risk (V aR), expected shortfall (ES), and maximum shortfall (MS). This is con-
sistent with the fact that these measures capture progressively more extreme tail risk. In-
terestingly, we see that all measures of dispersion increase in this order as well. That is, as
more weight is put in the tail of the distribution, there is more variability in the computed
measures both across time and across accounts. This indicates that for traded portfolios ,
there is higher heterogeneity in extreme movements than in moderate ones.
Table 8 provides preliminary evidence that portfolio variables explain margin levels and
variation. When comparing the levels of portfolio variables to that of initial margins, we see
that SD, V aR, ES, MS are much lower than IM , whereas measures based on notionals (AN
and AS) are almost 20–40 times larger. This shows that SD, V aR, ES, MS may consistently
underestimate margins, while notional measures such as AN and AS would significantly
overestimate them. In addition, such measures do not capture well the dispersion levels.
Remarkably, of all the portfolio variables considered, DSV matches well not only the level
of margins, but also all of the dispersion measures except for dispersion in time averages,
which is better approximated by MDSV .
Table 9 displays summary statistics of our key market variables and initial margins, in
basis points and millions of USD, respectively. Definitions of market variables are reported
in Table 7. Panel summaries are not reported for market variables that do not vary across
accounts. Panel market variables such as CDS spreads and the deviation from the average
CDS spread do not manifest a strong ability to capture the various dispersion measures
introduced. On the other hand, the OIS spread captures well (proportionally) the mean and
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standard deviation of initial margins. In particular, the average OIS spread is 1.74 times its
standard deviation, whereas the average initial margin is 1.78 times its standard deviation.
This provides preliminary evidence of the OIS spread’s ability to capture initial margins.
5.4.2 Margins and Portfolio-specific Risks
In this section, we perform a panel analysis and relate the observed margins to portfolio
variables. In particular, we estimate the following panel regression model with time and
account fixed effects:





t + unt , (5.6)
where PV is the set of the portfolio variables included in the panel regression. Notice
that the model specification in Eq. (5.6) assumes that the same coefficients apply for all
clearing members, a necessary condition if margining rules were implemented uniformly
across accounts.
We start with examining the set of portfolio variables to include in PV . First, we note
that aggregate net notional (AN) serves primarily as a measure of portfolio size. As portfolio
size is likely already accounted for by risk measures such as V aR, MS and AS, all expressed
in dollar units, we choose to drop this variable from our regression. 24 Second, we perform
a check for multicollinearity. We regress both expected shortfall and standard deviation on
Value-at-Risk, and report the results in Table 10. The first row reports estimates from the
(pooled) OLS regression, and the second row reports estimates after accounting for time and
account fixed effects. We find that Value-at-Risk explains more than 96% of the variation
in the dependent variables in all cases. This strongly points to multicollinearity issues, and
thus we leave out standard deviation and expected shortfall in our panel model specification.
Our final set of portfolio variables thus include Value-at-Risk, maximum shortfall, aggre-
24We have conducted a regression analysis including AN as an explanatory variable, and found that our
results remain largely unaffected qualitatively.
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Estimates Dependent variable:
(R2) SD ES
V aR 0.338∗∗∗ 1.342∗∗∗
(OLS) (98.6%) (96.7%)
V aR 0.341∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗
(Two-way Panel) (99.3%) (98.7%)
Observations 6,721
∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 10: Check for multicollinearity
We regress both expected shortfall and standard deviation on Value-at-Risk, and report the results. The
first row corresponds to estimates from (pooled) OLS regression, and the second row corresponds to
estimates from after accounting for time and account fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are all significant
at the 1% level. R2’s are in parentheses.
We see that Value-at-Risk explains more than 96% of the variation in the dependent variables in all cases.
This strongly points to multicollinearity issues, and thus we drop standard deviation and expected shortfall
in later model specifications.
gate short notional, and margins produced by the DSV model given in Eqs. (5.4) and (5.5).
That is, we estimate Eq. (5.6) with PV = {V aR,MS,AS,DSV,MDSV }, considering both
the case with and without (time and account) fixed effects, and report the results in Table
11.25 We use two-way clustered standard errors (by time and account), thus incorporating
potential correlation between residuals. The signs of all the coefficients are in line with our
expectations: because larger values for each of the explanatory variables point to a riskier
portfolio, the coefficients are expected to be positive.
25The DSV margins, a linear combination of maximum shortfall and aggregate short notional, are included
only when the latter two are not.
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Columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 show that Value-at-Risk alone can explain 56% of the
variation in initial margins, and 83% of the variation if fixed effects are accounted for. The
estimated slope coefficient, however, is much higher than unity in either case. In particular,
a multiplier of at least 250% is needed for the regression fit, showing that collateral require-
ments are set much more conservatively than what would be implied by the conventional
5-day 99% VaR rule. Columns (3) and (4) introduce maximum shortfall (MS) and aggregate
short notional (AS) as explanatory variables in conjunction with Value-at-Risk. Compared
to columns (1) and (2), we see that introducing these measures enhances explanatory power
by a 3% in the case with fixed effects, and 12% in the case without them. Moreover, the
magnitudes of the VaR slope coefficients are much closer to unity. Our results therefore show
that initial margins depend on risk characteristics which cannot be captured only by VaR.
We drop Value-at-Risk as an explanatory variable in columns (5) and (6), and find that
there is little loss in explanatory power compared to columns (3) and (4). In particular,
maximum shortfall is positively correlated with Value-at-Risk, and dropping Value-at-Risk
increases the statistical significance of the maximum shortfall loading. Interestingly, the
aggregate short notional coefficient estimate remains very stable and highly significant (in
the 1–2% range) for all the models estimated.
Columns (7)–(12) investigate the usefulness of the Duffie et al. (2015) initial margin
model (DSV) in explaining empirically observed margins, computed as
DSV = MS + 0.02× AS.
Columns (7) and (8) show that the DSV model captures a significant portion of variation
in initial margins. The DSV model also outperforms Value-at-Risk in terms of explanatory
power (columns (1) and (2)). The DSV model seems to overestimate the level of initial
margins by 27–60%, most likely due to the higher loading on maximum shortfall compared
to the optimal mix (columns (5) and (6)). The significance of the DSV slope coefficient
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persists when we introduce Value-at-Risk, and the explanatory power remains roughly the
same, showing that Value-at-Risk has little explanatory power beyond that already captured
by DSV. The overall explanatory power improves when we consider a modified version of
DSV (columns (11) and (12))
MDSV = 0.5×MS + 0.02× AS.
However, Value-at-Risk still has little explanatory power beyond that already captured by
our modified DSV model.
Our empirical results provides support to the margins model of Duffie et al. (2015), where
they assume short charge parameters also in the 1–2% range. Since the main objective of
Duffie et al. (2015) was to assess relative changes in margins, it was arguably more important
for the DSV model to capture initial margin variations than the precise level of margins.
However, we find that their model specification matches empirically observed CDS margins
quite well . Compared to the optimal mix of maximum shortfall and aggregate short notional
(columns (5) and (7)), we see that the 2% short charge parameter of DSV is remarkably
accurate, and that the loss in explanatory power when maximum shortfall is overweighted is
small (about 4%). DSV outperforms the simple VaR rule alone by 7% in terms of explanatory
power (columns (1) and (7)).
The magnitude of the effects of portfolio variables, on the other hand, differ greatly.
For example, combining the information in Table 8 and Table 11 (column (3)), we see than
an increase of one standard deviation for Value-at-Risk corresponds to an increase in 0.23
standard deviations in initial margins. All else equal, the corresponding increases from
maximum shortfall and aggregate short notional are 0.16 and 0.52, respectively. 26
When we consider the DSV model inclusive of VaR (column (9)), a one standard deviation
increase in the DSV variable corresponds to a 0.72 standard deviation increase in initial
margins. The DSV thus captures better the variation in margins compared to Value-at-
26This example is computed using Column 3 in Table 11, i.e. it is the full model without fixed effects.
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Risk, which corresponds to a 0.08 standard deviation increase. Comparing the baseline
DSV model and the modified DSV model (columns (9) and (11)), we see that the modified
DSV slightly further outperforms the baseline version by providing a 0.74 standard deviation
increase. Combining this with Table 8, we see that the reason for the outperformance is the
because modified DSV better captures the dispersion in account averages. That is, while
DSV performs well in capturing most of the dispersion measures in Table 8, modified DSV
captures well the dispersion in accounts average margin. Our results thus imply that this
dispersion has significant time variation, and by capturing that variation well modified DSV
better explains margins .
While our proposed measures capture significant variations in initial margins, the ex-
planatory power is far from perfect. This implies that there other contributing factors to
clearinghouse decisions, which cannot be incorporated into conventional risk measures.27
5.4.3 Funding Cost, Collateral Rates and other Market Variables
In this section, we incorporate market variables into our panel analysis and assess their
ability to explain margin requirements. The model proposed by Capponi and Cheng (2016)
shows that, regardless of the risk characteristics of the cleared portfolio, the clearinghouse
has the incentive to increase margins when (i) the average default risk is high, to protect
itself from larger expected default losses, and (ii) funding costs are low, as the deterrent effect
of margin costs is weak. The included market variables are chosen to capture variations in
margins that are due to changes in default risk and funding cost.
We consider the following panel regression model:










t + unt , (5.7)
27We have performed the same exercise for varying VaR confidence levels. We find additional multi-
collinearity problems introduced as the confidence level approaches one because VaR then coincides with
maximum shortfall. Our results, however, remain broadly the same.
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where PV = {V aR,MS,AS,DSV,MDSV } andMV = {OIS, LOIS,ACDS,DCDS, V IX}
are, respectively, the portfolio and market variables included in the panel regression. Be-
cause market variables are often not account specific (e.g. OIS spreads), including time
fixed-effects would result in identifiability problems. Thus, for this section we only consider
time fixed-effects when non account-specific variables are included.
We estimate the model in Eq. (5.7) using least squares regressions, choosing initial mar-
gins as the dependent variable and portfolio and market variables as explanatory variables.
The results with two-way clustered (by account and time) standard errors are reported in
Table 12.
We first observe that when market variables are included, our previous results obtained
by including only portfolio variables remain the same. The modified DSV initial margin
measure (columns (1)–(4)) and aggregate short notional appear to be strong drivers of initial
margins, and Value-at-Risk shows little statistical significance when these two measures are
controlled for.This shows that market variables can capture a dimension of initial margins
not explained by portfolio variables.
Columns (1) and (2) report the case where the full set of market variables are included
and Value-at-Risk and modified DSV margins are controlled for. There is a non-negligible
increase in explanatory power compared to models including only portfolio variables (Table
11), showing again the usefulness of market variables in explaining initial margins. Com-
paring Tables 11 and 12, however, we notice that a significant fraction of explanatory power
is attributed to portfolio variables alone. Thus, while market variables do seem to influence
margin levels, their effects seem to be smaller than that of portfolio variables.
Columns (3) and (4) report our results when replacing market variables with individual
clearing member CDS spreads. The increase in explanatory power is small, and the loading
on CDS spreads is insignificant. Thus, in general, market variables capture information
not accounted for by the default intensities of clearing members. Columns (5) and (6)
report our results when using maximum shortfall and aggregate short notional to replace the
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Dependent variable: Initial Margins (IM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value-at-Risk (V aR) 0.297 0.726 0.358 0.633 0.854 1.330
(0.873) (1.207) (0.979) (1.164) (0.791) (0.976)
Maximum Shortfall (MS) 0.322∗∗ 0.116
(0.146) (0.223)
Aggregate Short Notional (AS) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.005) (0.008)
Modified DSV Model (MDSV ) 1.099∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗
(0.257) (0.323) (0.291) (0.321)
Overnight Index Swap Spread (OIS) 5.894∗∗ 4.278∗ 5.172∗∗ 3.769
(2.847) (2.564) (2.612) (2.321)
LIBOR-OIS spread (LOIS) −3.562 −1.419 −2.513 −0.646
(3.285) (2.817) (3.068) (2.605)
CBOE volatility index (V IX) 0.035∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Member CDS spread (CDS) 0.872 −1.455
(1.134) (1.329)
Average CDS spread (ACDS) 0.632∗∗ 0.484 0.588∗∗ 0.464
(0.267) (0.339) (0.234) (0.318)
Deviation from average (DCDS) −1.676 −1.509 −2.022 −1.186
(1.568) (1.312) (1.652) (1.307)
Observations 6,721 6,721 6,721 6,721 6,721 6,721
Adjusted R2 0.709 0.861 0.675 0.859 0.714 0.864
Account FE N Y N Y N Y
Time FE N N N Y N N
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 12: Regression results for explaining initial margins with portfolio and market variables
We perform least squares regressions and report two-way clustered standard errors (by time and account).
We consider both the case of with and without fixed effects. Because market variables are often dependent
only on time, we consider only account fixed effects when such variables are introduced.
Columns (1) and (2) consider the full set of market variables in explaining initial margins when
Value-at-Risk and modified DSV margins are controlled for. There is a non-negligible increase in
explanatory power compared to models with only portfolio variables (Table 11). Columns (3) and (4)
consider individual clearing member CDS spreads. Market variables in general capture information not
priced in by individual clearing member default intensities. Columns (5) and (6) use maximum shortfall
and aggregate short notional to replace the modified DSV margins. The results demonstrates the
usefulness of the individual components of the DSV margins in explaining observed margins. The
estimated coefficient for aggregate short notional is significant and in the range of 1-2%, showing
robustness to our previous results in Table 11. Maximum shortfall also plays a significant role when
account fixed effects are not controlled for. Interest paid on collateral (measured by OIS) and market
volatility (measured by VIX) both play a significant role in explaining margins (columns (1), (2), (5), and
(6)). In particular, since increases in increase interest paid on collateralizing assets decreases the cost of
funding for collateral, members are more inclined to post margins. This shows up as a statistically positive
coefficient for OIS. Increases in VIX entices the clearinghouse to ask for more margins in view of the
increased tendency to default. Individual default probabilities do not seem to play key roles in margin
levels. This supports the claim that clearinghouses incorporate market level information but do not
emphasize heavily idiosyncratic clearing member risks when calculating margins.
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modified DSV margins. The increase in explanatory power is small when compared to the
results in columns (1) and (2). However, the comparison demonstrates the usefulness of the
individual components of the DSV margins in explaining observed margins. The estimated
coefficient for aggregate short notional is significant and in the range of 1-2%, again showing
the robustness of our previous results in Table 11. Maximum shortfall also plays a significant
role when account fixed effects are not controlled for.
We find that interest paid on collateral (measured by OIS) and market volatility (mea-
sured by VIX) both play a significant role in explaining margins (columns (1), (2), (5), and
(6)). In particular, since increases in the interest paid on collateralizing assets decrease the
cost of funding collateral assets, members are more inclined to post margins. This explains
the statistically positive coefficient for OIS, empirically validating the theoretical predictions
of Capponi and Cheng (2016). Increases in VIX are typically associated with increased
market stress, which entices the clearinghouse to ask for more margins in view of the in-
creased members’ default risk. Commonly referred to as a fear-gauge of the market, the
CBOE volatility index is meant to be forward-looking. In view of this interpretation, our
results suggest that clearinghouse margining rules demonstrate some intent to be forward
looking and do not only depend on characteristics of the current portfolio or market. Indi-
vidual default probabilities, however, measured by CDS spreads, do not seem to play key
roles in determining margin levels. This supports the claim that clearinghouses incorporate
market information but do not emphasize heavily idiosyncratic clearing member risks when
calculating margins.
The signs for ACDS, and DCDS also conform with intuition. The regression coefficient
for ACDS is positive, consistent with the fact that the clearinghouse would require more
margins when the average default risk is high. The regression coefficient for DCDS is
negative, which indicates that the margining rule yields lower margins for clearing members
in distress, consistent with empirical evidence provided by Bignon and Vuillemey (2016). We
note, however, that the regression coefficients for both ACDS and DCDS are statistically
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insignificant when account fixed effects are controlled for.
There are two explanations for why credit spreads seem to have a weak effect on margins.
The first explanation is that clearing member portfolios did not experience significant enough
losses during our sample period so that the clearinghouse’s equity value is inelastic to changes
in member credit quality. This is plausible because the sample period considered 2014–2016
does not cover a stressed period as significant as the Great Recession. Second, raising funds
from capital markets may not have been a primary concern for clearing members during the
low interest rate period of 2014–2016. As large financial institutions have accumulated hefty
cash balances over the past decade, variations in CDS spreads may not translate to variations
in funding costs, as collateral can be funded with excess cash. This is supported by the fact
that margins levels are estimated to be more responsive to changes in OIS spreads than to
changes in CDS spreads: interest on collateral is always earned on existing collateralizing
assets, whereas CDS spreads do not affect funding costs unless members choose to borrow
from capital markets.
Because of the granularity of our data set, we are able to separate out the two counteract-
ing effects of increasing CDS spreads from ACDS and DCDS. These results have important
implications for funding liquidity: margin spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)) may
be dampened or reinforced by clearinghouse margin rules. We find partial evidence for the
reinforcement channel through the average CDS spread, which has a positive and significant
coefficient when account fixed effects are not controlled for (columns (1) and (5) in Table
12). Our results show that if a market shock increases aggregate default risk in the market
(ACDS increases), this increases the required margins for members, which can lead to a
margin spiral. However, this shock must have commonly affected members so that it affects
all members’ CDS spreads, and is not offset by a counteracting shock in another members’
CDS spread. In the language of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), the clearinghouse be-
haves like an uninformed financier, possibly over-estimating fundamental volatility through
the average CDS spread and over-tightening margin constraints, which can set off margin
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spirals.
5.5 Robustness
In this section, we assess the robustness of the results presented in the previous sections.
5.5.1 Counterfactual losses and realized returns
We assess the robustness of the historical simulation method presented in Section 5.3.3.2
to misspecification due to the DV01 approximation. We assess the robustness by using the
historical simulation method to compute losses for the 2014–2016 sample period, where we
also observed realized losses for the actual portfolios. Comparing the two sets of losses, we
can assess how well the simulation method captures realized returns.
The results are reported in Table 13. We see that while the counterfactual losses are
on average smaller than the realized losses, they are more variable. In fact, compared to
either of the standard deviation of realized or counterfactual losses, the two average losses
are statistically indistinguishable. The higher standard deviation for the counterfactual
losses is expected, as they are computed from a first order linear approximation to real
price movements, and do not incorporates second order convexity effects that stabilize price
movements.
When performing a regression analysis, we find moderately positive correlation between
the two sets of losses. The estimated slope coefficients are statistically significant, and a
significant amount of variation in realized losses is explained by counterfactual losses (R2 =
0.25). We remark that while the association is far from perfect, the counterfactual losses do
serve as reasonable approximations of realized losses.
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Realized Losses Counterfactual Losses
Observations 6,604 6,604
Average losses ($) 110,234 24,553
Standard deviation of losses ($) 30,617,420 44,885,349
Regression analysis Realized ∼ Counterfactual Counterfactual ∼ Realized
Slope 0.7368∗∗∗ 0.3428∗∗∗
Standard error 0.0156 0.0073
Correlation 0.5026 0.5026
R2 0.2526 0.2526
Table 13: Comparing counterfactual losses to realized losses
We compare the historical simulation method to compute losses for the 2014–2016 sample period, where we
also observed realized losses for the actual portfolios. Counterfactual losses are on average. We find
moderately positive correlation between the two sets of losses. While the association is far from perfect, the
counterfactual losses do serve as reasonable approximations of realized losses.
5.5.2 CDS DV01 approximation duration
We assess the robustness of the time series test presented in Section 5.3.3.2 to varying
duration assumptions in the DV01 formula. We assess this by “stressing” our simulated
losses: the entire set of counterfactual losses is recomputed with the alternative assumption
d = 5. This directly scales up the level of losses and increases the number of exceptions
recorded. The assumption is assuredly conservative since the most actively traded CDS
contracts are typically five year contracts, which have a duration slightly less than five.
We compute the return on margins with the stressed counterfactual losses. We report
descriptive statistics and test results in Table 14. As the duration assumption merely scales
the level of losses, the descriptive statistics display a similar loss distribution to that re-
ported in Table 4. About half of the empirical distribution of returns lies between ±3.2%.
Aggregating over observations account/time/historical 5-day window combinations, we see
the empirical 99% Value at Risk is approximately 45% of posted margins. Approximately
98% of the observations lie within 3 standard deviations from the mean.
When testing the VaR margining rule, we see that there are many more observed ex-
ceptions (23,268 versus 3,456 for the d = 3 case). This brings the empirical frequency of
exceptions much closer to 1%. However, the result is still statistically significantly less than
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Interquartile Range (Q3-Q1)(%) [-3.14, 3.16]
Empirical V aR5,0.05(%) -18.47
Empirical V aR5,0.01(%) -44.93
Empirical V aR5,0.001(%) -101.48
|rm| ≤ 0.43 (%) 97.78
Test results for H0 : P(rm < −100%) = 1%
Initial Margin Exceptions 23,268
Ratio (Z ′) 1.05× 10−3
S.E.† 5.29× 10−4%
t-stat -16.92
Table 14: Descriptive statistics for historically simulated return on margins for d = 5 with
two-way clustered standard error
We report descriptive statistics for the historically simulated 5-day ahead returns on margins. The t-test
shows there being strong evidence against the 5-day 99% VaR rule.
1%. Thus, even with very conservative duration assumptions and including the crisis period
of 2007–2009 in the calculations, there is still strong evidence against the 5-day 99% VaR
rule, showing robustness to our previous conclusions.
5.5.3 Varying risk measurement windows
Value-at-Risk and maximum shortfall used in our panel analyses (Tables 11 and 12) were
based on P&L generated from our entire sample of credit spreads. Because our dataset
covered the financial crisis, the risk measures captured extreme movements and can thus
be viewed as overly conservative for estimating portfolio losses. In this section we consider
using only the last 1000 days (approximately 4 years) of credit spreads data to generate P&L.
Using these newly estimated counterfactual P&L, we compute Value-at-Risk and maximum
shortfall. We replicate our panel analyses and report the results in Tables 15 and 16.
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Importantly, there is a general increase in standard errors when we use only recent data
to estimate Value-at-Risk and maximum shortfall. This shows evidence that clearinghouse
margining rules place significant weight on historical crisis and downturns, and that their
estimates of portfolio losses mostly replicate extreme losses such as those observed during
the financial crisis.
Comparing Table 15 to Table 11, we see there is a distinct decrease in explanatory power
of Value-at-Risk (V aR) (columns (1) and (2). This is likely due the exclusion of the financial
crisis period in our simulation, resulting in both lower level and variability of Value-at-Risk.
Maximum shortfall (MS) and aggregate short notional (AS) still retain strong explanatory
power (columns (3) and (4)), and the aggregate short notional coefficient estimate remains
around the 2% range (columns (5) and (6)). Columns (5) and (6) show that Value-at-Risk has
little explanatory power beyond that already captured by maximum shortfall and aggregate
short notional. Columns (7) and (8) show that the DSV model still captures a significant
portion of variation in initial margins, and outperforms Value-at-Risk in terms of explanatory
power (columns (1) and (2)). The significance of the DSV slope coefficient persists when
we introduce Value-at-Risk, and the explanatory power remains roughly the same, showing
that Value-at-Risk has little explanatory power beyond that already captured by DSV. The
explanatory power increases when we consider the modified DSV model (columns (11) and
(12)). However, Value-at-Risk still has little explanatory power beyond that already captured
by our modified DSV model. Our conclusions remain broadly consistent with our previous
results.
Comparing Table 16 to Table 15, we observe again that there is a non-negligible increase
in explanatory power compared to models including only portfolio variables (Table 15). This
confirms that market variables can capture a dimension of initial margins not explained by
portfolio variables. Compared to Table 12, we see that the modified DSV model retains
significance and explanatory power, and that Value-at-Risk still has little explanatory power
beyond that already captured by the modified DSV (columns (1) and (2)). Columns (3) and
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Dependent variable: Initial Margins (IM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value-at-Risk (V aR) 0.823 0.343 0.938 0.324 2.378∗∗ 1.969
(0.748) (0.764) (0.756) (0.770) (1.119) (1.506)
Maximum shortfall (MS) −0.223 −0.358
(0.477) (0.585)
Aggregate short notional (AS) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007)
Modified DSV model (MDSV ) 1.279∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗ 1.215∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.347) (0.213) (0.346)
Overnight Index Swap spread (OIS) 2.869 2.049 3.003 2.294
(2.416) (2.209) (2.322) (2.092)
LIBOR-OIS spread (LOIS) 2.033 2.945 0.434 1.224
(3.505) (3.377) (2.939) (2.439)
CBOE volatility index (V IX) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Member CDS spread CDS 0.093 −2.743∗
(1.300) (1.648)
Average CDS spread (ACDS) −0.202 −0.111 0.011 0.087
(0.291) (0.358) (0.220) (0.285)
Deviation from average (DCDS) −2.059 −2.758 −2.219 −2.320
(1.926) (1.707) (1.896) (1.597)
Observations 6,721 6,721 6,721 6,721 6,721 6,721
Adjusted R2 0.678 0.839 0.655 0.837 0.686 0.845
Account FE N Y N Y N Y
Time FE N N N Y N N
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 16: Regression results for explaining initial margins with portfolio and market variables
with last 1000 days of P&L
We perform least squares regressions using initial margins as the dependent variable and portfolio and
market variables as explanatory variables. Two-way clustered (by time and account) standard errors. We
consider both the case of with and without fixed effects. Because market variables are often dependent
only on time, we consider only account fixed effects when such variables are introduced. Risk measures are
computed with only using last 1000 days of simulated return on margins.
The non-negligible increase in explanatory power compared to models with only portfolio variables (Table
15) confirms that market variables can capture a dimension of initial margins not explained by portfolio
variables. Compared to Table 12, we see that the modified DSV model retains significance and explanatory
power, and that Value-at-Risk still has little explanatory power beyond that already captured by modified
DSV (columns (1) and (2)). Columns (3) and (4) consider individual clearing member CDS spreads. The
increase in explanatory power is small and loadings insignificant. Again, we show that market variables in
general capture information not priced in by individual clearing member default intensities. Columns (5)
and (6) replace the modified DSV margins using maximum shortfall and aggregate short notional. The
estimated coefficient for aggregate short notional is significant around 2%, showing robustness to our
previous results. Maximum shortfall becomes insignificant, likely due to the high correlation with
Value-at-Risk.
We find again that market volatility (measured by VIX) plays a significant role in explaining margins
(columns (1), (2), (5), and (6)). The loading for OIS remains positive becomes insignificant. Individual
default probabilities measured by various CDS spreads again do not play key roles in margin levels.
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(4) consider individual clearing member CDS spreads. The increase in explanatory power is
small and loadings insignificant. Again, we show that market variables in general capture
information which is not priced in the default intensities of clearing members. Columns (5)
and (6) report results with using maximum shortfall and aggregate short notional instead of
modified DSV. The estimated coefficient for aggregate short notional is significant around
2%, showing robustness of our previous results. Maximum shortfall becomes insignificant,
likely due to the high correlation with Value-at-Risk. We find again that market volatility
(measured by VIX) plays a significant role in explaining margins (columns (1), (2), (5), and
(6)). While the sign remains positive, the loadings for OIS becomes insignificant, mostly due
to the large increase in standard errors. Individual default probabilities measured by various
CDS spreads again do not play key roles in determining margin levels.
5.6 Concluding remarks
Clearinghouses’ margining rules play an important role the functioning and regulation of
financial markets. We have considered a variety of approaches to identify key drivers of
margin levels. While risk measures such as Value-at-Risk can explain a significant fraction
of variation in margin levels, we find strong evidence against the conceptual rule-of-thumb of
VaR margining. Importantly, we show that margins are better explained by a combination
of maximum shortfall, aggregate short notional, and market variables, and that VaR has
little explanatory power after these variables are accounted for.
Our analysis exploits the availability of a unique dataset on clearing members’ portfolio
exposures and associated margin levels. We document several stylized facts, including the
tendency of returns on margins to cluster around the mean and the time variation in margin
levels. We show that margin levels are likely too conservative from a VaR perspective, and
that such a rule, if any, is unfairly implemented across accounts. Our analysis shows that
there are important factors which are not incorporated in conventional risk measures used
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for determining margins, but which can instead be captured by measures of funding cost
and default risk. The relation between margins and funding cost has important implications
with regards to margins spirals, as we find margin spirals to be more likely when there is
commonality among members’ exposures to shocks.
The VaR levels and their variations are both low compared to actual collateral require-
ments. Of course, one could argue that clearinghouses do in fact base margins on VaR, but
merely adjust their probabilities through “stressing” loss simulations. Our results then show
that clearinghouses’ assumed probability distributions of losses are much more conservative
than history: even after considering loss levels as large as those observed during the financial
crisis, historical VaR does not approximate collateral requirements well. Moreover, even if
some VaR rule were applied, it is unevenly applied to clearing members, and beliefs in the
underlying loss distribution have to change much faster than historical VaR to match margin
variation.
Our results show that it is quite improbable that margins only depend on characteristics
of the loss distribution. Suppose margins were determined using, for instance, expected
shortfall. Margins then depend on the entire loss distribution. Since such spectral risk
measures place increasing weights on the entire tail, the results are necessary smoother than
that of VaR, which places unit mass on a quantile. Thus, to explain the large variations
in margins, we need even more volatility or uncertainty in clearinghouses’ beliefs in the
underlying loss distribution. In this case, the assumptions used to generate liquidity spirals
in the literature may be too strong: a change in volatility does not affect margins as much
when the entire tail is taken into consideration, and spirals would be much smaller.
We have shown that margins can be explained by maximum shortfall and aggregate short
notional. This result reconciles with existing theory as the level of maximum shortfall can
be much higher than that of VaR, and, since portfolio positions can change quite rapidly, so
can margins based on aggregate short notional. In addition, the fact that the clearinghouse
conservatively includes variables independent of the loss distribution, such as aggregate short
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notional, shows that it may be very uncertain about the losses distribution. While clearing-
houses and members are typically thought of as those with superior information about the
cleared product and the market, our results show that they may be much more uninformed
than typically assumed. Since most members serve as dealers, this indicates that they play
the role of ”uninformed financiers” in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) which is key to
generating loss and margin spirals.
We note that a recurrent theme of general collateral equilibria (Geanakoplos (1997),
Geanakoplos (2010), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2014), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015)) in
binomial economies is that margins (collateral) is the payoff of the security in the down
state, which is the same as maximum shortfall. This theory does not rely on risk aversion but
rather on heterogenous beliefs of agents and thus provides another theoretical explanation
for our results: it could be that (i) the clearinghouse is completely uninformed and sets
collateral at the decentralized equilibrium level, (ii) agents have sufficient different beliefs
and this leads to maximum shortfall collateral.
Our results are based on historical data. There are a variety of approaches to calculate
initial margin levels based on conventional risk measures if underlying P&L are drawn from
parametric distributions chosen by the clearinghouse. However, the economic concern is then
how the clearinghouse chooses those distributions and the incentives driving those choices.
Margin requirements are then indirectly driven by those incentives, a dimension that cannot
be captured by empirical data.
Chapter 6
Default Funds and Clearinghouse
Equity
Overview
In this chapter, we analyze the clearinghouse’s incentives behind the determination of the
default fund requirement and its equity commitment, resources further down the default
waterfall. As the effective central counterparty to all members, the clearinghouse’s arrange-
ment of various layers of loss-absorbing capital has significant implications for the allocation
and management of counterparty risk.
The prospect of systemic shocks has led regulatory authorities and financial institutions
to adopt sophisticated mechanisms to mitigate counterparty risk. One of these mecha-
nisms is that of loss mutualization via a clearinghouse’s default waterfall (Pirrong (2011)).
This chapter provides an explanatory analysis of the layers further down a modern clear-
inghouse’s default waterfall, which consists of self-insuring initial margins, loss-mutualizing
default funds, and the clearinghouse’s equity commitment.
Recall from Chapter 1, losses originating from defaults of members within a clearing net-
work are allocated among the surviving members according to a “default waterfall” (Figure
141
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1). The first line of defense is the initial margin posted to the clearinghouse. Each member’s
initial margins is used only to absorb losses generated by his own portfolio, should he default.
The role and choice of initial margins within central clearing have been analyzed in chapters
3 and 4.
It is unanimously agreed upon that derivative clearinghouses are systemically important,
as they sit at the heart of financial networks.1 Market stress arising from the exhaustion of the
various layers of loss-absorbing capital in the default waterfall can disturb the functioning
of financial markets. Recent regulatory reforms have further increased the systemic role
of clearinghouses by mandating the clearing of standardized derivatives. This calls for an
economic analysis of the layers of loss-absorbing capital set in place. The junior, self-insuring
layer (initial margins) has been thoroughly analyzed in the literature (Geanakoplos (1997)) as
similar concepts of collateral occurs in many other contexts such as loans (Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981)). The more senior layers of capital (default funds and clearinghouse equity), however,
are unique to clearinghouse default waterfalls and have not been analyzed in previous studies.
The focus of this chapter is to study the incentives behind the determination of default funds
and clearinghouse equity resources.
Model 3 considers a two-period economy, consisting of a continuum of potential clearing
members and a profit-maximizing clearinghouse. Each member can be of safe or risky type.
At time zero, the clearinghouse declares its default fund requirement and equity commitment
rule. The default fund requirement is the amount of costly funds a member needs to post
with it, should he choose to participate in the clearing process. The equity commitment
is the amount of losses the clearinghouse commits to bear, should defaulting members’
default funds be exhausted. This skin in the game directly impacts the clearinghouse’s
expected profit, and incentivizes it to manage default risks. In response to the clearinghouse’s
declaration, members individually choose whether or not to participate in clearing. Both
1Major clearinghouses are recognized as Derivative Clearing Organizations (DCOs) by the US Commodity
Futures Trading Commission and are subject to additional regulatory oversight due to the special roles they
play in the cleared market.
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the members and the clearinghouse derive income from participating in the clearing process.
At time one, members may default, generating losses to the surviving clearing members
and the clearinghouse. Realized losses are then allocated among clearing members and the
clearinghouse according to the default waterfall.
Model 3 features the fundamental trade-offs faced by the clearinghouse and its poten-
tial clearing members. Large default fund requirements increase the funding costs borne
by members and decrease the amount of (counterparty) risk they can offload to the clear-
ing network; on the other hand, they increase protection from other members’ defaults and
reduce the clearinghouse’s exposure to default losses. Large equity commitments increase
members’ expected profits by providing a further layer of protection, attracting more mem-
bers to participate and increasing the clearinghouse’s revenue; however, they also increase
the clearinghouse’s potential for losses. We show that the role played by default funds and
clearinghouse equity are complementary to that of initial margins. It is well established
in the literature that self-insuring collateral (initial margins) screens out risky participants
(Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Our analysis predicts that default funds complement the role of
initial margins by incentivizing safe members to participate rather than deter risky ones.
The main intuition behind our results follows from two fundamental insights: (i) the loss-
mutualization mechanism creates an implicit wealth transfer from safe to risky members, and
(ii) the monopolistic clearinghouse commits equity to absorb losses only if it increases its
profits. While large default fund requirements can mitigate the implicit wealth transfer, they
lose the screening ability of initial margin requirements. These differences arise because, dif-
ferently from the initial margin, the default fund can be used to absorb losses originating from
another member’s default, and hence is a bona fide source of loss-mutualization. We show
that, regardless of the default fund requirement, risky members always gain from sharing
their risk with safe ones. The clearinghouse’s equity commitment, typically referred to as its
“skin in the game”, is more effective at incentivizing safe member participation compared to
the default fund requirement. This is because it requires no additional contribution from the
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safe members themselves. Clearinghouses are reluctant to contribute equity, however, as it
increases the amount of losses that they would need to absorb. We show that, in the absence
of clearinghouse equity commitments, safe members may not participate: the clearinghouse
commits equity to prevent this from happening and maintain revenue. All this serves to
explain why clearinghouses commit positive equity in the absence of regulatory minimums,2
a seeming anomaly as they bear no default losses if they do not.
Our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate on the adequacy of current clearinghouse
default waterfalls. Established to align the interests of the clearinghouse with those of their
members, the appropriate level and rules behind the clearinghouse’s skin in the game is still
an active source of regulatory debate. Skin in the game was one of the major topics discussed
during the Global Markets Advisory Committee Meeting held on May 14, 2015 by the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Clearing members have generally argued
for more contributions from clearinghouses to align clearinghouse incentives with those of
their members. While major clearinghouses generally agreed that they and their members
should have aligned incentives, they have argued against their skins in the game being a
major source of loss absorption (LCH Clearnet (2014a), CME Group (2015)). Our results
explain these assertions as they indicate that it is privately optimal for clearinghouses to only
contribute equity up to the point where safe members are comfortable with participating.
Model 3 explains the empirically observed differences in capitalization and profitability
across clearinghouses. The International Organization of Securities Commissions disclosures
indicate that ICE Clear Europe requires more default funds and equity per unit risk than ICE
Clear Credit. Model 3 attributes these differences to the more diverse profile of European
market participants compared to those in the U.S.. We also explain the current prevalence of
“defaulter-pays” clearing networks: ISDA (2013b) indicates that clearinghouse default fund
levels are quite conservative: on average less than 20% of the pre-funded default funds are
2Such requirements are part of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) but not imposed
in the U.S.. Both ICE Clear Credit and CME’s CDS Clearing segment boast of $50 million of corporate
default resource contributions.
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used when defaults occur under stressed scenarios. Our analysis predicts that the current
low funding cost environment incentivizes the clearinghouse to use large default funds to
protect its business and equity.
We argue that, with their features of loss-mutualization, no combination of default funds
and equity can screen out only the risky members. In addition, as the clearinghouse needs
equity capital to attract safe members, it may fail to do so if it is capital constrained. To
the extent that clearinghouses are capital constrained, Model 3 offers a positive explanation
to the existence of “bad clearinghouses”, which have riskier members; for instance, CC&G’s
member base is mostly of low quality, as compared to the larger ICE Clear Credit. Interest-
ingly, our results also indicate that the surplus that the risky members capture is decreasing
in the amount of risk-sharing. In other words, the clearinghouse’s (privately) optimal mix of
default funds and equity resources can incentivize risky members to lower the risk that they
impose onto others. This result provides support to the current default waterfall structure.3
Although our analysis is positive in nature, our results also provide several normative
insights into the regulation of systemic risk. We measure systemic risk generated by the
clearing network with the funding shortfall that can arise when all pre-funded resources are
exhausted, and investigate the dependence of systemic risk on the level of risk-sharing and
funding costs. We find that while more risk-sharing increases the default fund and hence
the funding costs the model economy has to bear, the clearing network is safer since the ex-
pected funding shortfall is lower. On the other hand, increased funding costs decreases both
default fund requirements and equity commitments, leading to a higher funding shortfall.
Interestingly, systemic risk may rise when clearing revenues increase, as the clearinghouse’s
equilibrium response is to reduce the layer of default resources. This is against the common
argument that large corporate revenues serve as a capital buffer and mitigate risk. In par-
ticular, when member revenues increase, the overall clearing network is riskier even though
some members enjoy a larger economic surplus.
3Acharya et al. (2009) discuss the additional usefulness of clearinghouses in mitigating operational risks
and increasing market transparency.
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We assess the impact of minimum equity requirements, a regulatory measure designed
to mitigate systemic risk. Depending on his systemic risk aversion, a welfare-maximizing
regulator may find the clearinghouse’s capital choices insufficient and choose to increase
default resources through a minimum equity requirement. We find that the imposition of
such a requirement increases default fund contributions, thus also creating additional funding
costs to the model economy. The regulator thus needs to balance the additional funding costs
triggered by such a requirement with the resulting reinforced systemic risk mitigation via
increased default funds.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 reviews existing related
literature on clearinghouses. We present Model 3 in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 develops the
equilibrium solution and provides a comparative statics analysis. Section 6.4 analyzes the
equilibrium welfare distribution and systemic risk. Section 6.5 presents empirical predictions
of the model analysis. Section 6.6 discusses policy implications. Section 6.7 concludes.
Technical proofs are delegated to the appendix.
6.1 Related Literature
Model 3 contributes to the very recent, but exponentially growing, literature on clearing-
houses and in particular the branch analyzing the default waterfall structure. Related to
our theoretical framework is the empirical analysis of Armakola and Laurent (2015), who
analyze clearinghouse default resources data. They argue that the quality and heterogene-
ity of clearing members are key to the monitoring and supervision of CCPs and must be
taken into account when sizing the default fund. Our results echo theirs in showing that
the level of risk-sharing, a measure of member heterogeneity, is central to the determination
of resources in the default waterfall structure. These conclusions are further supported by
Ruffini et al. (2015), who argue that risk-sharing is an important characteristic of centrally
cleared systems.
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Biais et al. (2016b) study the incentives in risk-sharing via derivative contracts and show
that risk-sharing may undermine risk-prevention incentives. In contrast to them, we find that
the typical default waterfall structure of a clearinghouse potentially supports risk-prevention.
The rule for default funds advocated by the Principles for Financial Market Infrastruc-
tures is the “Cover 2” requirement (CPMI and IOSCO (2012)), stating that the aggregate
default fund should be sufficient to cover the default losses of the two largest clearing mem-
bers. However, since the clearinghouse has much discretion over the methodology used to
simulate stressed scenarios, there is ambiguity as to how default funds are actually deter-
mined. Menkveld (2016) analyzes systemic liquidation within a crowded trades setting and
views the default fund as the minimum level of funds needed to cover default losses in “ex-
treme but plausible” conditions. The incentives provided by costs incurred to finance default
funds are featured in the default resource calibration framework of Ghamami and Glasserman
(2016). Different from these studies, which follow risk-measure based rules to determine de-
fault funds or equity commitments, we solve for equilibrium default waterfall resources from
first principles. Amini et al. (2015) consider how central clearing can be used to reduce
systemic risk in a Eisenberg-Noe (Eisenberg and Noe (2001)) type clearing network, and
propose an alternative structure to the default fund to reduce liquidation costs, taking into
account incentive compatibility of the requirements. In contrast, our model focuses entirely
on agents’ incentives to pin down the equilibrium resources within the waterfall.4
While outside the scope of this chapter, it is important to notice that large amounts of
capital are being committed as initial margins. The role and choice of initial margins in the
context of central clearing have been investigated in the literature. Figlewski (1984) relates
initial margin rules to pre-specified quantiles of the loss distribution. Telser (1981) describes
the competing incentives behind margin setting due to market riskiness and funding costs.
Duffie and Zhu (2011) study how central clearing affects collateral usage.
4Our model does not take into account the presence of multiple competing clearinghouses. Glasserman
et al. (2015) discuss the equilibrium effect of multiple central counterparties on collateral requirements,
whereas Duffie et al. (2015) empirically document the increase in collateral demand arising from central
counterparties’ specialization.
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The determination of collateral resources to protect against the default risk of clearing
members bears similarities with the banking and insurance literature, but also presents
important distinctions. Banks demand collateral when providing loans to protect themselves
against losses due to asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). This is, however,
markedly distinct from default fund resources because the collateral securing the loans is
generally not used to absorb losses of other borrowers. Banks are also required to hold
large amounts of equity capital to mitigate risk-taking behavior due to the improper pricing
of deposit insurance. It should be clear that the economic problem faced by the bank
is different from that of a clearinghouse: banks are both the entities contributing equity
capital and the shirking agents in the principal-agent problem. Banks may shirk by privately
increasing risk-taking in view of insurance protection, which is why banking equity capital
is highly regulated to prevent moral hazard. In our context, it is the clearinghouse who
faces asymmetric information and uses equity capital to increase revenues. The significant
differences between the economic problems faced by banks and clearinghouses explain why
the on-going debate over clearinghouse equity capital requirements is not yet clear-cut.
The functioning mechanism of the clearinghouse’s default waterfall is related to that
of insurance guarantee funds administered by U.S. state governments. These guarantee
funds protect policy holders in the event of insolvencies of the insurance company, and
mutualize losses among state-licensed insurance companies. However, different from the
clearinghouse setting, participation in these funds is mandatory, government administrators
have no profit motive and do not contribute equity capital. In addition, contributions are
sometimes assessed post-insolvency rather than having permanent pre-funded capital set
aside.
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6.2 Model 3
We consider a two-period model economy consisting of one clearinghouse and a continuum
of potential members. All agents maximize expected profits. Of the unit mass of potential
members, m ∈ [0, 1] are risky (H) and 1 − m are safe (L). Risky members default with
probability dH and safe ones default with probability dL, where 1 > dH > dL > 0. We
also refer to dL as the baseline default rate. Potential members’ types are known only to
themselves; however, dH , dL and m are common knowledge.
At time zero, the clearinghouse assigns a default fund requirement G ≥ 0 and declares
its equity rule, which specifies its committed equity, E ≥ 0, as a percentage, Θ, of aggregate
expected default losses. We model the committed equity as such to reflect the general
consensus that a clearinghouse’s skin in the game should reflect the riskiness of the cleared
market.
In response, members choose their propensities {piH , pjL}i∈[0,m),j∈[m,1] of participating in
the cleared market. We focus on symmetric rational expectations equilibria, i.e. piH = pH
and pjL = pL.
For each participating member, B units of revenue are generated in the model economy.
The parameter B ≥ 0 is a reduced form specification for the preferences of members’ clients
to execute centrally cleared trades over bilateral ones, and quantifies the premium paid for
such services. Revenue is split among the clearinghouse and the participating members, with
the clearinghouse receiving K := (1− φ)B as fee and the member receiving R := φB, where
φ ∈ [0, 1).
At time one, members default independently and exogenously. Given the participation
propensities {pH , pL}, the law of large numbers (Judd (1985)) gives the mass of participat-
ing members who will default as d := mpHdH + (1−m)pLdL, and the mass of participating
members who will remain solvent as s := mpH(1−dH)+(1−m)pL(1−dL). Members incur a
per unit funding cost α for posting the default fund. We model a stressed market, where de-
fault losses are perfectly correlated and distributed according to an exponentially distributed









q In the money (ITM)
Out of the money (OTM)
Figure 14: Model 3 timeline and type † member evolution.
Members choose their participation propensities p† († ∈ {H,L}) in response to the clearinghouse’s
declaration of default fund requirement G and equity commitment Θ. Then members of type † default
exogenously with probability d†. Conditioned on solvency, they are in the money with a fixed probability q.
random variable Z with rate parameter λ, Z ∼ Exponential(λ). Realized aggregate default
loss is hence Zd, and aggregate expected default loss is d
λ
. This also yields the committed
equity as E = Θ d
λ
.
The objective is to analyze the economic role of default funds and clearinghouse equity,
thus we do not model initial margins which usually serve as the first line of defense against
default losses. This comes without loss of generality, however, as we can view Z as a random
variable describing the losses that exceed initial margin requirements. In fact, the current
market is moving towards a “defaulter-pays” model where initial margins are set at very
conservative levels. This implies that a deeply stressed market is required for initial margins
to be exhausted, and supports our assumption of strong loss correlation among parties, as
losses tend to be more correlated under stressed market conditions (Hull (2012)).
Losses are covered first by using the defaulting member’s default fund, second with the
clearinghouse’s equity, and third allocated to surviving clearing members’ pre-funded default
funds. When the allocated losses exceed the pre-funded amount, the clearinghouse utilizes
its assessment rights to obtain addition capital from members. When even that capital
is exhausted, losses are allocated to solvent members who are “in the money” (ITM). We
assume that the clearinghouse’s assessment rights is a multiple δ of the default fund, and
that the probability of a solvent member being out of the money (OTM) is 1− q, 0 < q < 1.
The model timeline is provided in Figure 14.
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6.2.1 Members
The payoff function of a participating member depends on his state at the end of time 1,
and is given by:
X(Default) = R− αG−G+ (G− Z)+, (6.1)
X(Solvent & OTM) = R− αG− (1 + δ)G+
(





X(Solvent & ITM) = R− αG− (1 + δ)G+
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In all cases, the member receives income R for participating and pays upfront a funding
cost αG because of the default fund requirement. In Eq. (6.1), (G − Z)+ − G reflects that
the defaulting member’s default fund is used to absorb the losses first, with the remaining
losses absorbed by next tiers in the default waterfall. The term (d(Z−G)−E)+
s
in Eq. (6.2) and
Eq. (6.3) reflects that losses allocated to surviving members are those exceeding defaulting
members’ default fund and the clearinghouse’s committed equity. Eq. (6.2) reflects that
when members are out of the money, their contributions to absorbing losses are limited to a






term in Eq. (6.3) reflects that all losses not covered
by pre-funded default fund, clearinghouse committed equity, and assessment rights, are borne
by members who are in the money (say, via variation margin gain haircutting).
The expected payoff of a member, conditioned on the default losses Z and solvency, is
then given by
E[X(Solvent)|Z] = qX(Solvent & ITM) + (1− q)X(Solvent & OTM)
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Because agents are assumed to have linear utility, Eq. (6.4) shows that the payoff function
is equivalent to the one where the clearinghouse has unlimited assessment rights, and that
the parameters δ and q do not affect agents’ decisions.
We can then compute the overall expected payoff for a member of type † ∈ {H,L} given
by
E[X†] =R− αG− d†
λ
(1− e−λG)− (1− d†)d
sλ
e−λG−Θ. (6.5)
If a member chooses to not participate in clearing, his expected payoff is the expected loss
generated when he defaults, −d†
λ
.5 Thus his economic profit for participating is E[X†] + d†λ .
6.2.2 Clearinghouse
The clearinghouse’s payoff function is given by:
Y := KM − E + (E − d(Z −G)+)+,
where M := mpH+(1−m)pL is the mass of participating members. The KM term represents
its revenue, whereas −E+ (E− d(Z−G)+)+ indicates that the clearinghouse absorbs losses
that exceed defaulting members’ default funds, up to the amount of its committed equity.
Its expected payoff is




In this section we solve for symmetric rational expectations subgame perfect equilibria of
the model, and compute the associated equilibrium quantities.
5This is to model the fact the member cannot avoid a default just by not joining a clearing network.
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Definition 6.1 An equilibrium is a pair (p∗H(G,Θ), p∗L(G,Θ)) ∈ {R2+ → [0, 1]2} such that
for all (G,Θ)) ∈ R2+
1. p∗H(G,Θ) ∈ argmax
pH∈[0,1]
pHE [XH(pH ;G,Θ, p∗L(G,Θ))]− (1− pH)
dH
λ
2. p∗L(G,Θ) ∈ argmax
pL∈[0,1]
pLE [XL(pL;G,Θ, p∗H(G,Θ))]− (1− pL)
dL
λ
and a pair (G∗,Θ∗) ∈ R2+ such that
(G∗,Θ∗) ∈ argmax
G,Θ≥0
E[Y (G,Θ; p∗H(G,Θ), p∗L(G,Θ))]
By Eq. (6.5), we can normalize all monetary quantities (G,E,B,E[X],E[Y ]) using the
expected default loss 1
λ
as the unit of account. Hence, there is no loss of generality in
assuming λ = 1, a convention we maintain throughout the rest of the chapter.
It follows from Eq. (6.5) that
E[XH ] + dH > E[XL] + dL, (6.7)
which implies that p∗H ≥ p∗L holds in equilibrium. It is thus possible to observe two types
of equilibria: separating equilibria (p∗L = 0) where the clearinghouse’s choice of default
resources fail to incentivize safe members to participate, or pooling equilibria (p∗L > 0)
where safe members have a positive propensity of participating in the loss-mutualization
process. We individually consider the problems the clearinghouse faces when solving for
separating equilibria and pooling equilibria. Their equilibrium default fund and equity rules
are denoted by (G∗s,Θ∗s) and (G∗p,Θ∗p), respectively.
For separating equilibria, safe members do not participate in the clearing network. This
happens when clearing is not profitable for them and their individual rationality (IR) con-
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subject to R− αG+ dHe−G − (1− dH)d
s
e−G−Θ ≥ 0, (IRH)
R− αG+ dLe−G − (1− dL)d
s
e−G−Θ < 0. (IRoL)
Here (IRH) is the risky members’ individual rationality (participation) constraint, and (IRoL)
is the safe members’ constraint for no participation.




subject to R− αG+ dLe−G − (1− dL)d
s
e−G−Θ ≥ 0. (IRL)
Here (IRL) is the safe members’ participation constraint. Notice that (IRH) is automatically
satisfied when (IRL) is.
The interplay between the clearinghouse’s equity rule and the IR constraints plays a
central role in our analysis. The following key lemma allows us to dichotomize the analysis
of equilibrium equity rules.
Lemma 6.1 For any separating equilibria with Θ∗s > 0, (IRH) is binding. For any pooling
equilibria with Θ∗p > 0, (IRL) is binding.
The economic intuition behind Lemma 6.1 is as follows. By Eq. (6.6), for a fixed level of
positive equity, the clearinghouse would like to set default funds as high as possible, so to
protect its committed equity. Since default funds introduce linear costs to its members, it
sets default funds to the level where the marginal participating member is indifferent between
participating or not. This implies that (IRH) is binding for separating equilibria and (IRL)
is binding for pooling equilibria.
We observe that when Θ = 0, there may be multiple levels of default funds among which
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the clearinghouse is indifferent, since it bears no default losses. We break the tie by assuming
that the clearinghouse chooses the minimum default fund that is incentive compatible for it,
as this minimizes funding costs and thus maximizes aggregate surplus captured by members.
6.3.1 Equilibrium decisions
In this section we solve for equilibrium default fund and equity contributions.
6.3.1.1 Separating Equilibria (p∗L = 0)
When safe members do not participate, in equilibrium agents expect the market to consist
only of risky members and compute their expected payoffs accordingly. The mass of agents
who participate, default, and survive can then be expressed as M = mpH , d = mpHdH ,





K − dHe−G(1− e−Θ)
)





R− αG+ dLe−G − (1− dL)dH1− dH e
−G−Θ < 0. (6.9)
Proposition 6.1 For separating equilibria, (p∗H , p∗L,Θ∗s) = (1, 0, 0). Moreover, suppose R ≤
dH−dL
1−dL , then G
∗
s = 0; otherwise G∗s is the unique solution to
(R− αG)eG = dH − dL1− dL . (6.10)
The result in Proposition 6.1 is intuitive. When participating members are homogenous
(only risky members participate), there is no concern for wealth transfers from one member
to another, as the risks they offload onto the clearing network are the same. Thus, when
rewards for joining are low, R ≤ dH−dL1−dL , all risky members would participate. When rewards
from participating are high, however, the clearinghouse must set default funds high enough
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to disincentivize safe members from participating. This also implies that the clearinghouse
can attract all risky members to participate without committing equity, which minimizes its
potential loss and thus maximizes its profit.
6.3.1.2 Pooling Equilibria (p∗L > 0, p∗H = 1)
We consider the case where safe members participate with positive propensity (p∗L > 0).
When safe members do participate, in equilibrium agents expect that all risky members
participate. That is, by Eq. (6.7), p∗H = 1 when p∗L > 0 . The mass of agents who participate,
default, and survive can then be expressed as M = m+ (1−m)pL, d = mdH + (1−m)dLpL,
and s = m(1− dH) + (1−m)(1− dL)pL, respectively.
The clearinghouse’s problem (Pp) can be rewritten as:
max
G,Θ≥0
K(m+ (1−m)pL)− de−G(1− e−Θ), (P ′p)
subject to R− αG+ dLe−G − (1− dL)d
s
e−G−Θ ≥ 0. (6.11)
We can carry out the analysis of pooling equilibria by first showing that mixed strategies
do not arise in equilibrium.
Lemma 6.2 For pooling equilibria, (p∗H , p∗L) = (1, 1).
Lemma 6.2 can be understood as follows: because of linear utilities, the marginal profit
safe traders contribute to the clearinghouse is constant. In addition, the clearinghouse wants
safe traders to participate only when the marginal profit they contribute is positive. Thus,
the fact that the equilibrium is pooling (p∗L > 0) implies that the marginal profit safe traders
contribute is a positive constant, in which case the clearinghouse incentivizes all of them to
participate (p∗L = 1).
Having solved for members’ joining propensities, we next solve for the clearinghouse
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choices of G and Θ. We define the risk-sharing coefficient as
γ := m(dH − dL)




Here D = mdH + (1 − m)dL and S = m(1 − dH) + (1 − m)(1 − dL) are, respectively, the
mass of defaulting and solvent members under full participation. The parameter γ is the
aggregate additional default risk (above the baseline default rate dL) introduced by the risky
members, which is allocated to solvent members. When γ is large, more risk is transferred
to solvent members.
Our next result relates the arising pooling equilibria to the funding cost α, the baseline
default rate dL, reward for participation R, and the amount of risk-sharing γ.
Proposition 6.2 Define h¯(x) := 1 + log x, and h(x) := −dL
x
+ log x. The following state-
ments hold:
(i) if γ ≥ α and h¯(γ) > R
α













G∗p = log γα .





+ logα < h(γ), then Θ∗p =∞ and G∗p is the unique solution to
R− αG+ dLe−G = 0. (6.12)
(iv) If R < γ, R
α
+ logα ≥ h¯(γ) and γ ≥ α, then Θ∗p = 0 and G∗p is the unique solution to




(v) If R ≥ γ then Θ∗p = G∗p = 0.
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Figure 15: Sectioning of the α− γ plane into different pooling equilibria regimes.
Depending on the level of risk-sharing (γ) and funding cost (α), different types of pooling equilibria arise.
Non-degenerate pooling equilibria (those with finite and positive default fund and equity) arise when both
risk-sharing and funding cost are moderate.
Remark 6.1 The risk-sharing coefficient γ plays a prominent role in the determination
and analysis of pooling equilibria. The use of γ allows us to reduce the parameter space
(m, dH , dL, α,K) ∈ [0, 1]2 × [0, dH ] × R2+ to (dL, γ, α,K) ∈ [0, 1] × R2+ for the analysis of
pooling equilibria. Importantly, given dL, γ can take any value in the interval [0,∞), allowing
us to perform comparative statics analyses without constraints.
Proposition 6.2 is graphically demonstrated in Figure 15. Depending on the values of the
parameter vector (γ,R, α, dL), there are different regimes of pooling equilibria. When the
clearinghouse can attract all members to participate without committing equity, it would do
so (cases (iv) and (v)) because it bears no losses. In these cases, it may use default funds
to mitigate the wealth transfer from safe members to risky ones, so to incentivize them
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to participate (case (iv)). To see this, note that with zero equity, safe members’ expected
profits are R−αG−γe−G and risky members’ expected profits are R−αG+ 1−m
m
γe−G. The
term γe−G term represents the wealth transfer resulting from loss-mutualization, which is
decreasing in G.
Since equity directly increases members’ profits, the profit-maximizing clearinghouse may
need to commit equity to incentivize their participation (cases (i), (ii), and (iii)). Notice
that when R = 0, cases (iv) and (v) are precluded, and thus the clearinghouse’s equity must
be positive. This reflects the fact that, without additional incentives from clearing revenue,
the clearinghouse must provide equity protection to attract safe members. This highlights
the economic role of clearinghouse equity: it mitigates the losses generated by risky members,
which safe members must bear due to loss-mutualization, and hence attracts safe members
to participate.
When the clearinghouse commits equity, it has the additional incentive to require large
default funds to protect its equity, which is reigned in by the funding costs that members
would bear. For moderate levels of risk-sharing and funding cost, it is optimal for the
clearinghouse to use a finite combination of equity and default fund (case (i)), which we refer
to as non-degenerate pooling equilibria. When the funding cost is too high relative to the
amount of risk-sharing, the clearinghouse abandons the use of the default fund requirement
altogether, so to help members save on paying the costs. This allows the clearinghouse to
reduce the amount of committed equity, lowering its potential loss (case (ii)). When there
is a lot of risk-sharing and low funding cost (case (iii)), the clearinghouse can impose a high
default fund requirement while committing a large amount of equity. Because of the high
default fund requirement, its expected loss from utilizing its equity to cover defaults is low.
In this extreme case, it essentially commits to absorbing all losses in excess of defaulting
members’ default funds, and members are completely insulated from each other. While such
a regime may seem implausible, it was essentially the approach taken on by the failed Paris
commodity clearing house CLAM. The failure of CLAM in Paris in 1974 was in part due
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to its obligation to absorbing all losses beyond initial margins with its equity (Bignon and
Vuillemey (2016)).
We remark that the expressions given in Proposition 6.2 may result in default fund and
equity levels that violate the clearinghouse’s individual rationality constraint. For example,
when the level of risk-sharing is high and B is low, the financing cost of default fund con-
tributions may exceed the aggregate revenue K that the clearinghouse can capture. In this
case, it is necessarily making negative expected profits and is better off not clearing trades
at all. Recall, however, that the clearinghouse can capture a profit of mK in separating
equilibria, so in the aforementioned situation the clearinghouse would set requirements to
create a separating equilibrium rather than a pooling one.
6.3.1.3 Prevailing equilibria
This section studies equilibrium selection based on the model parameters. We use Proposi-
tion 6.1 to compute a separating equilibrium, Proposition 6.2 to compute a pooling equilib-
rium, and then select the equilibrium where the clearinghouse makes higher profit.
Proposition 6.1 shows that the clearinghouse’s profit in a separating equilibrium is mK.
Comparing this with (P ′p), we see that the pooling equilibrium prevails if and only the
clearinghouse’s extra profit from choosing a pooling equilibrium (1−m)K−De−G∗p(1−e−Θ∗p) is
positive; otherwise the separating equilibrium prevails. We can classify the type of prevailing
equilibria by directly plugging the expressions given in Proposition 6.2.
Corollary 6.1 The prevailing equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium if and only if one of the
following conditions hold
(i) γ ≥ α, h¯(γ) > R
α








(ii) α > γ > R and (1−m)K ≥ γ−R1+γ ,
(iii) R
α
+ logα < h(γ) and (1 − m)K ≥ γ+dL1+γ e−G
∗
p, where G∗p is the unique solution to
Eq. (6.12),
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(iv) R ≥ α and h¯(γ) ≤ R
α
+ logα.
(v) R ≥ γ,
Otherwise the prevailing equilibrium is a separating equilibrium.
Corollary 6.1 also shows that separating equilibria are not vacuous. In the first three
cases, there is always a large enough K so that pooling equilibria prevail, and a small
enough K so that separating equilibria prevail, ceteris paribus.
6.3.2 Comparative statics
We provide a comparative statics analysis focusing on the major economic forces at play:
(I) the cost and benefit tradeoff from loss-mutualization, (II) the clearinghouse’s equity at
risk and the benefit that it provides to its members, and (III) the protection provided by
default funds and the funding costs it imposes on its members. We assume R = 0 for most
of this section as this allows to better demonstrate the key insights, but we also emphasize
additional effects that can arise when R > 0.
When R = 0, the results of propositions 6.1 and 6.2 simplify. The second case of
Proposition 6.1, and the fourth and fifth cases of Proposition 6.2 are precluded. The re-
strictions of the parameter set for the first three cases of Proposition 6.2 also simplify to{
γ ≥ α > γe− dLγ
}
, {α > γ} , and
{
α ≤ γe− dLγ
}
, respectively.
Default fund and equity levels are always zero for the case of separating equilibria. The
more interesting case is then when pooling equilibria arise. The sensitivity of the clear-
inghouse’s equilibrium choices to changes in model parameters are tabulated in Table 17.
The complete set of results for both cases presented in Proposition 6.1, and all five cases
presented in Proposition 6.2 when R > 0, is delegated to Appendix D.
We see from Table 17 that the relations remain consistent across cases (there is no change
in sign). Hence, we will focus our discussion on the non-degenerate case (first column), and
note that the same economic intuition follows for the degenerate ones.
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G∗p ∼ param. γ ≥ α > γe−
dL
γ α > γ α ≤ γe− dLγ
α decrease no effect decrease
γ increase no effect no affect
dL no effect no effect increase
Θ∗p ∼ param. γ ≥ α > γe−
dL
γ α > γ α ≤ γe− dLγ
α decrease no effect no effect
γ increase increase no effect
dL decrease decrease no effect
Table 17: Comparative statics for the equilibrium default fund and equity rule.
The relation between default resources and model parameters within pooling equilibria depends on the
type of pooling equilibrium that arises. The sign of the relation is generally consistent with that of the
non-degenerate case (first column).
When the funding cost (α) increases, the clearinghouse observes the lowered incentives
of potential members to participate, and consequently lowers the default fund requirement.
This increases its potential losses, however, as the default fund acts as a cushion to absorb
losses before its equity is used. Thus it also lowers its equity contribution. On the other
hand, increased risk-sharing (γ) increases both the default fund requirement and equity con-
tribution. When there is more risk-sharing, the safe members are less willing to participate
since they need to bear more of the risky members’ losses. In response, the clearinghouse
increases their default protection by increasing its equity contribution, but also increases its
default fund requirement to protect its equity. Finally, an increase in the baseline default
rate (dL) means that there is a higher probability that the clearinghouse has to suffer default
losses, hence it lowers its equity contribution in response. In the extreme case where it com-
mits to absorbing all losses in excess of defaulting members’ default funds (third column), it
asks for more default funds to protect its equity.
We next present interesting phenomena that arise when R > 0:
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3. If R < γ, R
α
+ logα ≥ h¯(γ) and γ ≥ α, ∂G∗p
∂α
> 0.
Proposition 6.3 highlights the fact that members’ clearing revenue can alter their in-
centives. First, increased member revenue means that participation is less costly for safe
members, lowering the amount of equity the clearinghouse needs to commit to attract them.
Second, when member revenue is high (R > α), the increase in funding cost creates a de-
crease in default funds, which greatly increases the wealth transfer from safe members to
risky ones. In this case, the clearinghouse responds by increasing its equity commitment
to keep the safe members from exiting. Third, a similar situation can arise when there is
a lot of risk-sharing γ ≥ max(α,R). While the clearinghouse can attract all members to
participate without committing equity, an increase in funding cost greatly lowers the safe
members’ surplus, which must be compensated for by decreasing the wealth transfer from
safe members to risky ones. This is achieved by increasing the default fund requirement.
6.4 Welfare and systemic risk
In this section we investigate the distribution of economic profits, and analyze systemic risk
measured by expected funding shortfall. We then apply our results to analyze the incentives
provided to the agents by the default waterfall structure.
6.4.1 Equilibrium welfare distribution
We study the distribution of economic profits for the different types of equilibria. We denote
the equilibrium economic profits of the clearinghouse, risky members, and safe members by
KC , KH := E[X∗H ] + dH , and KL := E[X∗L] + dL, respectively.
For separating equilibria, it follows from Proposition 6.1 that KC,s = Km, KL,s = 0 and
KH,s = R when R ≤ dH−dL1−dL . When R ≥
dH−dL
1−dL , however, KH,s =
dH−dL
1−dL e
−G∗s where G∗s is the
solution to Eq. (6.10).
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For pooling equilibria, we know that p∗L = 1. In addition, safe members make zero
economic profit when Θ∗p > 0. We can then compute risky members’ economic profit as









and the clearinghouse’s economic profit as
KC,p = K −De−G∗p(1− e−Θ∗p). (6.15)
Using Proposition 6.2, we can compute explicitly these equilibrium quantities. The cor-
responding expressions are given in Corollary 6.2, and are directly obtained by plugging the
clearinghouses’s equilibrium choices into Eqs. (6.14) and (6.15).
Corollary 6.2 For pooling equilibria, agents’ economic profits admit the following expres-
sions (the numbering of cases correspond to that provided in Proposition 6.2.):




1− γ log γ
α
)
; KC,p = K − α1+γ
(





; KL,p = 0.
(ii) mKH,p = γ1+γR +
γ
1+γ ; KC,p = K − γ−R1+γ ; KL,p = 0.
(iii) mKH,p = γ(1−dL)1+γ e
−G∗p; KC,p = K− γ+dL1+γ e−G
∗
p; KL,p = 0. Here G∗p is the unique solution
to Eq. (6.12).
(iv) mKH,p = mR−mαG∗p + (1−m)γe−G∗p; KC,p = K; KL,p = R−αG∗p− γe−G∗p. Here G∗p
is the unique solution to Eq. (6.13) smaller than R
α
− 1.
(v) mKH,p = mR + (1−m)γ; KC,p = K; KL,p = R− γ.
Next, we provide a comparative statics analysis on the aggregate welfare and its distri-
bution. For ease of exposition we focus on the case R = 0.6 All members’ surpluses are held
at zero for the case of separating equilibria. Aggregate welfare is then mB. Again, the more
6When R > 0 safe members require less protection to participate. This reduces the need for default funds
and equity, and is expected to increase the profit of both the risky members and the clearinghouse.
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interesting case is when pooling equilibria arise. In these equilibria safe members’ profits are
still zero, but both the clearinghouse and its risky members make positive economic profit.
The aggregate welfare is B−αG∗p. From Table 17 and Proposition 6.2 we see that increasing
funding cost and risk-sharing leads to higher αG∗p, and thus lower aggregate welfare. In fact,
when there is a lot of default risk (say, m ≈ 1), it is easily seen that aggregate welfare is
higher if only risky members participate.
The effects of an increase in model parameters on the equilibrium welfare distribution are
tabulated in Table 18 for pooling equilibria. The relations remain mostly consistent across
cases.
mK∗H,p ∼ param. γ ≥ α > γe−
dL
γ α > γ α ≤ γe− dLγ
α increase no effect increase
γ decrease increase increase
dL no effect no effect decrease
K∗C,p ∼ param. γ ≥ α > γe−
dL
γ α > γ α ≤ γe− dLγ
α decrease no effect decrease
γ decrease decrease decrease
dL no effect no effect increase
Table 18: Comparative statics for the equilibrium welfare distributions.
The relation between the equilibrium welfare distributions and model parameters within pooling equilibria
depends on the type of pooling equilibrium that arises. Except for the dependency of risky members’
profits on the level of risk-sharing, the sign of the relation is generally consistent with that of the
non-degenerate case (first column). Since risky members’ profits decrease with risk-sharing only in
non-degenerate pooling equilibria, a positive combination of default fund and equity can align their
incentives with that of the clearinghouse.
When the funding cost increases, the clearinghouse lowers the default fund requirement so
as to incentivize safe members to participate (Table 17). There is more loss-mutualization
among members, which benefits the risky members. This comes at the detriment of the
clearinghouse, whose equity contribution is at a higher stake. On the other hand, Table 17
indicates that when there is more risk-sharing, the clearinghouse’s choices of default fund and
equity commitment both increase; however, Table 18 shows that the additional protection
coming from the increased default fund is overpowered by the higher potential losses due to
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the higher equity commitment, leading to a lower overall profit. The baseline default rate
(dL) mostly has no effect on economic profits except for the extreme case where members are
essentially insulated from each other (third column). In this case, an increase in dL leads the
clearinghouse to increase its protection against default losses through increasing G∗p, which
lowers risky members’ profits.
An interesting phenomenon is that an increase in risk-sharing increases aggregate eco-
nomic profit of risky members in degenerate pooling equilibria, but decreases it in non-
degenerate pooling equilibria. In a non-degenerate equilibrium, the clearinghouse’s choices
actually incentivize risky members to “be safer” and lower the amount of risk that is shared.
In Model 3, members’ default probabilities are exogenous. A straightforward extension,
analogous to the moral hazard model of Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997), can introduce the
possibility that members can choose to increase their default probabilities by a small amount.
The clearinghouse can detect whether such actions are taken, but cannot ensure who the risk
members are. In equilibrium, such an action would lower risky members’ profits. In general,
risk-sharing means that the clearinghouse and safe members have to subsidize more of the
risky members’ default losses. In models with moral hazard, this can lead to incentives for
members to “shirk” – to increase their default probabilities and capture economic surplus
from default protection, which is indeed the case in our degenerate pooling equilibria. How-
ever, Table 18 shows that the optimal combination of default funds and a positive equity
commitment can effectively align members’ incentives with that of the clearinghouse.
6.4.2 Systemic risk
A clearing network may impose systemic risk and negative externalities on the real economy
when its pre-funded capital stock is exhausted and external capital to absorb losses needs to
be provided. Our measure of systemic risk is the “funding shortfall”, the amount of external
capital the clearing network requires, which we denote by Q. Using the funding shortfall as
a measure for systemic risk is quite intuitive, as larger funding shortfalls tend to be more
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disruptive. As we are considering periods of market stress, this funding shortfall measure
is similar in spirit to the SRISK measure proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2017), where
they consider the expected capital shortfall of an entity conditioned on a systemic event.7
Acharya et al. (2017) consider Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES), the expected funding
shortfall conditioned on the event that the entire financial system is under-capitalized, again
a systemic risk measure based on funding shortfall.
The (ex-ante) expected funding shortfall, E[Q],8 can be straightforwardly computed as
E[Q] := E[(dL−MG− E)+] = de−MGd −Θ. (6.16)
Having solved for the equilibrium decisions in Section 6.3.1, we can calculate the equilibrium
expected funding shortfall E[Q∗].





s] = mdL. If R > 1m
γ
1+γ
then E[Q∗s] = mdLe−G
∗
s where G∗s solves Eq. (6.10). For pooling equilibria, we have:















(ii) E[Q∗p] = R+dL1+γ ,
(iii) E[Q∗p] = 0,
(iv) E[Q∗p] = γ+dL1+γ e
− 1+γ
γ+dL
G∗p , where G∗p solves Eq. (6.13),
(v) E[Q∗p] = γ+dL1+γ .
Above, the numbering corresponds to conditions on the parameters provided in Proposition
6.2.
7Brownlees and Engle (2017) show that such a shortfall measure can effectively rank financial institutions
in terms of systemic risk and predict declines in real economic activity.
8Another measure of systemic risk is the probability that pre-funded capital stock is exhausted P(dL ≥
MG + E). One can easily show that this measure provides analogous insights to the expected funding
shortfall.
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The results follow from plugging the expressions given by Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 into
Eq. (6.16) and using the identity D = γ+dL1+γ .
We next study the dependence of systemic risk on the underlying model parameters. For
ease of exposition, we consider the case where R = 0, and delegate the full analysis for R > 0
to Appendix D . In the case of separating equilibria, the expected funding shortfall is mdH .
The effect of an increase in model parameters on pooling equilibria are tabulated in Table
19. The relations remain consistent across cases.
E[Q∗p] ∼ param. γ ≥ α > γe−
dL
γ α > γ α ≤ γe− dLγ
α increase no effect no effect
γ decrease decrease no effect
dL increase increase no effect
Table 19: Comparative statics for the systemic risk measure.
The relation between systemic risk and model parameters within pooling equilibria depends on the type of
pooling equilibrium that arises. The sign of the relation is generally consistent with that of the
non-degenerate case (first column). Increases in the funding cost and decreases in risk-sharing both lead to
less pre-funded default resources and hence to a higher level of expected funding shortfall.
Since both equity and default funds decrease (for non-degenerate pooling equilibria)
when the funding cost increases (Table 17), a higher funding cost leads to a higher expected
funding shortfall. In addition, an increase in the baseline default risk leads to an overall
riskier system.
Importantly, when there is more risk-sharing, increased default fund and equity commit-
ment both contribute to mitigating expected funding shortfall. This implies that an increase
in the default probability dH of the risky members actually reduces systemic risk through the
clearinghouse’s equilibrium response of increasing default funds and equity. Recall, however,
that it reduces the economic profits of clearing members (Section 6.4.1).




≥ 0 and ∂E[Q∗s ]
∂R
≤ 0.
Corollary 6.4 considers the opposing effects that increasing member revenue can have on fund-
ing shortfall, depending on the type of equilibrium that arises. Interestingly, as increased
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revenues allow the clearinghouse to set lower equity and default fund levels in pooling equi-
libria, the expected funding shortfall increases. This is against the common argument that
large corporate revenues can increase the capital buffer that members can draw on during
market stress: the clearinghouse’s equilibrium response to members having higher revenue is
to reduce the layer of default resources. While some members may enjoy a larger economic
surplus (e.g. the risky members in our model), the equilibrium result is actually a riskier
clearing network. On the other hand, if the prevailing equilibrium is separating, the clear-
inghouse increases default fund requirements to increase aggregate funding costs borne by
members, and drive out safe members who may have been attracted by the larger revenue
otherwise. In this case, the expected funding shortfall decreases with member revenue.
6.5 Empirical predictions
Model 3 shows that the primary role of equity is to attract safer members to participate
in clearing, and that default funds mitigate the wealth transfer from safe members to risky
ones. A primary determinant of the equilibrium default waterfall is the level of risk-sharing,
γ, which can also be interpreted as how diverse members’ risk profiles are. For instance, γ is
larger when risky members’ default probabilities are significantly higher than those of safe
members (dH − dL is large).
Empirical Prediction 1 Clearing networks where participants have more diverse risk pro-
files are (on a risk and size adjusted basis) (i) capitalized with more clearinghouse equity and
default funds, (ii) less profitable, and (iii) safer from a systemic perspective.9
Asymmetric information problems are more pronounced when risk profiles are diverse
(large γ), because the clearinghouse’s knowledge of the average member’s default risk is less
useful. Uncertainty in the risks imposed onto the clearing network by its members reduces
9Recall, as Model 3 normalizes the mass of potential members to 1 and uses the expected default loss as
the unit of account, it is important to compare on a risk and size adjusted basis.
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clearing profit. The clearinghouse then requires a larger default fund and contributes more
equity to attract safe members, which in equilibrium reduces systemic risk, even when risk
profiles diversity stems from increased individual riskiness (dH is larger).
Our results are empirically supported by clearinghouse data across continents. For the
quarter ended in September 2015, ICE Clear Credit, the leading US CDS clearinghouse,
held $19.5 billion of initial margins, $1.9 billion of default funds, and $50 million of equity
contributions to capitalize their clearing network. In comparison, the CDS clearing branch
of ICE Clear Europe, held $7.7 billion of initial margins, $1.1 billion of default funds, and
$31 million of equity contributions.10 Using initial margins as a gauge for default risk and
size, this implies that ICE Clear Europe requires more default funds and equity per unit of
risk, which can be attributed to the more diverse profile of European market participants
compared to those in the U.S. Our predictions are also supported by clearinghouse data
across asset classes. As reported by OFR (2017), for the quarter ended June, 2016, CME’s
core clearing operations were capitalized with $14.1 billion of house margins, $3.3 billion
of default funds, and $100 million of equity contributions, whereas the figures for CME’s
interest rate swaps (IRS) clearing activities were $8.1 billion, $2.9 billion and $150 million,
respectively. CME’s core clearing operations had a more diverse member base, as only very
sophisticated and large broker/dealers are IRS clearing members, which explains the higher
capitalization per unit of risk.
Empirical Prediction 2 Diverse risk profiles and low funding costs lead to a “defaulter-
pays” clearing network. When the funding cost is high compared to the level of risk-sharing,
more loss-mutualization arises.
As previously discussed, diverse risk profiles intensify asymmetric information, which
then incentivizes the clearinghouse to require large member contributions to the default
10This data is retrieved from the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) disclo-
sures, which are available on the Intercontinental Exchange website www.theice.com. IOSCO does not
report house margins, which reflect the collateral resources used to capitalize members’ proprietary positions
and do not include capital posted by members’ customers. While it would have been preferable to use house
margins, we use aggregate margins as a proxy due to data limitations.
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fund (Table 17). This is commonly referred to as a “defaulter-pays” business model, where
the clearinghouse sets conservative capitalization requirements to reduce the need for loss-
mutualization.11 At the same time, if funding costs are low then the clearinghouse uses
large default funds to protect its business and equity (Table 17 and Proposition 6.2); this
is because in this case large default funds do not severely impact its members’ profits but
can provide large default protection, also leading to a “defaulter-pays” default waterfall. In
view of the current low interest rate environment, default fund levels are predicted to be
relatively high. Indeed, ISDA (2013b) shows that for their sample, clearinghouse default
fund levels are quite conservative: on average less than 20% of the pre-funded default funds
are used when defaults occur under stressed scenarios. On the other hand, when the funding
cost is high compared to the level of risk-sharing, it becomes very costly to utilize default
funds (Proposition 6.2). Since members’ risk profiles are relatively similar in this case, the
clearinghouse can use equity to attract many members to participate, and use the increased
revenue to offset lost default protection from requiring lower default funds.
We remark that current market practices do tend toward a defaulter-pays structure,
where initial margins and default funds are set at very conservative levels. In fact, it is
not uncommon for members to advocate for more conservative member contributions. This
is due to a general aversion towards sharing in default losses generated by other members.
As we discuss in Section 6.6, however, such high levels of default resources are incentive
compatible only when funding costs are kept low, i.e. when a low interest rate environment
persists.
Empirical Prediction 3 The clearinghouse may choose to not attract safer members to
participate when its clearing revenue is low or when it is capital constrained.
Model 3 shows that, while the participation of safer members lowers the average default
11The loss-mutualization role of default funds may suggest that large default fund contributions lead to
“survivor-pay” clearing networks. However, as implied from our results, when the default fund is uniformly
more stringent, the wealth transfer from safe to risky members is mitigated, essentially forcing risky members,
i.e. the ones prone to default, to pay more. Hence, our results imply that survivor-pay networks require
heterogenous default funds, with larger (smaller) default funds imposed on safe (risky) members.
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risk, the clearinghouse can only attract them by subjecting its equity to default losses,
especially when members gain little revenue from clearing. It is then beneficial for the
clearinghouse to attract safe members if (I) the extra revenue it can capture from their
participation covers the default losses that it must bear and (II) it has the equity capital to
do so. In the event that its revenue is low or it is capital constrained, the clearinghouse may
choose to not attract them at all (Corollary 6.1). This resembles the behavior of CC&G,
whose member base is mostly of low quality, as compared to the larger ICE Clear Credit.
The latter typically requires members to have a credit rating of A or higher, and has much
stricter membership requirements (Armakola and Laurent (2015)).
6.6 Policy Implications
Our analysis informs policy making along three important dimensions (I) the impact of
minimum equity requirements, (II) how the economics of risk-sharing impact systemic risk
and (III) the importance of relating default resource levels to varying funding cost.
6.6.1 Minimum equity requirements
Minimum equity requirements can induce increases in the default fund. We first discuss
how Model 3 can be used by a regulator to assess holistically the impact of a minimum
equity requirement. Such requirements are part of the European Market Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR) but not imposed in the U.S.. There has been much regulatory debate
over the proper level of equity clearinghouses should commit. It was one of the major topics
discussed during the Global Markets Advisory Committee Meeting held on May 14, 2015 by
the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Clearing members have generally
argued for minimum equity requirements and more contributions from clearinghouses to
align interests with those of their members (JPMorgan Chase & CO. (2014)). While major
clearinghouses generally agree on the proposed incentive effects, they have argued against
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their skins in the game being a major source of loss absorption (LCH Clearnet (2014a), CME
Group (2015)).
In the context of Model 3, a minimum equity requirement imposes a constraint Θ > θ
on the clearinghouse’s optimization problem. The regulator wants to balance the objectives
of (I) maximizing welfare of the clearinghouse and clearing members, and (II) minimizing
systemic risk. We can quantify his tradeoff via the following maximization problem:
max
θ≥0
M(B − αG∗)− ρE[Q]
subject to Θ ≥ θ.
The first term of the objective function represents the aggregate welfare in the model econ-
omy; the second term represents systemic risk generated by the clearing network, where ρ is
a parameter quantifying the systemic risk generated per unit expected funding shortfall. We
will denote the clearinghouse’s choice of equity and default fund levels under the minimum
equity requirement by G∗I and Θ∗I , respectively.
In line with our previous results, such a minimum equity requirement is binding only
when it exceeds the unconstrained equilibrium equity levels.
Lemma 6.3 For separating equilibria, the constraint introduced by the policy intervention
is binding if and only if θ ≥ Θ∗s, in which case Θ∗s,I = θ and G∗s,I is the unique solution to
R− αG+ dHe−G(1− e−θ) = 0 (6.17)
For pooling equilibria, the constraint introduced by the policy intervention is binding if and
only if θ ≥ Θ∗p, in which case Θ∗p,I = θ and G∗p,I is the unique solution to
R− αG+ dLe−G − (1− dL)D
S
e−G−θ = 0 (6.18)
The result in Lemma 6.3 is intuitive. It shows that the minimum equity requirement
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has an impact only when it is higher than the prevailing equilibrium equity level. When the
equity requirement is binding, G∗I is given by the IR constraint of the marginal participating
member. Using Lemma 6.3, we can assess the impact of the requirement:
Proposition 6.4 Assume that all clearing revenue is captured by the clearinghouse, i.e.








> 0 when θ ≥ Θ∗p.
Proposition 6.4 has important implications with regards to minimum equity regulations.
In particular, there are two effects from the clearinghouse’s equilibrium response to such
regulations, one that mitigates systemic risk and one that decreases welfare. Proposition
6.4 shows that the clearinghouse’s response to such a regulation is generally to increase
its default fund requirement to protect its equity. This action is still incentive compatible
for members since they are better protected with the increased equity. The clearinghouse’s
response complements the regulator’s goal of mitigating systemic risk through lowering E[Q].
However, the aggregate welfare (B − αG)M is reduced because higher default funds also
increase funding costs. A proper minimum equity requirement policy should balance and
internalize these two effects.
6.6.2 Clearing membership policies
Risk-sharing can mitigate systemic risk but reduces clearing participation. We show that the
level of risk-sharing, a measure of member heterogeneity, is central to the determination of
default resources, the associated welfare, and systemic risk. This is pertinent to the discussion
on how clearinghouses should screen for potential members, and whether it is beneficial to




< 0, in equilibrium
systemic risk decreases with member heterogeneity, and pooling members with different risk
profiles may be beneficial in terms of mitigating systemic risk. However, since the mitigation
stems from increased default resources, this reduces the profitability of clearing and may
increase funding costs, which in turn reduce clearing participation.
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6.6.3 Hidden risks from increasing funding costs
Low funding costs create the illusion that the clearing network is safe. Another dimension
of regulatory policy is to endogenize the effect of varying funding costs. Recall that default
funds generally decrease with funding cost, ∂G∗
∂α
< 0. The current low interest rate environ-
ment indicates that funding costs are generally low, which implies that large amounts of
capital can be tied up in the clearing network. This may reduce productive capital invest-
ments, and thus regulatory policies limiting the increase in default funds when funding costs
decrease may be socially desirable. At the same time, the large stock of default resources
may be taken as evidence that systemic risk stemming from the clearing network is low. To
the extend that funding costs are can be with interest rates, future increases in interest rates
provides clearinghouses with the incentive to reduce default fund requirements. This may
have serious systemic risk implications if such a period is followed by market stress, given
that the clearinghouse may not be adequately capitalized under this scenario. Monetary
tightening should thus take into account the sensitivity of the stock of default resources to
variations in interest rates.
6.7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the incentives behind the determination of the different layers of default
protection in the clearinghouse’s default waterfall structure. The main incentive driving the
clearinghouse’s choice of equity requirements is the profitability of its clearing business, sub-
ject to regulatory constraints. The equity commitment serves to insulate members from each
other’s default losses, and makes clearing profitable for members who would not participate
otherwise. The clearinghouse then has an incentive to use default funds to protect its equity,
and by doing so it also lowers the wealth transfer from safer members to risky ones caused
by loss-mutualization. Model 3 provides a tractable framework to quantify the interplay of
these incentives, and delivers explicit expressions for equilibrium default fund and equity
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levels.
While it is well established in the credit markets literature that collateralizing assets can
screen out high risk participants, Model 3 shows that default funds and equity, with their
features of loss-mutualization, do not necessarily play this role. Indeed, in Model 3 riskier
members’ expected profits are always higher than those of safer ones, and no combination
of default funds and equity can screen out only the risky members. It is worth mentioning
that initial margins can be incorporated as such a screening device into Model 3. As margin
screening is likely imperfect, however, members not screened out by the margin require-
ments are likely to have heterogenous risk profiles. We thus expect our results to remain
qualitatively the same.
Model 3 focuses mainly on the typical default waterfall, and does not consider more
exotic types of loss allocation mechanisms (e.g. additional layers of equity commitments),
which can be accommodated by an extension of our framework. In a future continuation of
this research, it would be useful to account for the extra funding costs borne by members
when there is a funding shortfall, so to reflect their exposure to fire sale losses generated
from raising capital under market stress. Members would then need to internalize part
of the systemic risk generated, and would most likely prefer larger contributions to default
fund resources. Another interesting direction for further research concerns the situation when
members’ default probabilities are unknown ex-ante and are realized after the clearinghouse’s
declaration, plausibly due to business shocks or the arrival of new information.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Since payoffs are linear in pi, we need only consider the case in
which the trader takes a maximum long position, i.e., pi = 1. As H is symmetric, the case
of a short position follows by a symmetry argument.
We first show the existence of an income threshold at which the expected profit of the
trader is zero. That is, there exists B such that
(1 + α)δ + αC = E[(B + ε)1ε>−B−C − C1ε≤−B−C ] (A.1)
Setting






E[B1ε>−B−C ] + E[ε1ε>−B−C ]− E[C1ε≤−B−C ]
=∞+ 0− C =∞.
by using the fact that E[ε] = 0 and applying the Monotone Convergence Theorem. In
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−(−B − C)E[1ε>−B−C ] + E[ε1ε>−B−C ]− C
= −C,
where we have used the fact that E|ε| < ∞ implies that limx→∞ xP (ε > x) = 0. Thus, if
δ, C, α ≥ 0, there must exist B = B˜ such that Eq. (A.1) is satisfied.








φ′1(B) = 1−H(−B − C) > 0,
φ1(B) is a strictly increasing function of B. So there must be a unique B which solves the
equation.
The following lemma characterizes the trading threshold.
Lemma A.1 Let δ, C, α ≥ 0. Then B˜ ≥ 0 if and only if
(1 + α)δ + αC ≥ 12γ e
−γC .
When B˜ ≥ 0, it uniquely solves the equation
(1 + α)δ + αC = B˜ + 12γ e
−γ(B˜+C). (A.2)
Moreover, it holds that
∂B˜
∂δ





= 1 + α
H(B˜ + C)
− 1 > 0.
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Proof of Lemma A.1. By definition
(1 + α)δ + αC =
∫ ∞
−B˜−C































Above, we have used the layer cake representation of expectation to derive the third equality









= H(B + C) > 0, (A.4)
so it is enough to consider the case B˜ = 0. Plugging it into Eq. (A.3), we obtain
(1 + α)δ + αC =
∫ ∞
C
(1−H(x)) dx = 12γ e
−γC ,
leading to the conclusion that B˜(δ, C;α) ≥ 0 if and only if (1 + α)δ + αC ≥ 12γ e−γC . Notice
that when B˜ ≥ 0, B˜ +C ≥ 0. We can evaluate Eq.(A.3) to be B˜ + 12γ e−γ(B˜+C), and hence B˜
is the unique solution to Eq. (A.2) by Eq. (A.4). The expressions for the partial derivatives
of B˜ follow immediately from differentiating Eq. (A.3).
Using Lemma A.1 we obtain the following corollary, which will be used extensively in the
forthcoming analysis, and whose proof follows from straightforward algebraic manipulations.
For the rest of the section, we will use the notation u := 1− 12e−γ(B˜+C), v := γ(1 + α)δ and
w := γC.
Corollary A.1 For (δ, C) ∈ Kα := {δ ≥ 0, C ≥ 0, (1 + α)δ + αC ≥ 12γ e−γC}, the following
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relations hold:
v + w(1 + α) = − log(2− 2u) + (1− u) (A.5)
γB˜ = v1 + α −
1− u
1 + α −
α
1 + α log(2− 2u). (A.6)
Proposition A.1 Let (δ˜, C˜) be a critical point of E[X(δ, C)]. Define u˜ := 1−12e−γ(B˜(δ˜,C˜;α)+C˜),
v˜ := γ(1 + α)δ˜, and w˜ := γC˜. Then u˜ solves
κ(u˜; θ, α) = 0, (A.7)
where
κ(u; θ, α) := θu(1− u) + α(−θu2 − ((1 + θ)2 + 1)u+ 1 + θ) + α(θ + 1)(u− 1) log(2− 2u).
In addition,
v˜ = α + (θ + 1− α)u˜− u˜
2 − α(1− u˜) log(2− 2u˜)
u˜
. (A.8)
w˜ = −α + (−θ + α)u˜+ (α− u˜− αu˜) log(2− 2u˜)
u˜(1 + α) . (A.9)
Proof of Proposition A.1. Define the function Λ as













































= 1− u1 + θ
(
u+ v
1 + α +
θ
1 + θ +
α
1 + α −
α







θ(1 + α) ((1− u)u− uv + (1− u)α(1− log(2− 2u))) .








which leads to Eq. (A.8) after plugging in the expressions given by Eq. (A.10), using the
expression for ∂B˜
∂δ
given in Eq. (A.1), and recalling the definition of the Laplace distribution













Lemma A.1 along with Eq. (A.11) allows us to rewrite the first order condition with respect

















Using Corollary A.1, this yields
v = (θ + u)(1 + θ + θ
2)− (1 + θ)u2
(1 + θ)(u+ θ) +
α((θ2 − θ − 1)u+ θ3 + (1 + θ)2)
(1 + θ)(u+ θ)
− α(1− u) log(2− 2u)
u+ θ .
As both first order conditions must hold at a critical point, the right hand sides of the
two first order conditions with respect to δ and C must coincide and equal zero. After
straightforward yet cumbersome manipulations, it can be seen that u = u˜ solves Eq. (A.7).
The expressions for w˜ follow from Corollary A.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We first solve for optimal (δ, C) = (δ˜, C˜) for α = 0, and
then derived the main result using Taylor expansions on the defining equations given in
Proposition A.1.
Notice that when B˜ < 0, the clearinghouse can always increase its profits by increasing
C or δ, as doing so does not immediately reduce market volume. Thus, by Lemma A.1 it
need only consider (δ, C) ∈ {δ ≥ 0, C ≥ 0, (1 + α)δ + αC ≥ 12γ e−γC}.
We start with searching for interior solutions, that is, solutions that correspond with
critical points given in Proposition A.1. Using Proposition A.1 and set α = 0, we see that
the only interior solution is u˜ = 1. Eqs. (A.8) and (A.9) then imply v˜ = θ and C = ∞. It
then follows from Corollary A.1 that B˜ = δ = 1
λ
. Moreover, by plugging these results values
into Eq. (3.8), we see that the expected clearinghouse profit for the interior solution is e−1
λ
.
Next we look for boundary solutions, that is, solutions where δ = 0 or∞, solutions where
C = 0, and solutions where δ− 12γ e−γC = 0. As the expected profit at the interior solution is
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positive, we can rule out cases where δ =∞ (zero expected profit) and δ = 0 (non-positive
expected profit). What remains to be considered are the cases (i) δ − 12γ e−γC = 0 and (ii)
C = 0.
Under the constraint δ = 12γ e
−γC , we have that the trading threshold B˜ = 0. The
maximum expected profit of the clearinghouse is obtained by solving
max
C













−γC + λ(λ+ 2γ)2(λ+ γ)2 e
−γC ,
As the above derivative is always positive, it is enough to consider the limiting case C =∞.
Then the constraint would reduce to δ = 0, which cannot be a global maximum because the
clearinghouse would make zero profit in this case.
Under the constraint (ii), we can solve the following system of equations, consisting of
the first order condition with respect to δ for the expected clearinghouse profit function and
of Eq. (A.5) from Corollary A.1:

v = 1 + θ − u˜,
v = − log(2− 2u˜) + (1− u˜).
The solution to the above system of equations is u˜ = 1 − 12e−θ, v = θ + 12e−θ. Moreover,
this implies that the trading threshold is B˜ = 1
λ
by Corollary A.1. Plugging these inside
the expected clearinghouse profit function given in Eq. (3.8), we obtain that its maximized





2(λ+γ)2 , which is strictly lower than that of the interior solution.
The previous analysis shows that when α = 0, the optimal (δ˜, C˜) is a critical point
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characterized by Proposition A.1. In the following we will use extensively the notations
u˜ := 1− 12e
−γ(B˜(δ˜,C˜;α)+C˜), v˜ := γ(1 + α)δ˜, w˜ := γC˜,
and the characterizing equations (Eqs. (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9)) given in Proposition A.1.
Now we perform a Taylor expansion to solve for equilibrium quantities for a positive
funding cost. Implicit differentiation of Eq. (A.7) gives
∂u˜
∂α
= −θ(u˜(θ + u˜+ 2)− 1) + (θ + 1)(u˜− 1) log(2− 2u˜)− 2u˜+ 1
α (θ2 + θ + 1) + 2(α + 1)θu˜− α(θ + 1) log(2− 2u˜)− θ (A.12)
Because as α→ 0, C˜ →∞, we have that as α→ 0, u˜→ 1. Evaluating Eq. (A.12) at α = 0
by taking the limit u˜→ 1, we have
∂u˜
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣α→0 = −(1 + θ)2θ .
A first order Taylor expansion thus implies:
u˜(θ, α) = 1− (1 + θ)
2
θ
α + o(α). (A.13)
Next, by Proposition A.1, we have:




A first order Taylor expansion around α = 0 gives






α + o(α), (A.14)




Because λδ˜ = v˜
θ(1+α) , we obtain Eq. (3.10) after using the identity
1
1+α = 1− α + o(α).
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Last, we prove the relation in Eq. (3.11). We know from Corollary A.1 that
(1 + α)w˜ = − log(2− 2u˜) + 1− u˜− v˜.
The above equality along with equations (A.13) and (A.14) imply:









− θ + o(α)
]
.
Because log(x+ y) = log(x) + y
x
+ o(y), we may then write









− θ + o(1)
]
,
which yields the desired expression in Eq. (3.11) using 11+α = 1− α + o(α).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Using Eq. (A.6) from Corollary A.1, we have
λB˜ = 1(1 + α)θ (v˜ − (1− u˜)− α log(2− 2u˜)) .
Plugging in the expressions in Eqs. (A.13) and (A.14), we obtain
λB˜ = 1− α + o(α)
θ
(







Using the identity log(x+ y) = log(x) + y
x
+ o(y), we further obtain
λB˜ = 1− α + o(α)
θ
(










= 1− α + o(α)
θ
(
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This yields Eq. (3.12). In addition, this implies that market volume is given by
2(1− F (B˜)) = e−λB˜ = e−1ααθ
(
1 + α + α
θ





Proof of Proposition 3.5. The clearinghouse’s revenue is given by λδ˜(θ, α)e−λB(θ,α).
Using the expressions given by Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.4, we have
λδ˜e−λB =
(










1 + α + α
θ













1 + α + α
θ












1 + α + α
θ

















Next, we compute the expected margin shortfall.




+ 11 + θ + λB˜
)




+ 11 + θ + λB¯
)
Using the expressions given by Proposition 3.4 and Eq. (A.13), we have






1 + α + α
θ























θ(1 + θ) + 1
)
+ o(α)
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We can then combine Eqs. (A.15) and (A.16) to arrive at
λE[X˜] = λδ˜e−λB − λM˜
= e−1ααθ
(





log 2(1 + θ)
2
θ

















Proof of Proposition 3.6. By Eq. (3.16) and Corollary A.1, we have
λW˜ (θ, α) = e−λB˜
(
1 + λB˜ − 1− u˜1 + θ
( 1
1 + θ + λB˜
)
− αλδ˜ − αλC
)
.
Using the expressions given by Theorem 3.1, Proposition 3.4 and Eq. (A.13), we have
λW˜ (θ, α) = e−λB˜
2− α− α
θ











− α + α + α
θ






1 + α + α
θ



















Proof of Proposition 3.7. Notice that, in equilibrium
P (MS > 0) = 2P (ε < −B˜ − C˜) = 2(1− u˜) = 2(1 + θ)
2
θ
α + o(α). (A.17)
Above, we have used the approximation given by Eq. (A.13). In addition, we may write
E[MS|MS > 0] = E[MS]
P (MS > 0) =
M˜
P (MS > 0) .
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Using Proposition 3.5 and Eq. (A.17), we obtain



















= e−1 1 + 3θ + θ
2
θ(1 + θ)2 + o(1)










−γ(B+C))− α(δ + C)
)
dF (B).
Because the social planner can set a different fee and margin requirement for each type, it




− α(δ + C) for each B to maximize
social welfare. We restrict our attention to the cases where B ≥ 0 and note that the results
for B ≤ 0 follow from a symmetric argument. Using the first order condition, we deduce
that the maximizers of g satisfy the following equations:
δ∗(B) := 0





However, because limB→0+ C∗(B) = limB→∞C∗(B) = −∞, and C∗(B) is a continuous
function of B, it may become negative and would violate the constraint C ≥ 0. Moreover, it
can be easily seen that C∗(B) is concave, and the unique maximum occurs at B∗ = 1
γ
with
maximized value − 1
γ
(1+ log(2α)). By assumption, α < e−12 , and thus the maximized value is
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C∗(B) < 0, the optimal choice of the social planner is to set C = 0 or C =∞. However, we
can exclude C =∞ because it would result in infinite margin funding cost and lower social
welfare. This yields the specific forms of δ˜ and C˜ given in the statement of the proposition.
Last, notice that g(δ˜, C˜) ≥ g(δ∗(B), C∗(B)) ≥ g(0, 0)) ≥ 0. Hence, the maximized profit
for each trader is always nonnegative. Consequently, the social planner would always have
every trader participate by setting p˜i(B) = sgn(B).
Before giving the proof of Proposition 3.9, we introduce an auxiliary lemma:
Lemma A.2 Recall the definitions of xl(α) and xh(α) from Proposition 3.8. The following
equalities hold:
1. xl(α) = 2α + o(α).
2. xh(α) = − log(α) + o(log(α)).
Proof of Lemma A.2. Since xh(α) and xl(α) are respectively the larger and smaller so-
lution of the equation xe−x = 2α, we have limα→0+ xl(α) = 0 and limα→0+ xh(α) = ∞. By
implicit differentiation, for i ∈ {l, h}, we obtain
∂xi(α)
∂α
= 2(1− xi(α))e−xi(α) .
Thus a first order Taylor expansion around α = 0 leads to xl(α) = 2α + o(α).









(1− xh(α)) = limα→0+
−xh(α)
(1− xh(α)) = 1.
Thus xh(α) = − log(α) + o(log(α)).
Proof of Proposition 3.9. By Eq. (3.19), we can write W˜1 = I+II+III+IV +V +V I,
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du = −c0− log x−













Summing together all six components:





(θ − 1 + log 2 + c0 − log θ) + o(α).
Our next result shows that when the exchange chooses to list the contract, its choice of δb
is unique. While the proof of Proposition A.2 relies on our Laplace distribution assumption,
we remark that the proposition can be proven in greater generality by utilizing the theory of
log-concavity. The uniqueness of the local maximum still holds if we make the assumption
that F is twice continuously differentiable, symmetric, and strictly log-concave. To see this,
note that B˜(δb+δc, C;α) is increasing and concave in δb (Lemma A.1 in the appendix implies
that B˜(δ, C;α) is concave in its first argument), so F ◦ B˜ is strictly log-concave (Bagnoli and
Bergstrom (2005)). For B˜ < 0, δb(1− F (B¯)) = δb and B˜ are both monotonically increasing
in δb, which guarantees that R(δb; δc, C,G, α) is unimodal (Ewerhart (2013)). The main ad-
vantage of focusing on the Laplace family of distributions is that the parametrization carries
straightforward economic interpretations (recall the discussion in Section 3.2). Moreover, the
exchange’s profit maximizing fee δ˜b(δc, C;α) can be represented in an analytically tractable
manner.
Proposition A.2 guarantees that R(δb; δc, C,G, α) is unimodal. The continuity of the
solution indicates that there would be no “jumps” in the exchange’s fee if the clearinghouse
were to change (δc, C), and plays an important role in the analysis of the clearinghouse’s
choices.
Proposition A.2 Fix δc, C, α ≥ 0. Then R(δb; δc, C,G, α) has a unique local maximum at
δ˜b = δ˜b(δc, C;α). In addition, δ˜b(δc, C;α) is continuous in δc and C.
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Proof of Proposition A.2.
We first show the existence of a maximum. Define the exchange’s revenue function as




B˜(δb + δc, C;α) =∞, (A.18)
and ∂B˜
∂δ








0 tdF (t) = 12λ <∞, it follows by the Dominated Convergence Theorem that
lim
B→∞
B(1− F (B)) = 0.






B˜(δb + δc, C;α)
lim
B˜→∞
B˜(1− F (B˜)) = 0.
Above, we have used Eqs. (A.18) and (A.19) to derive the second limit. As φ2(δb) ≥ 0,
φ2(0) = φ2(∞) = 0, and φ2 is continuous, there exists an interior maximizer of φ2(δb) on
(0,∞).
Next, we show uniqueness. By Lemma A.1, the exchange’s profit function can be written
as
2δb(1− F (B¯))−G =

δbe
−λB˜(δb+δc,C) −G, (1 + α)δ + αC ≥ 12γ e−γC
δb −G, (1 + α)δ + αC < 12γ e−γC




∣∣∣B˜(δb + δc, C;α) < 0} = {δb∣∣∣(1 + α)δ + αC < 12γ e−γC} is a local maximizer
of φ2. Then φ2 can be always increased by choosing δb slightly larger than δ˜b, thus δ˜b cannot be
a local maximizer. Therefore, a local maximizer must be in the region {δb|B˜(δb + δc, C;α) ≥
0}. This implies that a local maximizer δ˜b either solves the equation
B˜(δb + δc, C;α) = 0, (A.20)
or is a critical point of the differentiable function
φ3(δb) := δbe−λB˜(δb+δc,C;α).
By Lemma A.1, the solution to Eq. (A.20) is δ0b := 12γ(1+α)e
−γC − δc− α1+αC. In addition,
as B˜ < 0 for all δb < δ0b , we need only consider critical points of φ3(δb) larger than δ0b when
searching for local maximizers. We will show that there is at most one such critical point.
The first order condition and Lemma A.1 give
1− λ(1 + α)δb
1− 12e−γ(B˜(δb+δc,C;α)+C)
= 0. (A.21)
By Eq. (A.2) in Lemma A.1, we also have




Thus, combining equations (A.21) and (A.22), we can eliminate B˜ and obtain that any
critical point of φ3(δb) must satisfy
γα(δc + C) + log 2− 1 = −λαδb − γαδb − log(1− λαδb), (A.23)
where λα := λ(1 + α) and γα := γ(1 + α).
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Define
φ4(δb) := −λαδb − γαδb − log(1− λαδb),
and
φ5(γα) := γα(δc + C) + log 2− 1.







(1− λαδb)2 ≥ 0, for δb ∈ (0, λ
−1
α ).
Hence, the unique minimum of φ4(δb) satisfies the first order condition:
φ′4(δb) = −λα − γα +
λα
1− λαδb = 0,

















As the function φ4 is convex and its minimum is negative, on {δb|0 < λαδb < 1}, φ3(δb) has
exactly one critical point when φ5(γα) > 0 or φ5(γα) = φ4(δ∗b ) and exactly two critical points
when φ4(δ∗b ) < φ5(γα) ≤ 0.
We will now show that when there are two critical points, the smaller critical point is
always less than δ0b . We consider γα(δc+C) = z and show that for all values of z ∈ [0, 1−log 2],
a lower bound for δ0b is always greater than the smaller critical point. We need only consider
z ∈ [0, 1− log 2] as there cannot be two critical points when φ5(γα) > 0. To obtain a lower
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(1− log 2− z) =: m¯(z)
The constraint γα(δc + C) = z also means that we can rewrite Eq. (A.23) as:
z + log 2− 1 = φ4(δb). (A.25)
Denote the smaller branch of solutions to Eq. (A.25) by δ−b (z). By Eq. (A.24), we see that
δ−b (z) < γαλα(λα+γα) . It then holds that
m¯(1− log 2) = δ−b (1− log 2) = 0.

































This shows that for all z ∈ [0, 1 − log 2), m¯(z) > δ−b (z). Hence there is at most one critical
point, δ†b , greater than δ0b .
The profit function is differentiable everywhere except at δ0b . As there is no critical point
other than δ†b , if δ
†
b 6= δ0b , only one of them can be a local maximizer. This is because if they
were both local maximizers there must be a local minimizer between them which must be a
critical point, a contradiction. This allows us to conclude there exists a unique maximizer:
the function is either maximized at δ†b or δ0b .
The second statement of the proposition, i.e., the continuity of the function δ˜b(δc, C),
follows from Berge’s Maximum Theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3.10. The functional forms of the exchange’s fee in strategic
complement and substitute regimes are given in the proof of Proposition A.2 (Eqs. (A.20)
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and (A.23)). Define δ0b := 12γα e
−γC − δc − αC1+α . We consider four cases, defined by δ0b < 0
or δ0b ≥ 0 and ξα ≥ 0 or ξα < 0. Notice that ξα < 0 implies that δ0b ≥ 0, so the case
ξα < 0, δ0b < 0 can be excluded.
Suppose next that δ0b < 0. Then we must have ξα ≥ 0. By Lemma A.1 we have B˜(δb +
δc, C;α) ≥ 0 for all δb ≥ 0, thus δ˜b must be the larger solution to Eq. (A.23). We recall from
Eq (A.24) that this solution must be greater than or equal to γα
λα(λα+γα) .
Next, suppose δ0b ≥ 0. Using Eq. (A.21), we see that the right derivative of the exchange’s
profit function evaluated at δb = δ0b , is given by
lim
δb→δ0b












−γC − (1 + α)δc − αC
)







where we have used that B(δ0b +δc, C;α) = 0 from Eq. (A.20). Because the local maximum of
the profit function is unique by Proposition A.2, δ˜b must be the larger solution to Eq. (A.23)
when the right derivative is positive, and equal to δ0b when the right derivative is negative.
The signs of the derivatives follow from direct differentiation.
We summarize the relations between the implicit functions defined so far. All these
relations come from rearranging previous results or by direct differentiation. For the rest of
this section, we adopt the notation
u˜ := λ(1 + α)δ˜b, v := γ(1 + α)δc, w := γC, ν := λG.
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Corollary A.2 For (δc, C) ∈ Kα := {δc ≥ 0, C ≥ 0, ξα ≥ 0}, the following relations hold:
u˜ = 1− 12e
−γ(B˜+C) (A.26)
θu˜+ v + αw = γB˜ + 12e
−γB˜−w (A.27)
γB˜ = (1 + θ)u˜+ v − 1 + αw (A.28)
v + (1 + α)w + log 2− 1 = −(1 + θ)u˜− log(1− u˜). (A.29)
γB˜ = 1 + θ1 + αu˜+
v
1 + α −
1
1 + α −
α





= θ−(1 + θ) + 11−u˜
. (A.31)
Moreover, u˜ ∈ [ θ1+θ , 1].
Proof of Corollary A.2. Eq. (A.26) follows from Eq. (A.21). Eq. (A.27) follows from
Eq. (A.22). Eq. (A.28) follows from equations (A.26) and (A.27). Eq. (A.29) follows
from Eq. (A.23). Eq. (A.30) follows from eliminating w using equations (A.28) and (A.23).
Eq. (A.35) follows from differentiating Eq. (A.23). Lastly, u˜ ∈ [ θ1+θ , 1] by Proposition 3.10.
Proposition A.3 Let (δ˜c, C˜) be a critical point of E[X(δc, C)]. Define u˜ := 1−12e−γ(B˜(δ˜,C˜;α)+C˜),
v˜ := γ(1 + α)δ˜c, and w˜ := γC˜. Then u˜ solves
κb(u˜; θ, α) = 0, (A.32)
where
κb(u; θ, α) : = θ(θ2 + θ − u)(u− 1) + α(−θu2 − ((1 + θ)2 + 1))u+ 1 + θ)
+ α(θ + 1)(u− 1) log(2− 2u).




λ(1 + α) ,
v˜ = α− θ
2 + ((θ + 1)2 − α)u˜− (1 + θ)u˜2 − α(1− u˜) log(2− 2u˜)
u˜
, , (A.33)
w˜ = −α + θ
2 + (−θ2 − 2θ + α)u˜+ (α− u˜− αu˜) log(2− 2u˜)
u˜(1 + α) . (A.34)
Proof of Proposition A.3. Define the function Λ as

















= 1− u˜1 + θ
(
(1 + θ)u˜+ v
1 + α +
θ
1 + θ +
α
1 + α −
α







θ(1 + α) ((1 + θ)(1− u˜)u˜− u˜v + (1− u˜)α(1− log(2− 2u˜))) .
∂δ˜b
∂δc
+ 1 = u˜1− (1 + θ)(1− u˜) . (A.35)













This implies Eq. (A.33):
v = α− θ
2 + ((θ + 1)2 − α)u˜− (1 + θ)u˜2 − α(1− u˜) log(2− 2u˜)
u˜
.
Using Corollary A.1 and Eq (A.36), we can rewrite the first order condition with respect to










v = (θ + u˜)(1 + θ + θ
2)− (1 + θ)u2
(1 + θ)(u˜+ θ) +
α((θ2 − θ − 1)u+ θ3 + (1 + θ)2)
(1 + θ)(u˜+ θ) −
α(1− u˜) log(2− 2u˜)
u˜+ θ .
Because both first order conditions must hold at a critical point, the right hand sides
of the two first order conditions must coincide and equal zero. After straightforward yet
cumbersome manipulations, it can be seen that u˜ solves Eq. (A.32). The expression for w˜
follows from Corollary A.2.
Before the proof of Proposition 3.11, we introduce two auxiliary lemmas:
Lemma A.3 For each pair (C,G), there is at most one point δc = δ¯c(C,G) satisfying
R(δ˜b(δc, C;α); δ¯c(C,G), C,G) = 0.
As a function of (C,G), δ¯c is C1, decreasing and concave in C, and decreasing in G. More-
over, for any G ≥ 0, the IR constraint crosses the regime switching line ξα = 0 at most
once.
Proof of Lemma A.3. We start with computing the derivatives of the exchange’s
revenue with respect to G, δc, and C, and summarize the results in Table 20. The results
follow from the Envelope Theorem and direct differentiation.
As all the partial derivatives are strictly negative, we deduce that there can be at most
one solution to R(x) = 0, for x ∈ {δc, C,G}, keeping the other two variables fixed. Using
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∂C −λδ˜be−λB˜ ∂B˜∂C − e
−γC
2(1+α) − α1+α
Table 20: Derivatives of the exchange’s revenue function
Derivatives with respect to G, δc, and C.
the expressions in Table 20, we obtain
∂δ¯c(C,G)
∂C
= u˜1 + α − 1 < 0, (A.37)
for strategic complements and
∂δ¯c(C,G)
∂C
= − 12(1 + α)e
−γC − α1 + α < 0, (A.38)
for strategic substitutes. From Lemma A.1 and Proposition 3.10 we deduce that δ¯c(·, G) is










for strategic complements and
∂2δ¯c(·, G)
∂C2
= γ2(1 + α)e
−γC > 0,
for strategic substitutes. This proves that δ¯c(·, G) is convex.
To show the “single crossing” property, observe that along the curve ξα = 0 (where we
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− α1 + α ≤ −
e−γC









2(1 + α) −
α






The last inequality holds because for all δc, C such that the exchange’s fee acts as a strategic
complement, B˜ ≥ 0. Thus the curves can cross at most once.
The proof of Proposition A.3 (equations (A.37) and (A.38)) provides the following corol-
lary.
Corollary A.3 For a fixed G ≥ 0, define L = {(δc, C)|R(δ˜b(δc, C;α); δc, C,G) = 0}. Sup-
pose L is nonempty. Then the following statements hold on L:
1. When the exchange’s fee acts as a strategic complement ∂δc(C)
∂C
= u˜1+α − 1 < 0.
2. When the exchange’s fee acts as a strategic substitute ∂δc(C)
∂C
= − 12(1+α)e−w − α1+α < 0.
Lemma A.4 Set α = 0. Then there exists a unique local maximizer δ∗c for the function
δc → E[X(δc, 0)]. The maximized value is positive. In addition, the exchange’s fee u˜ :=
λδ˜b(δ∗c , 0) is the unique solution to η(u˜) = 0 greater than θ1+θ , where




Proof of Lemma A.4. We start with the proof of existence. Set C = 0. By Proposition 3.10,
the exchange’s fee acts as a strategic complement when









where we are using the definition of ξα given in Eq. (3.21). This is equivalent to
v ≥ 1− θ2 .
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, i.e. the threshold above which the exchange
switches regimes. Notice this is only relevant when θ < 1. Because C = 0 and B˜ = 0, we






= 12 from Eq. (A.27). Using Eq. (3.8), we can compute the right





((1 + θ)(1− u˜)− v) u˜1− (1− u˜)(1 + θ)
)
, (A.39)











= 1 + 11− θ > 0.








the previous analysis this means that the expected profit is maximized at a finite point where
the exchange’s fee acts as a strategic complement.
Next, consider a point v > 1−θ2 . Then by Eq. (A.29) we have
v + log 2− 1 = −(1 + θ)u˜− log(1− u˜). (A.41)
Thus when v increases, u˜ approaches 1 monotonically. From Eq. (A.40) there exists a




This follows directly from the expression given in Eq. (A.39). As E[X(∞, C)] = 0, the
maximized value is positive.
The condition for optimality is then given by equations (A.33) and (A.41). Rearranging,
this means that u˜ solves η(u˜) = 0. Notice that this function always has exactly one root in
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= −θ − log 2 + log(1 + θ) < 0
η(1−) =∞,






























− 2θ − log 2 < 0,
where the last inequality follows from the following two inequalities













which hold true for all θ > 0. To show the first inequality, we notice that




















= 1− 24 + θ2 ≥ 0
Thus the first inequality in (A.42) holds. The second inequality follows from basic calculus
by observing that − log(1− x) ≥ x for all x ∈ [0, 1). As δc → E[X(δc, 0)] has at exactly one
critical point, and we have shown that local maxima do not occur on the boundary, it must
be the global maximum.
Proof of Proposition 3.11. Fix a triple (γ, λ,G) ∈ R3. We define a pair (v, w) :=
(γδc, γC) of equilibrium fee and margin requirements to be: a zero margin equilibrium if
w = 0; an interior margin equilibrium if 0 < w < ∞; and an infinite margin equilibrium
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if w = ∞. The equilibrium is constrained if the exchange’s profit at that pair of (v, w)
is zero, and is unconstrained otherwise. Because the exchange’s fee can act as a strategic
complement or substitute, this leads to 12 cases to be considered. The proof is broken down
into four steps.
[Step 1.] We first rule out all unconstrained equilibria with strategic substitute exchange
fees (3 cases). By Proposition 3.10, the exchange’s fee is a strategic substitute when ξ0 < 0.
In this case, we have B˜ = 0 and the clearinghouse’s expected profit function (Eq. (3.8)) is
given by














Thus, when ξ0 < 0, the clearinghouse can increase its profit by increasing δc and C, and
thus in unconstrained equilibria it must choose δc, C such that ξ0 = 0. We rule this out by











Introducing the Lagrange multiplier µ, we obtain that the following must hold for a local
maximizer satisfying ξ0 = 0,

0 = 1 + µλ























1 = λ(λ+ γ)
λ2 + 2λγ
(λ+ γ)2 < 1,
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which is a contradiction. Thus a local maximum cannot occur along the boundary ξα = 0
unless δc = 0 or C = 0. Yet Lemma A.4 shows that there cannot be a local maximum at the
point where ξα = 0 and C = 0, and that there is a choice of (δc, C) where the clearinghouse
is making positive expected profit, and thus it would never choose δc = 0 as in that case
expected profit is nonpositive.
[Step 2.] Next we show the possible existence of unconstrained infinite and zero margin
equilibria with strictly strategic complement exchange fees (cases (i) and (iii)), while ruling
out unconstrained interior margin equilibria with strategic complement exchange fees (3
cases). We search for all possible maxima over the space K0 := {(δc, C)|δc ≥ 0, C ≥ 0, ξ0 ≥
0}. The profit function is obviously continuous, and is continuously differentiable on K0 \
{ξ0(δc, C) = 0}, where ξα is defined in Proposition 3.10.
Using the expressions given by Proposition A.3, we see directly that at a critical point
of E[X(δc, C)] we have:
0 = (u˜− 1)(u˜− θ2 − θ)
The above equation implies that critical points can occur only at (u˜∞, v∞) := (1, θ) and
(u˜int, vint) := (θ + θ2, 1 − θ3 − θ31+θ ). Notice that (u˜, v) = (1, θ) directly implies C = ∞ by
Proposition 3.10. These two critical points give what we refer to as the (unconstrained)
infinite and interior margin equilibrium, respectively.
When C = ∞, the expression for B˜ simplifies to B˜ = δ and E [X(δc,∞)] = δce−λ(δb+δc)
by Lemma A.1. This fully characterizes the infinite margin equilibrium in case (i).
We now rule out the interior margin equilibrium. Notice that the equilibrium is only well
defined when u˜int ≤ 1, and coincides with the infinite margin equilibrium at θ2 + θ = 1. At
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(u˜int, v˜int) we have the following expressions (using Corollary A.2)
λB˜ = 1 + 3θ + θ
2
1 + θ
γE[X(u˜int, vint)] = vinte−λB˜ − 11 + θe
−λB˜(1− u˜int)
(













1 + θ = −
e−
θ2
θ+1− 3θθ+1− 1θ+1 θ (θ4 + 2θ3 − θ2 − 5θ − 4)
(θ + 1)3
∝ −θ4 − 2θ3 + θ2 + 5θ + 4 > 0
The last inequality follows from the fact that for u˜int < 1 we must have θ ≤ 1. As this deriva-
tive is positive, the maximum expected profit (maximized over all θ) of the clearinghouse
at the interior margin equilibrium is θ2 + θ = 1. For any other θ, the clearinghouse’s profit
is strictly less than the profit at the infinite margin equilibrium. It is thus never a global
maximum unless it coincides with the infinite margin equilibrium, ruling out the interior
margin equilibrium as the prevailing equilibrium. The characterization of zero margin equi-
libria follows from Lemma A.4. This completes the characterization of the unconstrained
zero margin equilibrium (case (iii)).
[Step 3.] We now rule out all constrained equilibria with strategic substitute exchange
fees (3 cases). We start with the zero margin equilibrium and assume that the exchange
is imposing strategic substitute fees. As the IR constraint shifts down when G increases,
G must be higher than the level of costs for which the IR constraint starts to intersect the
strategic substitute fee region in the δc − C plane. Denote this level of costs as G0. This
geometry is demonstrated in Figure 16. As G increases, the feasible region in the (δc, C)
plane is reduced.
By the “single crossing property” between ξ0 = 0 and any IR constraint given by Lemma









Figure 16: The exchange’s individual rationality constraint.
The exchange’s individual rationality constraint limits the feasible region of the clearinghouse’s fee/margin
choices. Higher operational costs (GH > GL) reduce the feasible region.
A.3, when G = G0 we must have that the IR constraint intersects the strategic substitute fee
region at (δc, C) =
(
1
2γ − 12λ , 0
)
(see also Figure 6a.) Because at this point ξ0 = 0, B˜ = 0 and
we have that δb = 12λ . Next, as the exchange is making zero profits when it is constrained,
we have λG0 = 12 .
Thus when the exchange is constrained, we must have ν ≥ 12 where we recall that
ν := λG. In addition, because for any (δc, C) in the complementing fee regime we have
B¯ = 0, and the exchange is making zero profits when it is constrained, we see that u˜ = G.
The clearinghouse’s normalized expected profit is given by
γE[X(δc, C)] = v − θ + 22(1 + θ)2 =
1
2 − θν −
θ + 2








3 + θ2 + 1
2(θ + 1)2 < 0
so the clearinghouse kills the market by setting v =∞.
When margin equals infinity we must have ξ0 ≥ 0 by the defining equation in Eq. (3.21).
By Proposition 3.10, this rules out the constrained infinite margin equilibrium with strategic
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substitute exchange fees.
Last, we show that a constrained interior margin equilibrium with strategic substitute
exchange fees cannot exist. The proof goes by contradiction. As the constraint is binding
and the exchange is imposing strategic substitute fees, we must have B¯ = 0, v = 12e
−w − θu˜,
and u˜ = ν by Corollary A.2 and Proposition 3.10. The clearinghouse’s normalized expected
profit is given by
γE[X(δc, C)] = v − 12e
−w θ + 2
2(1 + θ)2 =
1
2e
−w − θν − 12e




2 + θ − 1
(1 + θ)2 − θν ≤ max{
1
2
θ2 + θ − 1





This rules out constrained interior margin equilibria with strategic substitute exchange fees.
[Step 4.] It remains to show the possible existence of constrained infinite and zero margin
equilibria with strategic complement exchange fees (cases (ii) and (iv)), the possible non-
existence of equilibria, while ruling out constrained interior margin equilibria with strategic
complement exchange fees.
The Lagrangian associated with the clearinghouse’s maximization problem is:





We assume that the multiplier is positive at the critical points. In the case that it is zero,
the results reduce to those given in step 2. When this “strict complementarity” holds, the
binding condition µ > 0 implies that ∂δc
∂C
along the level curve of the clearinghouse’s expected
profit coincides with ∂δc
∂C
along the exchange’s IR constraint.




= 1 + u˜((1 + θ)(1− u˜)− v)






u˜+ v1 + θ +
θ
(1 + θ)2 +
u˜(1 + θ)((1 + θ)(1− u˜)− v)
θ(1− (1− u˜)(1 + θ))
)
.










Using Corollary A.3, we obtain that the derivative of the clearinghouse’s fee with the
respect to the margin along the IR constraint is given by
∂δc
∂C














When u˜ = 1, we only consider the case v < ∞ otherwise no trading occurs. This
means that C =∞ by Proposition 3.10 and we can compute the constrained infinite margin
equilibrium (u˜, v˜, w˜) = (1,−θ(log ν + 1),∞), (case (ii)). At this point the exchange’s profit
is zero and the clearinghouse’s (normalized) expected profit is −θν(log ν + 1). Thus, for the
clearinghouse to participate, ν ≤ e−1. In addition, from step 2 we see that an unconstrained
infinite margin equilibrium yields revenue 1
λ
e−2 to the exchange, so we must have ν ≥ e−2
for the IR constraint to be binding.
We will now rule out u˜ 6= 1, proving that there are no “constrained interior margin
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or
u˜+ v1 + θ +
θ
(1 + θ)2 − 1 +
u˜((1 + θ)(1− u˜)− v)
1− (1− u˜)(1 + θ) = 0,
v
1 + θ +
θ
(1 + θ)2 − 1 +
u˜(1− v)
1− (1− u˜)(1 + θ) = 0,
v = θ(1− u˜) + 11 + θ .
From Corollary A.2, we have:
2(1− u˜) = e−γB˜−w,
w = −u˜− log(1− u˜)− log 2− θ
2
1 + θ ,
− γB = θ log ν
u˜
.
Hence, we arrive at
2(1− u˜) = eθ log νu˜+u˜+log(1−u˜)+log 2+ θ
2
1+θ ,










+ θ1 + θ . (A.43)
Using again Corollary A.2, we see that this imposes a restriction on ν:















which in turn leads to the following restriction on θ:
e−1 ≥ ν ≥ u˜ ≥ θ1 + θ .
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Let θH ≈ 0.58 be the solution to e−1 = θ1+θ ,. Then we must have θ ≤ θH .
Eq. (A.43) also imposes another restriction on θ. As log u− u
θ
is maximized at u = θ, we
have that
θ
1 + θ = − log ν + log u˜−
u˜
θ
≤ 1 + log θ − 1 = log θ.
Let θL ≈ 1.93 be the unique solution to log θ = θ1+θ . Then we must have θ ≥ θL. Altogether,
this means that there does not exist θ for which a constrained interior margin equilibrium
with strategic complement exchange fees exists.
Next we turn to the constrained zero margin equilibrium. From Corollary A.2 we can
write
(2(1− u˜))− 1θ = eλB˜.
Thus when the constraint is binding, u˜ must solve
u˜(2(1− u˜)) 1θ = ν.
Having solved for u˜, we can use Eq. (A.29) to find v˜, and hence characterize the equilibrium




= 0 only at





such that u˜(2(1− u˜)) 1θ equals ν.
Last, we see that when ν approaches infinity, none of the equilibria presented are individu-
ally rational (case (v)). As 1 ≥ u˜ ≥ u˜e−λB, the exchange’s normalized revenue λδb(1−F (B¯))
is always bounded above by 1. Values of ν greater than 1 will result in the nonexistence of
any feasible equilibria. Because when ν ≤ e−1 some infinite margin equilibrium must exist,
and infinite margin equilibria always provide the clearinghouse with nonnegative profit, the
clearinghouse only kills the market when ν is greater than e−1.
The expressions for expected profits come from substituting the equilibrium clearinghouse
APPENDIX A. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3 219
fee, exchange fee, and margin requirements into Eq. (3.22). Notice that all profit functions
and IR constraints can be written in terms of only θ and ν, thus which equilibrium prevails
only depends on θ and ν.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. In the following we will use extensively the notations
u˜ := λ(1 + α)δb, v˜ := γ(1 + α)δ˜c, w˜ := γC˜,
and the characterizing equations (Eqs. (A.32), (A.33), and (A.34)) given in Proposition A.3.
Implicit differentiation of Eq. (A.32) gives
∂u˜
∂α
= −θ(u˜(θ + u˜+ 2)− 1) + (θ + 1)(u˜− 1) log(2− 2u˜)− 2u˜+ 1(θ2 + θ + 1) (α− θ) + 2(α + 1)θu˜− α(θ + 1) log(2− 2u˜)
Evaluating this at α→ 0 and u˜→ 1, we have
∂u
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣α=0 = − (1 + θ)2θ(1− θ − θ2) .
A first order Taylor expansion thus implies:
u˜(θ, α) = 1− (1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)α + o(α). (A.44)
= 1− (1 + θ)
2
θ
α− (1 + θ)
3
1− θ2 − θα + o(α).
This gives Eq. (3.23). Next, a first order Taylor expansion applied to Eq. (A.33) implies
v˜(θ, α) = θ − (1 + θ)
2(θ2 − θ − 1)
θ(1− θ − θ2) α + o(α), (A.45)
= θ + (1 + θ)
2
θ
α + 2(1 + θ)
2
1− θ2 − θα + o(α).
As λδc = vθ(1+α) , this yields Eq. (3.24).
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Using Corollary A.2, Eqs. (A.44) and (A.45) thus imply:






θ(1− θ − θ2)α
)
− 2θ + o(1)
]
.
Proof of Proposition 3.12. Corollary A.2 implies
λB˜ = (1 + θ)u˜+ v − 1 + θαλC
θ
Plugging in Eqs. (A.44), (A.45) and (3.25), we obtain
λB˜ = 1
θ
1 + θ − (1 + θ)3
θ
α− (1 + θ)
4
1− θ − θ2α + θ +
(1 + θ)2
θ
α + 2(1 + θ)
2
1− θ − θ2α
− 1− 2θα− α log
(
2(1 + θ)2α





2θ − (1 + θ)2α + (1 + θ)
2(θ2 + 2θ − 1)
−1 + θ + θ2 α− 2θα− α log
(
2(1 + θ)2α
θ(1− θ − θ2)
))
+ o(α)
= 2− 2α− (1 + θ)
2
1− θ − θ2α−
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2








1− α + (1 + θ)
2
θ2
α + 2(1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)α
)
×(
1 + 2α + (1 + θ)
2
1− θ − θ2α +
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2





1− α + (1 + θ)
3
θ2(1− θ − θ2)α +
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)
)
+ o(α)
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The expected margin shortfall is




+ 11 + θ + λB˜
)
= 1 + θ
θ(1− θ − θ2)αe
−2α
α
θ (1 + o(1))
(1
θ
+ 11 + θ + 2 + o(1)
)
+ o(α)
= e−2ααθ +1 θ
2 + 3θ + 1
θ2(1− θ − θ2) + o(α)
This implies
λE[X˜] = λδ˜ce−λB˜ − λM˜
= e−2ααθ
(
1 + (1 + θ)
2
1− θ − θ2α +
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)
)
+ o(α)
Similarly, the exchange’s profit is:
λR˜ = λδ˜be−λB˜ −G
= e−2ααθ
(
1− α− (1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)α
)(
1 + 2α + (1 + θ)
2
1− θ − θ2α +
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2





1 + α− (1 + θ)
2(1− θ)
θ(1− θ − θ2) α +
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)
)
−G+ o(α).
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Last, we calculate welfare using
λW˜ = e−λB˜
(
1 + λB˜ − 1− u˜1 + θ
( 1
1 + θ + λB˜
)
− αλδ˜b − αλδ˜c − αλC
)
= e−λB˜
1 + λB˜ − (1 + θ)α
θ(1− θ − θ2)
( 1
1 + θ + 2 + o(1)
)










3− 2α− (1 + θ)
2
1− θ − θ2α−
(3 + 2θ)α
θ(1− θ − θ2)
)
×(
1 + 2α + (1 + θ)
2
1− θ − θ2α +
α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2






3 − 4θ + 3
θ(1− θ − θ2)α +
3α
θ
log 2(1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)
)
+ o(α).
Proof of Proposition 3.13. A direct computation shows that:
P (MS > 0) = 2(1− u˜) = 2(1 + θ)
2
θ(1− θ − θ2)α + o(α).
λE[MS|MS > 0] = λM˜


















= e−2 1 + 3θ + θ
2
2θ(1 + θ)2 + o(1).
Appendix B
Auxiliary lemmas and proofs for
Chapter 4
Lemma B.1 [Regularity] Let F be strongly regular with ∫∞0 F¯ (x)dx <∞, then it is regular.












F¯ (y) = aF¯ (a)
y
, y ≥ a ≥ 0.
Thus
∫∞
a F¯ (y)dy =∞, a contradiction.
The previous analysis implies that there is a set with positive Lebesgue measure on which
xf(x) 6= F¯ (x). Since we have the identity ∫∞0 xf(x)dx = ∫∞0 F¯ (x)dx, this implies that there
exists M > 0 such that MφF (M) = Mf(M)F¯ (M) > 1.
Define aM := Mf(M)F¯ (M) − 1 = MφF (M)− 1 > 0, then xφF (x) > MφF (M) > 1 + aM for all
x > M by strong regularity, showing that F is regular.
223
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Lemma B.2 [Positive Clearing Rewards] Let F be regular, then for every C(t), ν(t) ≥ 0,
there exists δC ∈ (0,∞) such that K(δC , C(t), ν(t)) > 0.
Proof of Lemma B.2. For ease of exposition we will suppress time dependence throughout




















The last expression follows since limB¯→∞ B¯−βC−αλDWHB¯ = 1. Now since limδ→∞K(δ, C, ν) = 0,
the fact that ∂K(δ,C,ν)
∂δ
< 0 for all large δ implies that there must exist a δC such that
K(δC , C, ν) > 0.
Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1. First we note that for the optimal solution p˜ii(t), we must have
p˜ii(t)Bi ≥ 0. To see this, consider p˜ii(t)Bi < 0. Then the trader can do strictly better by
choosing pii(t) = −p˜ii(t), a contradiction. Thus, there is no loss of generality in assuming
pii(t)Bi ≥ 0
Second, we compute the distribution function of τi, conditioned on the sigma algebra
generated by the arrival intensity process, L := σ({λ(s), s ≥ 0}). Then







Third, we note that since P (t) is a martingale, E[wP (τi)] = 0.
Fourth, we compute
























e−DΛ(s)|pii(s)| (|Bi| − βC(s)− (1 + α)δ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣L] ,
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where the last inequality follows from pii(t)Bi ≥ 0.
Fifth, we compute
E [wD(τi)|L] = E
[
|pii(τi)|((ν(τ−i )ε(τi)sgn(pii(τi)) + C(τi))+ − C(τi))
∣∣∣L] .
Since ν(τ−i ) is independent of L, ν(τ−i ) = ν(τi) with probability one. As ε(τi) is symmetric,
|pii(τi)|((ν(τ−i )ε(τi)sgn(pii(τi)) + C(τi))+ − C(τi))
has the same distribution as
|pii(τi)|((ν(τi)ε(τi) + C(τi))+ − C(τi)).
This implies
E [wD(τi)|L] = E
[
|pii(τi)|((ν(τi)ε(τi) + C(τi))+ − C(τi))
∣∣∣L]





Combining our results, we obtain that the traders’ objective function can be rewritten
as Eq. (4.6)
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Denote Tn = σ(Tk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n) the sigma algebra generated
by the first n market stress times, and Λ(s, t) :=
∫ t
s λ(u)du. Then






















Where the last equation follows from Eq. (4.8).
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Notice that
P(Tn+1 − Tn > t|Tn ∧ L) = e−Λ(Tn, Tn+t). (C.2)
Evaluating Eq. (C.1) with Eq. (C.2) gives:














∣∣∣∣Tn ∧ L] .
Next, notice that
E[|p˜iB(t)|C(t) + ν(t)ε(t)p˜iB(t))−] = |p˜iB(t)|WH(ν(t), C(t)).
This implies









λ(s)e−Λ(Tn, s)WH(ν(s), C(s))F¯ (B¯(s))ds
∣∣∣∣Tn ∧ L]
Combining our results, we see that








Here K(δ(s), C(s), ν(s)) = (δ(s)− λ(s)DWH(ν(s), C(s))) F¯ (B¯(s)). Since Tn follows a Pois-
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Proof of Corollary 4.1. For ease of exposition we suppress time dependence through-
out this proof. Since K(∞, C, ν) = 0 > K(0, C, ν), we must have δ∗ > 0 and δ∗ must
be chosen such that marginal surplus of the clearinghouse per trader is nonnegative. This
further implies that δ∗ ≥ λDWH(C, ν). We thus obtain:
B˜ = B¯(δ∗, C, ν) = (1 + α)δ∗ + βC − λDWH ≥ βC + αλDWH .
Since B¯(δ∗, C, ν) > 0, B¯ is differentiable at (δ∗, C).
Suppose δ∗ <∞, then it must satisfy the first order condition Eq. (4.10), since we have
ruled out the case δ = 0. Notice that δ∗ = ∞ implies f(B˜) = F (B˜) = 0 and thus δ∗ = ∞
also satisfies Eq. (4.10) for any C ≥ 0. Hence δ∗ is always a solution to Eq. (4.10).
Proof of Proposition 4.3. For ease of exposition we will suppress time dependence
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throughout this proof. We start with showing regularity of F implies that δ∗ <∞. We note
that K(δ, C, ν) = 0 when δ = ∞ and K(0, C, ν) < 0. By Lemma B.2, there exists δC such
that K(δC , C, ν) > 0 for any given C ≥ 0. Thus δ∗ < ∞. Furthermore, from Corollary 4.1,
we see that δ∗ solves Eq. (4.10).
Next, we show that strong regularity of F implies that the solution to Eq. (4.10) is unique.
Eq. (4.10) can be rewritten as
(




1 + α. (C.3)
Notice that the left hand side is equal to zero when B¯ = βC + αλDWH .
Since F is strongly regular, it is regular (Lemma B.1), which implies that there exists
M > βC+αλDWH and a > 0 such that MφF (M) > 1+a. This implies for sufficiently large
B¯,
(
B¯ − βC − αλDWH
)
φF (B¯) =







is increasing in B¯ and B¯φF (B¯) is non-decreasing in B¯ (strong
regularity), (B¯ − βC − αλDWH)φF (B¯) is strictly increasing in B¯. This, combined with our
previous results, implies that Eq. (C.3) admits a unique solution B¯ ∈ (βC + αλDWH ,∞).
Fixing C and ν, there is a one-to-one correspondence between δ and B¯, thus there is a unique
profit-maximizing fee δ∗ ∈ (λDWH ,∞).
Proof of Proposition 4.4. For ease of exposition we will suppress time dependence
throughout this proof. Given that F is regular, Lemma B.2 shows that the clearing business
is profitable (there is a finite pair (δC , C) such that K(δC , C, ν) > 0, which implies that
δ˜ <∞ and C˜ <∞ as K(δ,∞, ν) = K(∞, C, ν) = 0.
The two cases, (I) δ˜, C˜ ∈ (0,∞) and (II) δ˜ > 0, C˜ = 0 are thus exhaustive. First assume
2β
λDα
< 1, ∀t ≥ 0. (C.4)
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Then we will rule out case (II) which shows that only interior optima (case (I)) are possible.
Assume the contrary, in other words, K(δ, C, ν) is maximized at some point δ1 ∈ (0,∞)
and C = 0. Since δ1 necessarily solves the first order condition Eq. (4.10) (Corollary A.2),
we obtain
(δ1 − λDWH) F¯
′(B¯)
F¯ (B¯)
= − 11 + α. (C.5)
We can compute the right partial derivative of h with respect to C at (δ1, 0):
∂K
∂C
(δ1, 0+, ν, R) := lim
C→0+










Plugging in Eq. (C.5) and H(0) = 12 , we have
∂K
∂C
(δ1, 0+, ν, R) =
F¯ (B¯)
2(1 + α) (αλD − 2β) > 0,
here the last inequality follows from our assumption Eq. (C.4). Since ∂K
∂C
(δ1, 0+, ν) > 0, K
can be increased by increasing margin by an infinitesimal amount, which means (δ1, 0) is not
a maximizer, a contradiction. This rules out case (II).
Now when Eq. (C.4) fails, the two first order conditions Eq. (4.10) and (4.11) cannot be
jointly satisfied. From the previous discussion we see that this implies C˜ = 0.
Appendix D
Comparative statics computations for
Chapter 6
In this section, we provide a full comparative statics analysis of equilibrium default funds
and equity commitments for φ ∈ [0, 1). It will be useful to define the function
h(G) := (R− αG)eG.
We note the following properties of h(G):
1. It is uniquely maximized at G0 := Rα − 1. h′(G) > 0 for G < G0 and h′(G) < 0 for
G > G0.
2. h(G) ≥ 0 for G ≤ R
α
and h(G) < 0 for G < R
α
.
3. h(0) = R.
We start with default funds, and report the results in Table 21
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G∗p ∼ param. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
α − 0 − + 0
γ + 0 0 + 0
dL 0 0 + 0 0
R 0 0 + − 0
Table 21: Comparative statics for the equilibrium default fund.
The relation between default funds and model parameters within pooling equilibria depends on the type of
pooling equilibrium that arises. For pooling equilibria, the sign of the relation is generally consistent with





1 + γ .





















since G∗s ≥ Rα − 1. We also note that the second type of separating equilibria is not vacuous.
Indeed, one can consider m = 0.95, γ = e−1 > α = R = 10.9(1+e) , and K > 100α. Then the
resulting equilibrium is separating, and yields a positive default fund.
For pooling equilibria, cases (i), (ii) and (v) are trivial. For case (iii), we have h(G) =




































APPENDIX D. COMPARATIVE STATICS COMPUTATIONS FOR CHAPTER 6 233
Next, we consider the equity commitment:
Θ∗p ∼ param. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
α ± 0 0 0 0
γ + + 0 0 0
dL − − 0 0 0
R − − 0 0 0




∂α > 0 when R ≥ α and
∂Θ∗p
∂α < 0 otherwise. The relation between equity and model parameters
within pooling equilibria depends on the type of pooling equilibrium that arises. The sign of the relation is
generally consistent with that of the non-degenerate case (first column).
Computations for Table 22. For pooling equilibria, cases (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are




































≥ 0 when R ≥ α and ∂Θ∗p
∂α
< 0 otherwise.
We next develop the computations of the sensitivities of the welfare distribution, displayed
in Table 18. Computations for Table 18. The results follow from a straightforward
differentiation of the expressions presented in Proposition 6.4.1. The case that requires
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extra attention is when γ ≥ α > γe− dLγ . We arrive at
∂mK∗H,p
∂γ
= − α(1 + γ)2
(






= 1− γ log
γ
α
1 + γ > 0,
∂K∗C,p
∂γ
= − α(1 + γ)2
(









1 + γ < 0,
where we have used the fact that log γ
α
≥ 0 and γ log γ
α
≤ dL < 1. In addition, when












































> 0, and (II) when α = γe−
dL
γ we must have G∗p = dLγ , we conclude





Last, we present the computations for the sensitivities of the expected funding shortfall,
tabulated in Table 23.
Computations for Table 23. In view of tables 21 and 22, the only non-trivial case is
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E[Q∗p] ∼ param. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
α ± 0 0 − 0
γ − − 0 − 0
dL + + 0 0 0
R + + 0 + 0




∂α > 0 when R < α and
∂E[Q∗p]
∂α < 0 when R > 1 + 2α. The relation between systemic risk and
model parameters within pooling equilibria depends on the type of pooling equilibrium that arises. For






for non-degenerate pooling equilibria. We have
∂E[Q∗p]
∂α




















Using the parameters restrictions for non-degenerate pooling equilibria, we obtain














≥ γ − γR
α
.










< 0. Notice that the second case is
not vacuous since for case (i), α < γ, and thus R > 1 + 2α suffices.
Appendix E
Proofs for Chapter 6
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Observe that, for a fixed pH , if there exists (G ≥ 0,Θ = 0)
that satisfy Eqs. (6.8) and (6.9), then they necessarily maximize the expected profit of the
clearinghouse. Moreover, the clearinghouse is indifferent between which level of G prevails.
Recall that in this case, we assume that the clearinghouse chooses the minimum feasible
default fund requirement G.
Consider first the case G∗s = 0. Eqs. (6.8) and (6.9) are both satisfied if and only if
R ≤ dH−dL1−dL , in which case the equilibrium default fund level is zero. Otherwise, if R >
dH−dL
1−dL ,
the minimum possible default fund level G is a solution to
(R− αG)eG − dH − dL1− dH = 0.
Simple calculus shows that there is a unique solution G∗s ≤ Rα . This characterizes the
equilibrium default fund level. Finally, since the expected profit per member is K > 0 for
Θ = 0, the clearinghouse prefers full participation (p∗H = 1).
Proof of Lemma 6.2.. We start with the case Θ∗p = 0. Then the clearinghouse’s
expected profit is monotonically increasing in pL. In addition, since ds is decreasing in pL,
the feasible region given by Eq. (6.11) increases with pL. Thus p∗L = 1.
Next, consider the case Θ∗p > 0. From Lemma 6.1 we know that (IRL) is binding. Plugging
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in the constraint, we see that the clearinghouse’s objective can be rewritten as




Differentiating the transformed objective function J with respect to pL leads to
∂J
∂pL
= φ(1−m)B − (1−m)dLe−G + (1−m)(1− dL)1− dL
(
φB − αG+ dLe−G
)
= (1−m)(B − αG).
We now argue that the clearinghouse’s expected profit is increasing in pL. When B < αG,
the net outflows of the model economy exceed production, and the clearinghouse necessarily




p∗L = 1 in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6.2. We first consider the case Θ∗p = 0. This is always the
prevailing equilibrium should there exist G∗p ≥ 0 such that (G∗p,Θ∗p) is feasible. Using Lemma




subject to R− αG− γe−G ≥ 0.
Recall that when the clearinghouse is indifferent among default fund levels, we assume that
default funds are set to the minimum feasible level. Simple calculus shows that G∗p = 0 if
R ≥ γ, and is the unique solution to R − αG − γe−G = 0. This is smaller than R
α
− 1 if
R < γ, R
α
+ logα ≥ h¯(γ), and γ ≥ α. This gives the cases (iv) and (v).
Next, we consider the remaining cases, in which we must have Θ∗p > 0. By Lemma 6.1,
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(IRL) is binding. We can rewrite the clearinghouse’s problem as
max
G,Θ≥0





subject to R− αG+ dLe−G − (1− dL)D
S









= −m(dH − dL)e
−G
1− dL < 0.
Hence, J1 is concave in G and there is a unique maximizer given by ∂J1∂G = 0.
The solution to the first order condition is G˜ = log γ
α
. Plugging it into Eq. (E.1) gives













These quantities are the clearinghouse’s equilibrium choices if (G˜, Θ˜) ∈ R2+. G˜ ∈ R+ implies
γ ≥ α, whereas Θ˜ ∈ R+ implies h¯(γ) > Rα + logα > h(γ).
We observe that (I) the relation implied by h¯(γ) = R
α
+ logα, γ¯(α) = αeRα−1, is a
convex function of α satisfying lim
α→0+
γ¯(α) = lim
α→∞ γ¯(α) = ∞. Moreover, the minimum value
γ¯(α0) = R occurs at α0 = R; (II) the relation implied by h(γ) = Rα + logα, γ(α), is a convex
function of α satisfying lim
α→0+
γ(α) = lim
α→∞ γ(α) =∞. The minimum value occurs at α0 = R
and γ(α) ≥ α; (III) γ(α) ≥ γ¯(α) since h¯(γ) ≥ h(γ). Given R and dL, this implies that the
α− γ plane can be sectioned as presented in Figure 17.
Continuity of the maximum (Berge’s Maximum Theorem) implies that we can analyze
which of the constraints G ≥ 0, Θ ≥ 0, and Θ < ∞ are binding by looking at Figure 17.
Straightforwardly, we see that when the constraint h(γ) ≤ R
α
+ logα is violated, we have
Θ∗p = ∞ and G∗p solves Eq. (6.12). Next, when α > γ ≥ R, it is the constraint G ≥ 0 that
becomes binding. In this case, we must have G∗p = 0, which when plugged into Eq. (E.1)
gives Θ∗p = log dL+γdL+R . Notice that Θ
∗
p ∈ R+ since γ ≥ R. In addition, for α ≥ R, γ = R





7h(.) = R, + log,
h(.) = R, + log, . = ,
R
Figure 17: Sectioning of the α− γ plane.
The various constraints in the optimization problem section the parameter space into several regions. Our
analysis shows that the behavior of the optimal default resources depend critically on which region the
parameters are in.
implies Θ∗p = 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.3. See Tables 21 and 22.
Proof of Corollary 6.4. See Table 23
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Using the same argument as that of Lemma 6.1, we see that
one of the IR constraints must be binding in equilibrium.
For separating equilibria, the IR constraint of the risky members must then be binding.
In this case, the clearinghouse would set Θ∗s,I = Θ∗s if Θ ≥ θ were not binding. Thus, if
θ > Θ∗s, Θ∗s,I = θ and G∗s,I solves Eq. (6.17). The cases for pooling equilibria and Eq. (6.18)
follow analogously.
Proof of Proposition 6.4. For the case of separating equilibria, using implicit differ-







s,I (1− e−θ) > 0.
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p,I − (1− dL)DS e−G
∗
p,I−θ .
Hence, the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the denominator. We can compute:
α + dLe−G
∗




p,I−θ = α + dLe−G
∗
p,I − (γ + dL)e−G∗p,I−θ = α + αG∗p,I > 0.
Thus ∂G
∗
p,I
∂θ
> 0.
